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The American experience between the Civil 
War and World War I can perhaps be best 
understood as an attempt to reorder national 
life in the wake of a radical social and eco­
nomic disruption that was brought on by rapid 
industrialization. 
In California, even more than in other areas 
of the nation, fundamental and dramatic 
changes were to occur throughout the period 
as various sectors of the state's rapidly ex­
panding economy became both increasingly 
differentiated and more closely interdependent. 
Through a series of mergers and consolida­
tions, large, diversified, integrated, and multi­
level firms came to replace smaller, more 
specialized, independent, and single-level 
companies. Trade associations, marketing com­
bines, and other affiliations served to organize 
these emergent firms within each industry; 
and businessmen, acutely aware of a need for 
recognition of their status as members of a 
profession, began increasingly to act in con­
cert as a special-interest group, both in public, 
in their representations to legislative bodies, 
and in private, as apologists for commercial 
practice and as agents working to suppress 
competition and increase efficiency. 
Professor Blackford examines three of Cali­
fornia's more important basic productive in­
dustries—agriculture, oil, and lumber—and 
three of its principal supportive businesses — 
banking, investment banking, and insurance 
— together with two major issues that cut 
across industry lines: the growing movement 
to bring about state regulation of railroads 
and public utilities, and the effort to effect 
tax reform. The California experience, he finds, 
clearly suggests that on the local as well as 
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Preface 
In recent years historians have been reevaluating late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century American history. Led by the synthetic efforts of Samuel 
Hays and Robert Wiebe, they have recast much of the thinking on the 
nature of American society, culture, politics, and business during this 
period.1 Their studies stress the problems Americans faced in coming to 
grips with the rapid industrialization of their nation and suggest that much 
of the American experience between the Civil War and the First World War 
can best be understood as an attempt to reorder American life in the wake of 
social and economic disruption.2 Historians have come to view the re­
sponse of Americans to the disruption of their lives in terms of the growing 
organization of American society. This interpretation, which has become 
known as the "organizational synthesis," emphasizes the spread of 
bureaucratic organizations and the growth of professions, together with a 
heightened awareness of the need for order and efficiency, as the themes 
best explaining the course of American development in this period. As a 
corollary, many scholars adopting this approach have abandoned political 
discontinuities, and especially the dichotomy between reform and reac­
tion, as the key to the recent history of the United States. Rather, their 
interpretation stresses more the continuity of the response of Americans to 
the modernization of their nation.3 
In the following study I examine the findings of the organizational 
synthesis interpretation by analyzing how Californians, and particularly 
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various groups of California businessmen, reacted to the forces of 
economic change that were transforming their state between roughly 1890 
and 1920.1 deal with what were three of California's most important basic 
productive industries—agriculture, oil, and lumber—and three of its most 
significant supportive businesses—banking, investment banking, and in­
surance. In addition, I examine two major issues that cut across industry 
lines and that involved a wide variety of businessmen: state regulation of 
railroads and public utilities and tax reform movements. My account 
reveals that businessmen tried to solve their difficulties through a complex 
combination of private and public actions that, taken together, compose 
what I have labeled the "politics of business." In the private realm, 
businessmen restructured their firms and industries as they sought to 
control their changing economic environment while trying to achieve or 
maintain competitive advantages over each other. In the sphere of public 
politics, businessmen sought the same goals. Through state or, on occa­
sion, national legislation they hoped to both channel and limit the impact of 
the forces of change while also often using the altered economic situation to 
obtain competitive advantages. 
Historians have long been engaged in chronicling how businessmen 
restructured their firms and industries as they tried to cope with changes 
occurring in their business environment, but much remains to be done in 
this field.4 Business historians have prepared numerous company histories 
and studies of single industries; and, somewhat less frequently, historians 
like Alfred Chandler, Jr., have compared the experiences of businessmen 
in different companies and industries as a basis for generalization.5 These 
studies have proven to be intrinsically valuable and useful as building 
blocks for further research; but, because most of them have focused too 
closely upon the internal business decisions of management and the chang­
ing structures of business firms, they have missed much of the significance 
of the social and political environments within which businessmen operate. 
More efforts need to be made in connecting the private, internal-
management business decisions with the public, external environments 
surrounding businesses.6 
A growing number of historians have been trying to unravel the connec­
tions between the difficulties businessmen encountered as a result of the 
modernization of the American economy and their involvement in politics. 
Gabriel Kolko's analysis of the relationship between business and the 
Progressive movement broke new ground in this respect.7 Other studies, 
particularly those of Robert Wiebe, indicate, however, that Kolko's in­
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terpretation is simplistic and that patterns of business political engagement 
were considerably more complex than Kolko's work suggests.8 The ques­
tion of the extent to which businessmen influenced legislation and state 
regulation of their industries during the Progressive Era certainly requires 
closer inspection. And, in examining this subject historians can, perhaps, 
help political scientists and sociologists reach some conclusions on the 
more general question of the extent to which modern American govern­
ment has been pluralistic or elitist in nature.9 
By investigating how businessmen in one specific locale, the state of 
California, responded to economic modernization, I hope to strike a 
balance between specialization and generalization. My study should add to 
our still incomplete knowledge of the economic and political development 
of California. Although not a detailed analysis of all aspects of the Progres­
sive movement in the Golden State, my work should also supplement, and 
in places modify, the interpretations of the movement put forward by 
George Mowry and Spencer Olin, Jr.10 Their works deal, of course, with 
much more than the business legislation of this period, but my findings 
suggest that, at least in this realm of study, their conclusions need to be 
reexamined. I hope, too, that my research will help explain in more depth 
the interaction between groups of businessmen and state officials in the 
formulation of economic policy and legislation in California, a task ably 
begun by the historian Gerald Nash.n I believe my work has implications 
for the study of recent American history in general. In the broadest terms, 
this investigation should heighten our understanding of the ways 
businessmen and others sought to control and take advantage of their 
changing economic environment through an intricate combination of pri­
vate and public actions. More specifically, I hope my study will provide 
some insight into the workings of the American political system, and 
especially the question of whether it has been elitist or pluralistic in recent 
times. 
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California's Changing Economy 
Addressing a meeting of his colleagues in 1904, one of California's leading 
insurance men observed that although his "business was constantly chang­
ing," at the present time ' 'the changes are revolving with such velocity that 
some of us are made dizzy by the mere contemplation of them."1 
Businessmen throughout California frequently voiced similar sentiments, 
for, even more than most other areas of the nation, California's economy 
experienced fundamental alterations in the late nineteenth and early twen­
tieth centuries.2 Industries previously only in their formative stages 
emerged as the leading sectors of California's economy, and the various 
segments of the state's economy became both increasingly differentiated 
and interdependent. Accompanying these developments were regional 
shifts in the Golden State's commerce, finance, and manufacturing. 
Economic Development 
As was true throughout the United States, railroads were the key to 
economic development in California, for they linked the different sections 
of the state and provided Californians with access to markets in the East and 
Midwest.3 The completion of transcontinental connections by the Union 
Pacific and Central Pacific in 1869 heralded a bright future for California. 
Seven years later the Southern Pacific drove its rails south through the San 
Joaquin Valley and in 1883 finished its line to New Orleans. Shortly 
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afterward, the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe entered Los Angeles from 
Texas, and in 1898 it extended its operations to the San Joaquin Valley. 
Farther north, the Southern Pacific constructed branches through the Sac­
ramento Valley in the 1880s and 1890s, and the Western Pacific invaded 
the region in the early twentieth century with a line from Salt Lake City to 
Oakland. By 1910, California possessed four direct transcontinental con­
nections and a web of feeder lines that reached every part of the state except 
the northwest corner around Eureka and Humboldt Bay.4 The spread of this 
railroad network spurred the development of big business in California. 
The opening of new markets and the advent of irrigation brought intensive 
agriculture to California, and fruits and vegetables soon displaced wheat as 
the state's leading crop. In the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California 
the development of the oil industry added another new element to Califor­
nia's economic growth. Farther north, along the coast above San Francisco 
and in the Sierra Nevadas, redwood and pine lumbering operations 
emerged as major enterprises for the first time. 
When Frank Norris described large-scale wheat ranching as the principal 
activity of California farmers in his novel The Octopus in 1901, his 
observations had already become outdated, for the production of wheat 
was yielding to diversified fruit growing as the chief occupation of the 
state's agriculturalists. In 1890, California ranked second among the 
nation's wheat-growing states with an output of over 40 million bushels, 
but in succeeding years production dropped drastically. The fall in produc­
tion so alarmed the San Francisco merchants who handled the wheat trade 
that in 1905 they obtained funding from the state legislature for a study by 
agronomists at the University of California to suggest ways to reverse the 
trend. The report's recommendations helped little. Soil exhaustion, in­
creased competition with grain from Russia and Argentina, and the com­
pletion of railroad links between California and the rest of the nation, 
which made the growing of perishable crops for eastern markets possible, 
all contributed to the demise of the bonanza wheat ranches. By 1916, 
Californians were growing only about 4 million bushels annually.5 
The rise of fruit growing was as dramatic as the decline in wheat 
production. In the first decade of the twentieth century the value of 
California's fruits and nuts jumped from $28,809,830 to $48,917,655 to 
overtake the value of the state's wheat crop.6 Farmers expended so much 
effort on fruit that about one-half of the livestock and wheat consumed in 
California came from out of state.7 Acknowledging this shift in production 
patterns, the California Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped relating sea­
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sonal unemployment to the annual cycle of hay and wheat growing and 
began connecting it with the vagaries of fruit and vegetable crops.8 
California had been the home of citrus and deciduous fruits since 
mission days, but only in the 1880s and 1890s did large-scale production 
become economically feasible. Scientific advances by growers and gov­
ernmental officials in combating diseases, improving stocks, and perfect­
ing soil-sampling methods prepared the way. The work of the state board of 
viticulture in fighting phylloxera, a blight that attacked grape vines, and the 
efforts of the state horticultural commissioner in eliminating the cotton­
cushiony scale that ravaged orange groves proved especially valuable.9 
Irrigation facilitated the spread of the orange culture south to the Tehachapi 
and the growth of intensive agriculture in the San Joaquin and Sacramento 
valleys. As early as 1891, irrigators in Kern County had constructed 
ditches capable of floating boats of several hundred tons, and hydroelectric 
projects began supplying power for pumps seven years later. By 1902, 
California had nearly 2 million acres under irrigation, one-quarter of the 
nation's total, and, within three years more, irrigated farms accounted for 
one-third of the value of California's agricultural production.10 
If scientific research by state officials and the adoption of irrigation 
spurred the output of fruit and vegetables, it was the coming of the railroad 
that insured their dominance over wheat. As a nonperishable, wheat could 
endure lengthy sea voyages to Liverpool and other distribution points and 
did not require rail connections, but fruits and vegetables, if they were to 
reach other than local markets, needed the speedy service that railroads 
alone could provide.11 California quickly became the nation s fruit bowl. 
The development of ventilator and refrigerator cars and the discovery of 
ways to pre-cool fruit before shipment opened national markets for perish­
able commodities. In 1886, growers sent their first entire trainload of 
oranges east, and within five years Californians were dispatching 18,693 
carloads of fruits and nuts to out-of-state destinations.12 By 1906, the 
shipments had risen to 81,976 carloads, and they continued to climb in 
succeeding years.13 In 1916, over 400 carloads left California each day at 
the peak of the shipping season, and the state horticultural commissioner 
estimated that California's farmers were sending over 90 percent of their 
fruit beyond the state's boundaries.14 
Lumbering, though it too existed in California before the American 
conquest, became a big business only in later years. When California 
attained statehood, redwood mills were running at Santa Cruz, Redwood 
City, Mill Valley, and Bodega Bay, and in the following decade lumber­
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men began operations farther north in Mendocino, Humboldt, and Del 
Norte counties. The mills had a hard time handling the large redwood logs 
(lumbermen sometimes used black powder to split them into convenient 
sizes), and their capacity was small. The first mill in Humboldt County 
turned out only 600 board feet per day. With the introduction of new 
techniques in the 1860s and 1870s, however, production mounted. Be­
tween 1861 and 1880 17 redwood mills, each with a daily output exceeding 
30,000 board feet, went into business to supply the expanding San Francis­
co market. In the Sierra Nevadas lumbermen got their start cutting pine to 
meet the needs of miners for timbering and flumes. When mining declined, 
its loss was offset by the demands of fruit growers for lumber used in 
making boxes and by the needs of builders in the state's expanding cities. 
In 1855, California possessed 80 sawmills. Twenty-five years later the 
number had grown to about 250, and their combined yearly output totalled 
over 300 million board feet. Yet, despite these increases California ranked 
only fifteenth among the nation*s timber-producing states in 1890. Eastern 
forests and the Great Lakes region still supplied most of the lumber 
requirements of the United States.15 
National markets played a significant role in the development of 
California's lumber industry in succeeding years. Eastern firms, hoping to 
serve the national market, began operations in California, and companies 
already there began looking beyond their state's boundaries for customers. 
In 1889, the Excelsior Redwood Company became the first lumber firm to 
break into eastern markets. Despite high railroad rates, redwood operators 
exported about one-sixth of their lumber by 1900, and they sold nearly half 
of this amount on the eastern seaboard. Twenty years later one-quarter of 
the state's redwood went to purchasers east of the Rocky Mountains. As the 
cut of Great Lakes timber dwindled, pine men braved competition from 
Pacific Northwest to ship ever greater amounts of their output to eastern 
buyers.16 Pushed out by the depletion of most of the virgin timber in the 
Great Lakes states and attracted by the possibility of profits farther west, a 
number of lumber firms migrated to California. 
As early as 1883, a Buffalo syndicate purchased 60,000 acres of red­
wood land in Humboldt County, and later in the decade a group of 
Michigan and Wisconsin businessmen organized the Usal Lumber Com­
pany with a large mill in Mendocino County. Not until the turn of the 
century, however, did this migration assume the shape of a mass move­
ment. The amount of capital invested in California's lumber industry 
doubled between 1899 and 1904, as eastern lumbermen moved into both 
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the pine and redwood forests. The lumber output of the Pacific Coast states 
surpassed that of the Great Lakes region in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, and by 1920 California stood fifth among the lumber-producing 
states of the nation.17 
Californians had long known about the presence of oil in their state, but, 
as in lumbering, the production of petroleum became a major industry only 
in the late nineteenth century. Access to national markets proved less 
important in the exploitation of oil than in that of other of California's 
natural resources. Prohibitive railroad rates and the lack of pipeline con­
nections prevented Californians from sending their petroleum east. 
California oil found few outlets beyond the West Coast, and only rarely did 
Californians import petroleum from eastern fields.18 Indians had used 
asphaltum in the Spanish and Mexican periods, and in 1853 the first state 
geologist listed it as one of California's commonest minerals. The success 
of E. L. Drake's oil well in Pennsylvania stimulated drilling in other 
regions, and California experienced its first oil boom in the 1860s. How­
ever, petroleum hunters discovered few paying properties, and the boom 
collapsed by the end of the decade. As late as 1890, California was 
producing only 307,360 barrels annually. Technological problems hin­
dered development. California's geologic structure differed from forma­
tions encountered in eastern fields, and the failure to understand the 
differences thwarted the search for oil. When they did find petroleum, oil 
men found it difficult to penetrate California's jumbled rock formations by 
drilling methods devised in the East. During the 1860s they extracted more 
petroleum by digging wells with picks and shovels or by tunneling into 
hillsides than by drilling wells. The first producing well in the San Joaquin 
Valley was dug by hand and reached a depth of only ten feet. The chemical 
properties of California oil presented a still more serious obstacle, for they 
made it nearly impossible to use the crude as a base for high-grade 
kerosene. Since petroleum had not yet demonstrated its value as a fuel, this 
impediment severely limited the market for California oil.19 
In the late 1890s and early 1900s California oil men solved their 
problems, and production soared. As their knowledge of the state's geol­
ogy increased, oil seekers looking for new fields placed less reliance on 
surface indications, like oil seepages, and concentrated more on the under­
lying structural formations. As a result, they were more successful in 
finding new oil pools and wasted less time and money on dry holes. The 
introduction of rotary drilling allowed them to probe previously inaccessi­
ble areas. Progress in refining enabled Californians to use more of their 
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crude for kerosene, but of greater importance was the growth in demand for 
crude as a fuel for locomotives, ships, and factories on the West Coast. At 
the annual convention of the California Miners' Association in 1900, the 
organization's president noted that it was whispered "that you oil men 
expect before long that your industry will outstrip that of gold mining." 
His premonitions proved correct. Within less than a decade the value of 
California's yearly output of petroleum had nearly doubled that of gold, 
and the oil men had broken away from the California Miners Association 
to set up their own organization. By 1914, California led the nation with a 
production of over 100 million barrels of crude.20 
As was the case in agriculture and lumbering (and, to a lesser degree, in 
the oil business), the financial institutions that developed to serve Califor­
nia's basic productive industries became more and more closely tied to the 
national economy. As the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s and the panic 
of 1907 demonstrated, California bankers grew increasingly susceptible to 
country-wide influences. The depression California suffered from in the 
1870s had its origins in mainly local rather than national causes. When the 
Bank of California closed its doors in 1875, it did so largely because of its 
president's disastrous involvement in the financing of Nevada's Comstock 
Lode. National events affected California bankers much more directly in 
later periods. In both 1893 and 1907 the state's banks were caught with 
large deposits of specie in New York and Chicago, and the refusal of 
eastern bankers to release these funds led to the closing of many California 
banks.21 Like bankers, insurance men felt the effects of national occur­
rences. The findings of the New York investigation into life insurance in 
1905 altered insurance practices in California. Similarly, the decisions of 
the country's leading insurance firms, which did most of the life and fire 
business in California, sometimes influenced the state's economy as a 
whole. The desire of major insurance companies to increase their invest­
ments in California's industries added a fillip to the development of the 
Golden State in the opening years of the twentieth century. 
Just as California's emergent businesses became linked with the nation 
as a whole, so the different regions and industries within the state grew 
increasingly interdependent, until no businessman could escape the con­
sequences of the actions of his fellows. The spread of rail network within 
California proved essential, for instance, in the development of the oil 
industry. Before the construction of pipeline systems, railroads carried 
crude from the fields to refineries and markets in the San Francisco Bay 
area and Los Angeles. The railroads, in turn, converted their locomotives 
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to burn crude and quickly became the best customers of the oil companies. 
Few relationships were so mutually beneficial. By stripping mountain 
watersheds of their cover lumbermen adversely influenced stream flow and 
injured the fortunes of agriculturalists dependent on irrigation. Similarly, 
conflicts arose between farmers who needed water for irrigation and 
hydroelectric companies trying to supply the power requirements of the 
state's burgeoning urban population. 
Regional Shifts in the Economy 
Regional shifts in California's economy accompanied the development 
of new business. Nowhere was this clearer than in the numerous battles 
waged between towns and cities for control over their localities, and 
particularly in the contest between San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
Oakland for hegemony over the entire state. The integration of California's 
economy brought merchants and businessmen from throughout the state 
into competition with each other and threatened to disrupt an already 
unstable economic situation. 
In 1878, the historian John Hittell could accurately describe San Fran­
cisco as "the metropolis" of the Far West.22 Yet, by the close of the 1890s 
the residents of Seattle and Portland had shattered the dominion San 
Franciscans had once maintained over the Pacific Coast, and within 
another decade Los Angeles and Oakland were challenging San Francisco 
within California. These cities ended San Francisco's control over trade 
with the state's interior valleys, foreign commerce, and manufacturing. 
The contest for the interior of California centered upon the San Joaquin 
Valley. The conversion from wheat ranching to smaller farms growing 
fruits, nuts, and vegetables heightened the valley's importance as a market 
for goods and a supplier of agricultural products. The discovery of oil in its 
southern reaches also attracted the eyes of businessmen. The commercial 
conquest of the valley depended upon the railroad. Whomever the rates 
favored had an often insurmountable advantage over its adversaries, and 
the battle for the valley revolved around the attempts of merchants to obtain 
favorable rates and block the similar efforts of their opponents. 
The struggle for control of the valley, which had been developing since 
the 1880s, intensified after 1906. The merchants of Los Angeles took 
advantage of the confusion following the San Francisco earthquake and fire 
to penetrate north of Bakersfield into "substantially the entire Valley."23 
Officials of the Southern Pacific Railroad favored this increase in Los 
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Angeles's trade and set rates that discriminated against San Franciscans. 
By sending traffic east via Los Angeles and New Orleans they avoided 
sharing profits with the Union Pacific that controlled the northern route east 
of Ogden, Utah.24 San Francisco businessmen soon spotted this threat to 
their livelihood and in early 1908 set up a traffic bureau to "resist at­
tempted encroachments'' upon their trade territories.25 The Traffic Bureau 
petitioned the state railroad commission to restructure freight rates into and 
out of the valley, but because of the strong opposition of Los Angeles 
businessmen its efforts proved fruitless. The commission upheld rates 
favoring Los Angeles. Moreover, arguing that increased traffic justified 
lower rates, its members reduced class rates and most commodity rates 
from Los Angeles northward.26 The rich plum of the San Joaquin Valley 
slipped from the grasp of San Franciscans, and much of its trade moved to 
market along new routes. 
Challenges to San Francisco's supremacy in foreign commerce accom­
panied the narrowing of the city's inland hinterland. By 1911, court 
decisions and legislative actions had broken the grip the Southern Pacific 
Railroad once held over the waterfronts of Oakland and Los Angeles.27 
The tidelands were declared state property; all that remained was to transfer 
title from the state to the cities. Meanwhile, San Francisco s rivals had 
already begun to carve out deep water ports. Los Angeles had started the 
construction of an outer breakwater at San Pedro, and Oakland already 
handled about 30 percent of the freight tonnage passing through the Golden 
Gate.28 
Any problem involving San Francisco's waterfront was complicated, 
because the State Board of Harbor Commissioners appointed by the gover­
nor controlled its port. Furthermore, bond issues for the improvement of 
the harbor had to win approval from the state legislature and then gain a 
majority in a statewide referendum. When San Francisco had been Califor­
nia's only major port, this system worked fairly well, but, as other ports 
rose in prominence, San Franciscans complained that state regulation 
worked to their disadvantage. As the population of other areas increased 
more rapidly than that of their own city, San Franciscans feared they might 
lose control of the board and worried that the board would take actions 
injurious to their city's economic growth. Moreover, San Franciscans 
recognized that, as time went on, they would have less and less control 
over the passage of bond issues for the development of their port and feared 
that unfavorable statewide votes on future bond flotations might imperil 
their city's commercial greatness.29 
The contest for California s ocean traffic exploded in the 1911 legisla­
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tive session. When representatives from Los Angeles and Oakland intro­
duced a bill transferring the state-held waterfronts to their cities, the 
business organizations and legislators of San Francisco rallied as a unit in 
opposition. San Franciscans believed that, should this measure pass, 
Oakland and Los Angeles would be able to establish port charges lower 
than their own. Because their city's harbor fees were set by the state board, 
which used them as a source of revenue, San Franciscans felt they would be 
unable to meet the competition of other ports. San Francisco businessmen 
also expressed fear of the growing power that the rest of the state had over 
bond issues needed for the development of their harbor facilities.30 
The resolution of the political conflict foreshadowed San Francisco's 
loss of economic power. The tidelands controversy was finally settled, not 
in the legislative halls, but in a private meeting between representatives of 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the business organizations of 
San Francisco. San Franciscans agreed to withdraw their opposition to the 
transfer in return for pledges of support on future harbor bond issues and for 
backing San Francisco as the site for a world's fair in 1915. Several days 
after the conference the San Francisco merchant bodies wired their city's 
delegation at Sacramento to vote for the tidelands measure, and it passed 
without dissent.31 This compromise worried many San Franciscans, and 
with good reason. Within little more than a decade Los Angeles handled 
more freight tonnage than their port, and Oakland was close behind.32 
While failing to retain command of their state's ocean traffic, San 
Franciscans also faced increasingly stiff competition from Oakland and 
Los Angeles as industrial centers. The earthquake and fire of 1906 slowed 
San Francisco's industrial advance. The value of its manufactured products 
rose only from $107,024,000 to $133,041,000 in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Some firms moved to Oakland and Los Angeles, and 
relatively few new ones located in San Francisco. The value of goods 
manufactured in Los Angeles climbed from $15,134,000 to $68,586,000 
and the corresponding figures for Oakland were $5,368,000 and 
$22,343,000.33 To halt this trend San Francisco business and civic groups 
fostered a drive for "home patronage of home industry'' and tried to lower 
costs of production by breaking labor unions in their city.34 However, 
despite their efforts, Los Angeles moved ahead in the 1920s as a center for 
oil refineries, rubber plants, and motion pictures; and by 1930, the value of 
these and other productions surpassed that of San Francisco's manufac­
turers.35 
Population movements reflected the modifications in California s 
economy. After rising only 22 percent in the 1890s (the lowest rate of 
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growth in the state's history), California's population soared from 
1,485,053 to 2,377,549 in the first decade of the twentieth century. This 
increase was distributed unevenly, for most of the newcomers settled in 
Southern California or the Central Valley. The population of Los Angeles 
rose 212 percent, to 319,198, a figure rivaling that of San Francisco's 
416,912 inhabitants. In 1903, the California State Board of Trade com­
mented upon the ' 'pronounced and strikingly noticeable movement into the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley" as small fruit and vegetable farms 
replaced the bonanza wheat ranches. Between 1900 and 1910 the popula­
tion of the San Joaquin Valley doubled, and that of the Sacramento 
Valley also increased, though at a slower pace. Even in the Bay Area, 
San Francisco no longer remained the only major locus of population. As 
an industrial and shipping center Oakland grew from a large town of 
66,960 to a city of 150,174, and Berkeley tripled its population to 
40,434.36 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then, California's 
economy underwent basic alterations. As new industries arose and patterns 
of trade and commerce changed, businessmen wondered what they could 
expect next. The coming of the railroad, more than any other single 
element, upset conditions in the Golden State. Many Californians asked, 
with Henry George, "What is the railroad to do for us, this railroad we 
have looked for, hoped for, prayed for so long?"37 The answer to this 
question, and the more general one of how to cope with the changing 
economy of their state and nation, was not readily apparent to California 
businessmen. Yet they did realize, if sometimes only partially and incor­
rectly, that the growing complexity of their economic situation required 
alterations in their business methods; and, like businessmen throughout the 
United States, they relied upon a wide range of strategies to solve their 
problems. Many tried to insulate their firms from market fluctuations by 
vertical and horizontal integration. On the industry-wide level, 
businessmen sought to stabilize economic conditions and rationalize busi­
ness practices through the formation of trade associations and various types 
of agreements between their companies. Few of these efforts, however, 
proved completely successful. Unable to resolve their problems by volun­
tary means, businessmen frequently turned to the state legislature for aid. 
So often, in fact, that at many points the story of how they met their 
difficulties becomes an analysis of their maneuverings in Sacramento. 
Agriculture: Growers Against Consumers 
California's farmers, like other of the state's businessmen, found both 
grave problems and glittering opportunities in the shifting structure of their 
state's economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Most pressing was the need to tap national markets for their new products. 
From the beginning of the 1880s the specter of overproduction spurred the 
establishment of national marketing arrangements, for the cultivation of 
fruits and vegetables outstripped the consumption needs of Californians. 
At the same time, the construction of a railroad network connecting 
California with the other sections of the nation opened the pleasing pros­
pect of highly profitable outlets for their produce in the urban centers of the 
Midwest and eastern seaboard. To penetrate these new markets and boost 
their profits, California's agriculturalists led the nation's farmers in adopt­
ing novel marketing techniques. 
The Cooperative Marketing Movement 
Fruit and vegetable growers in California first sought to solve their 
problems and seize the advantages of producing for the national market 
through the establishment of cooperative marketing associations. The 
organization of cooperative marketing bodies would, they hoped, allow 
them to rationalize their shipments to eastern points, limit competition 
within their ranks, and raise the prices they received for their goods. 
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Beyond these general goals, California's farmers often anticipated that 
they could lower their specific costs of production and distribution by 
organizing. They desired, in particular, to win concessions on railroad 
rates from the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific lines, while also 
obtaining better and speedier service. 
Even before the Civil War a few American farmers set up cooperative 
marketing associations to dispose of their produce at a profit. In the late 
nineteenth century, the number of these organizations rose, and many 
became affiliated with larger regional bodies like the Grange and Farmers 
Alliances, some of which participated in general political and social reform 
movements. In the early years of the twentieth century, farmers began 
organizing more single-mindedly to market specific crops, and in 1907, the 
United States Department of Agriculture could report that over one 
thousand selling associations existed throughout the nation. Though most 
of these bodies dealt with dairy products and cereal crops, cooperatives 
also handled fruit in Florida, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon as well as 
in California.1 
Californians took an active part in the cooperative marketing campaign, 
but their cooperative movement differed significantly from the drive in 
other parts of the nation. Most importantly, Californians recognized earlier 
than other farmers the need to concentrate their attention on economic 
grievances. Though not eschewing politics (the Populist party in California 
drew much of its strength from farmers), they always, even in the 1890s, 
focused their energies upon forming efficient national marketing systems. 
The nature of their crops—the transformation of the bonanza wheat 
ranches into highly capitalized farms using irrigation to raise specialized 
types of produce—meant that California s fruit and vegetable growers had 
to be more businesslike in their approach to farming than agriculturalists 
elsewhere. 
As tough-minded businessmen, California's farmers took their cue from 
industrialists in using collective action to cope with their difficulties. 
Farmers viewed the rise of labor unions and large corporations as portents 
of the future and as models of organization they should follow. Thus, 
Governor James Gillette, speaking before the California Fruit Growers 
Association in 1909, evoked prolonged applause when he urged farmers to 
emulate the steps lumber barons, railroad executives, and the owners of 
copper mines were taking to control the markets for their goods.2 Yet, 
although admitting that market control was their main objective, farmers 
also pointed out the benefits accruing to the rest of society from their 
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organizations. They claimed that their cooperatives, by improving the 
system of distribution, would eliminate waste and lower the costs of 
products to consumers. As A. L. Wisker of the Loma Rica Nurseries 
explained, "a trust is simply cooperation gone wrong."3 Expanding their 
arguments, some growers urged that all of society be organized along 
cooperative lines. Many endorsed the sentiments of William Glass, a 
prominent grape grower and past president of the Fresno Chamber of 
Commerce, when, in a paper presented before the California Fruit Growers 
Association in 1920, he called for the sale of "all products, agricultural, 
horticultural, industrial production, by cooperative marketing."4 
Citrus fruit growers began the drive for organization. By the middle of 
the 1870s they were raising more oranges and lemons than could be 
consumed in California and faced the threat of overproduction and low 
prices. Moreover, as arrangements then existed, the grower bore most of 
the risks but received little of the profit from the sale of his fruit. He had 
only two options by which to dispose of his crop. If he consigned it for sale 
by an eastern commission firm, he was apt to suffer high losses caused by 
spoilage and rough handling en route to market. Alternately, if he decided 
to sell his fruit on the tree directly to an eastern buyer, he often encountered 
combinations among the purchasers and frequently received such artifi­
cially low prices that he failed to cover his costs of operations. Whichever 
method they chose, growers had to contend with the danger of glutted 
markets. Lacking any central body to direct their shipments, they sent their 
fruit east in a haphazard fashion, and, as a result, most markets experienced 
periods of feast and famine, a situation leading to uncontrollable price 
fluctuations.5 
Citrus growers first tried to organize with the formation of the Orange 
Growers Protective Union in 1885. Established after a year of particularly 
bad losses, the union aimed at instituting a new system of distribution that 
would, its proponents hoped, deliver the growers from the "deadly em­
brace" of eastern buyers and consignment men. However, concerted 
attacks by the middlemen, who deeply resented this challenge to their 
profits and control over the citrus industry, killed this venture. Buyers and 
consignment agents formed associations that competed with the union and 
refused to handle its fruit except at prohibitive charges. Deprived of 
outlets, the union collapsed. A period of financial anarchy that became 
known in the citrus fruit trade as "the red ink years" followed the 
organization^ demise. Speculative buying, market gluts, and chronic 
price swings threatened the very survival of the growers. Continuing their 
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quest for security and profits, citrus fruit men again turned to collective 
marketing. In 1895, they set up the Southern California Fruit Exchange, 
and within eight years this body was handling nearly half of the state's 
oranges. The exchange brought temporary prosperity to its members, but 
in 1903 it disastrously overreached itself by combining with eastern ship­
ping interests as the California Fruit Agency. Within a year this unnatural 
alliance of dealers and growers fell apart in mutual acrimony.6 
Following this dissolution, the growers revamped the old Southern 
California Fruit Growers Exchange. Soon renamed the California Fruit 
Growers Exchange, this organization began operations in late 1904. Learn­
ing from their past experiences, the growers sought through this exchange 
to control all phases of the fruit business for California's entire orange and 
lemon crops. Only in this way could, its advocates thought, growers 
regulate prices and assure themselves of profit. As the exchange's manager 
noted in 1911, "in the early days of the industry, when output was small," 
it was easy to get "enough money for California oranges under the old 
methods to satisfy the grower and at the same time to give the shippers a 
very large remuneration for their services.'' But, he continued,'' when the 
output began to increase rapidly" cooperative marketing became neces­
sary to avoid market gluts and guarantee the grower a proper share of the 
profits.7 
The California Fruit Growers Exchange possessed three levels of or­
ganization, each of which served a different function. The individual 
growers formed local associations that were responsible for picking, grad­
ing, and packing the fruit. Members agreed to sell their entire output 
through these bodies. The associations pooled the fruit of their members 
according to grade and time picked and prorated the returns from sales 
among those in each particular pool. The local associations delegated the 
handling of actual sales to district exchanges. Based upon information 
furnished by a central body, district officers routed the shipments to 
market, sending cars only to those destinations which they thought could 
absorb more fruit. Local associations maintained the individuality of their 
fruit on paper throughout these transactions. Pooling never took place 
between local organizations, and the receipts of a local association came 
solely from the price obtained for its fruit. The capstone holding together 
these various groups was the central exchange that coordinated the work of 
all the district exchanges by sending them daily reports on fruit markets 
throughout the nation. In addition to this service the central body supported 
selling agents in hundreds of cities to supervise the final disposal of its 
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members' fruit and insure receipt of the highest possible prices. The central 
exchange also set uniform quality standards for fruit packed by the local 
associations and advertised the exchange's products nationally under the 
"Sunkist" label.8 
Within a decade the California Fruit Growers Exchange had organized 
most of California's citrus fruit industry. By 1917, it contained over 8,000 
growers affiliated in 117 local associations and 17 district exchanges, 
which marketed about two-thirds of the state's oranges and lemons. The 
exchange dampened price fluctuations but could not completely end them. 
Some growers remained outside its ranks, and their uncoordinated ship­
ments, combined with those of the Florida growers (who in 1915produced 
about 40 percent of the nation's orange crop), made occasional gluts 
unavoidable.9 Although it failed to gain absolute market control, the 
exchange did secure larger profits for its members, mainly by reducing the 
costs involved in packing, shipping, and selling their fruit. By purchasing 
timberlands and operating lumber mills the exchange lowered the cost of 
lumber used in fabricating boxes. Concerted actions brought freight rate 
reductions and rebates from the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroads, 
and growers working through the exchange found it easier to settle damage 
claims with the lines. Before the establishment of the California Fruit 
Growers Exchange, shippers and commission men had charged from 7 to 
10 percent to handle a grower's crop, but by 1915 the exchange had 
decreased the total cost of distribution, marketing, and advertising to about 
2xh. percent of the delivered value of the fruit. The manager of the exchange 
could, with considerable justification, claim in 1914 that his organization 
was "not only less expensive," but also "more comprehensive than any 
other crop marketing service yet developed."10 
The deciduous fruit men labored under many of the same hardships as 
the citrus fruit growers. Soaring production made access to new markets a 
necessity.11 Yet, an inefficient system of distribution caused frequent 
market gluts and wide price swings. Even when growers guessed correctly 
and sent their cars to the right destinations, middlemen and shippers 
skimmed off much of the profit. Nor could the growers, as individuals, win 
much in the way of concessions from the railroads, and, even more than the 
citrus fruit growers, they required special handling and fast transportation 
to avoid damage to their products. In addition to these problems the 
deciduous fruit producers faced a difficulty unknown to the orange and 
lemon growers. Their crops were much more diversified. Apricots, 
peaches, apples, cherries, plums, and pears were among the deciduous 
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fruits raised in California (grapes were also usually treated as a deciduous 
fruit). To find a common ground among the growers of such varied fruits 
proved nearly impossible, for each type of crop had its own special 
problems in cultivation, packing, shipping, and marketing. 
Deciduous fruit growers responded to their dilemmas by forming two 
types of cooperative marketing associations. Like the citrus fruit men, they 
tried to organize the entire range of production in a single association, but 
neither the degree of market control nor the savings gained by the citrus 
growers proved obtainable for deciduous fruit producers by this method. 
At the same time that they were experimenting with industry-wide bodies, 
the deciduous growers set up marketing associations to deal with single, 
specific crops. 
Deciduous fruit men made the first substantial effort to organize their 
industry with the establishment of the California Fruit Union in 1885. Set 
up as a corporation whose stock was owned solely by growers, the union, 
though concerned with railroad rates and service, sought mainly to control 
the distribution of fruit sent to urban centers in the East. Shipments through 
this body rose from 60 million pounds in 1886 to 160 million pounds seven 
years later, but its share of the out-of-state business dropped from 44 to 33 
percent in the same period. Several reasons account for the decline and 
final demise of the California Fruit Union. The onset of the general 
business depression hurt the growers, but more responsible for the failure 
of the union were two actions of its directors. In 1887, contrary to the 
organization's original constitution, they admitted nonproducers engaged 
in the buying and selling of fruit to stock ownership, and this arrangement 
split the union into bickering sections. The other mistake was to sign 
long-term contracts to deliver all of the union s fruit to one eastern buyer. 
This decision was soon costing growers profits they could have earned 
from competitive bidding.12 
The disbanding of the California Fruit Union left the deciduous growers 
in disarray for over a decade. Random shipments followed by market gluts 
made it impossible to benefit much even from the short crop of 1894, and 
railroad rates remained onerous and service slow. The forced return to 
consignment sales at closed auctions further aggravated the other difficul­
ties. In early 1895, the growers sought to end their chronic problems by 
joining together in the California Fruit Growers' and Shippers' Associa­
tion. The association's members moved quickly to rationalize the distribu­
tion of out-of-state fruit shipments. As one prominent fruit man explained, 
growers had for the past season "been groping around in the dark," and 
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were "constantly sending fruit to markets already overcrowded with 
California products." To improve their condition the growers set up a 
bureau of information to provide themselves with data on deciduous fruit 
shipments throughout the nation. A committee on transportation secured 
promises of five-day ventilator car service to Chicago from the freight 
manager of the Southern Pacific, and other members worked to remove 
abuses from auction sales. However, this association did not try to sell any 
fruit itself, and most growers looked upon it simply as a stopgap that they 
would abandon as soon as an organization with marketing powers could be 
established.13 
After several more years of sporadic progress the growers succeeded in 
forming a statewide marketing association. At a meeting held in Sac­
ramento in 1899 fruit growers voiced particularly strong complaints about 
shipping charges and poor market conditions. A conference held in Fresno 
a year later took actions to end these problems. A committee set up at this 
meeting issued a call for a convention to organize a marketing cooperative, 
and in 1901 the deciduous fruit growers formed the California Fresh Fruit 
Exchange.14 
A federated type of organization, the exchange (retitled the California 
Fruit Exchange in 1903) closely followed the lines of the Southern Califor­
nia Fruit Growers Exchange. Local packing associations sold their fruit 
through a central body that routed shipments to their destinations on the 
basis of all available market information. Salaried agents in most of the 
major and many of the secondary eastern cities assured exchange members 
of good prices for their fruit. The association worked to end consignment 
sales and shifted some of the risk of transit losses to the buyers. To hold a 
place for California produce on eastern markets, it also maintained uniform 
grades for its members' fruit and established easily recognized brand 
15 names.
The California Fruit Exchange was soon dealing in both cured and fresh 
deciduous fruits and rapidly expanded its activities. The 14 local associa­
tions affiliated with it in 1909 grew in number to 63 only fifteen years later, 
and the volume of its business rose from the shipment of only 201 cars in 
1901 to 6,281 in 1921. Yet, the exchange failed to gain market control. 
Even in 1921 it handled less than one-quarter of any deciduous fruit crop. 
Many growers preferred marketing cooperatives like the California Peach 
Growers Association, which because they dealt in only one specific fruit 
were felt to be more attuned to the individual grower s needs. The competi­
tion of fruit from other parts of the nation—apples from the Northwest and 
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peaches from Georgia—also made control impossible. The exchange did, 
however, achieve some success in raising the profits of the growers. It 
maintained a standing committee on transportation that successfully 
petitioned for rate reductions and faster service from the transcontinental 
railroads, and, again like the citrus growers, the deciduous fruit men 
entered into the cooperative production and purchasing of supplies to 
further reduce their costs. The exchange cut the expense of handling fruit to 
only 2lh percent of its retail value.16 
Many deciduous fruit growers joined cooperative marketing associa­
tions selling only one type of fruit, for by specializing in one particular 
crop, they believed they had a better chance of mastering market vagaries. 
Some single product cooperatives existed as early as the 1880s, but the 
extension of plantings in the early twentieth century led to the creation of 
many new ones.17 The actions of the California Peach Growers Associa­
tion typified the work of these bodies. The shipment of wormy peaches to 
Chicago and New York in 1909 had led many buyers to reject California 
brands during the following seasons. At the same time the expanding 
production of peaches throughout the nation heightened the competition 
for markets. In 1915, to obtain higher prices for their fruit and to increase 
their sales in the Midwest and East, peach growers formed the California 
Peach Growers Association. Within four years it was marketing three-
quarters of California's dried peaches, and by establishing uniform grades 
of fruit, well-known trademarks, and an efficient marketing apparatus, it 
reopened eastern markets to California peaches. The actions of the 
cooperative, combined with wartime demands, boosted the prices paid 
members for their crops from three cents per pound in 1914 to eighteen 
cents per pound four years later and, as one state official noted, "placed 
peach growing and marketing on a profitable and secure basis."18 
Farmers requiring national markets for other types of produce followed 
the lead of the fruit men. By 1919, Californians had founded cooperative 
marketing organizations for berries, rice, almonds, walnuts, lima beans, 
string beans, cantaloupes, and tomatoes.19 Like the fruit growers, the 
farmers raising these products hoped to expand their markets, regularize 
prices, and increase their profits. The manager of the California Almond 
Growers Exchange spoke for most other agriculturalists when he declared 
that "what we want is some method of marketing that will make the market 
for almonds as steady and stable as the market for flour or sugar.  "2  0 Those 
cooperatives which controlled a large percentage of the California output 
and which had an advantage of some sort over other regions in the United 
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States raising the same crops usually reported increased prices and profits 
for their members. The founder of the Sebastopol Berry Growers, which 
shipped its fruit to Salt Lake City, Seattle, Portland, and Spokane, claimed 
that the gains made by cooperative selling came "just in time to prevent 
half of us having our wives leave us in disgust."21 The California Almond 
Growers Exchange was probably most successful. Formed in 1910, when 
some farmers were grubbing up their trees to plant more profitable crops, it 
had within two seasons doubled the price paid growers for their nuts. 
Organized as a federation of local associations, it was by 1919 selling 85 
percent of California's almonds.22 
By 1920, cooperatives marketed well over half of California's agricul­
tural output, but, with a few exceptions like the association of almond 
growers, none of these bodies obtained anything approaching absolute 
control over their markets. They usually had to compete with farmers from 
other sections of the nation. Florida orange growers, Georgia peach grow­
ers, and apple growers in Washington prevented Californians from gaining 
monopolistic positions in their markets. Moreover, even in California 
some growers remained outside the cooperatives. Hoping to reap short-
term profits, they ignored the efforts of the cooperatives to stabilize market 
conditions. As a result, price fluctuations, while dampened, continued for 
most California crops. 
Although unsuccessful in achieving market control, the cooperatives did 
help increase the profits of California's farmers. The prices paid for the 
state's agricultural products rose in the early twentieth century. These 
increases cannot, however, be attributed solely to cooperative selling 
organizations, for the years between 1895 and 1915 were ones of generally 
rising prices for farm goods throughout the United States. The index of 
agricultural prices nearly doubled during this period. Nonetheless, the 
cooperatives in California and elsewhere were at least partly responsible 
for these increases.23 Marketing associations also widened profit margins 
by lowering the expenses farmers incurred in packing, shipping, and 
selling their goods. Finally, the cooperatives aided farmers in opening new 
markets by the establishment of uniform methods of grading produce and 
extensive name-brand advertising. 
The Agricultural Standardization Movement 
California's farmers sought many of the same goals through the agricul­
tural standardization movement that they had pursued through cooperative 
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marketing associations. By defining quality standards for their produce and 
by setting uniform packing rules, they sought to keep immature and 
damaged goods off the eastern markets. An improvement in the quality of 
products sold in the East would, most believed, establish a favorable 
reputation for their produce and thus increase the out-of-state consumption 
of it. Concerned only with expanding eastern purchases of their state's 
agricultural output, preferably at higher prices, the standardization cam­
paign was formulated to benefit California's farmers. In no sense was it 
designed to aid consumers. Indeed, its aim of raising food prices con­
tradicted the best interests of consumers. Moreover, none of the regula­
tions devised to improve the quality of produce applied to sales in Califor­
nia, and the state's markets soon became dumping grounds for inferior fruit 
and vegetables. 
Though considerations of economic gain motivated the majority of those 
involved in the standardization movement, some viewed the campaign in a 
broader perspective. Impressed with what they interpreted as the modern 
efficiency of their nation's manufacturing industries, they longed to 
reshape California agriculture along contemporary business lines. Thus, 
one proponent of standardization, addressing the California Fruit Growers 
Convention in 1914, asserted that "an analysis of the manufacturing or 
the mercantile business or a study of the wholesaler and the retailer will 
show that standardization and system are the watchwords of success," and 
berated the state's farmers for having fallen behind other groups of busi­
nessmen in these respects.24 Still others valued the standardization move­
ment as part of a much larger attempt to mold all aspects of American life 
into more rational forms. John Irish, a fruit grower active in the standardi­
zation campaign from its inception, praised it for having "affect[ed] the 
mental character of the entire state." The drive "has standardized the 
men" and had thus, he concluded, given California women "a better 
standard of men than their unfortunate mothers had a chance of marry­
ing."25 
Begun by state officials and deciduous fruit growers working together, 
the standardization movement soon spread to citrus fruits and other prod­
ucts. The earliest attempts to control packing conditions and to set uniform 
grades were undertaken on a purely voluntary basis, but, when it became 
apparent that the desired results could not be obtained in this fashion, the 
growers, with the close cooperation of state officials, resorted to the 
passage of state legislation embodying their wishes. 
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Marketing problems plagued deciduous fruit growers in the opening 
decade of the twentieth century. Many growers, eager for the premium 
prices received for the first fruit of the season and hoping to avoid late 
summer and fall market gluts, included immature and damaged fruit in 
their early shipments to the East. This practice reached a climax in 1909. 
So much fruit was of inferior quality in that year that, according to State 
Horticultural Commissioner J. A. Jeffrey, "hundreds of carloads were 
rejected outright" in the eastern cities, and "in one province [of Canada] 
our fruit was refused admittance altogether."26 Placer County alone, 
Jeffrey estimated, sent out 300 carloads of immature or spoiled peaches.2 7 
European importers and American consuls stationed overseas also com­
plained about the poor quality of the California deciduous fruit pack. They 
warned that unless growers improved their packing methods and standard­
ized their grades of fruit, they would lose their European markets. Import­
ers in Nantes, France, reported that "all fruits arriving in cases, such as 
prunes and apricots, evaporated peaches, pears, apples are badly packed" 
and asserted that "it is rare that a case of fruit arrives from the United States 
without some part of the immediate cover missing." A consul at Dussel­
dorf, Germany, noted that "shipments of goods of very inferior quality 
are becoming of frequent occurrence" and that they were " a cause of 
annoyance, embarrassment, and loss to importers." He urged that low 
grade fruit "which is apt to spoil the whole business in a country like 
Germany" be eliminated from the trade.28 
The possibility of losing their domestic and foreign outlets at a time of 
rising production goaded the fruit growers to work with the staff of the state 
horticultural commissioner to standardize their crops. In December, 1909, 
the California Fruit Growers Association passed a resolution calling for the 
"standardizing of all deciduous fruit packs prepared for interstate ship­
ment." In response to the pleas of growers Jeffrey held twenty-seven 
conferences throughout the state to standardize California's deciduous 
fruit, and by the opening of the 1910 season counties raising one-third of 
the output had adopted standardization rules. Under Jeffrey's supervision 
the growers set up bodies to standardize their crops on the local and county 
basis. The key to success, most believed, lay in getting shippers and 
growers to sign contracts not to handle any poor quality or incorrectly 
packed fruit. In most instances a board of directors composed of growers 
and shippers laid out regulations for all members in an association. Inspec­
tors, paid by membership dues, examined the packing sheds of those 
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belonging to the association, and fines or expulsion were the usual penal­
ties for violations. Each organization maintained its own brand names, and 
membership was voluntary.29 
From these local efforts, the growers, again in cooperation with the 
horticultural commissioner, moved on to establish statewide bodies. After 
several false starts, a convention of fruit men set up the California Decidu­
ous Fruit Protective League in late 1911. Though it also sought to devise a 
better distribution system for eastern sales and to gain rate reductions from 
the transcontinental railroads, the main purpose of the league was to 
encourage standardization. Upon the request of its founders, J. A. Jeffrey 
resigned from his position as state horticultural commissioner to become its 
manager. The California Cured Fruit Exchange, which dealt only in dried 
fruits, worked toward the same ends. Set up as a direct result of the chronic 
complaints from foreign importers about the poor quality of California 
fruit, this body established standards for local associations trying to or­
ganize the dried deciduous fruit business. By the 1913 season the exchange 
had 12 of the largest packing houses in Northern California affiliated with 
it.30 
Within a few years these organizations had begun to improve the market 
for California fruit. At the close of the 1910 season a Lodi County grape 
grower claimed that the benefits of the movement were "already appar­
ent" and urged that the campaign be intensified. The manager of the 
California Fruit Distributors remarked in the same year that "the result of 
this work had been plainly apparent throughout the season" and noted that 
purchasers were "well pleased and rejections much less frequent than in 
past years." Horticultural Commissioner Jeffrey found the same results. 
Placer County, which produced the most deciduous fruit of any county in 
California, suffered, he reported, no rejections in 1910, chiefly because it 
possessed an active standardization association. American consuls and 
fruit growers traveling in Europe announced significant meliorations in the 
foreign markets for California deciduous fruits, and they attributed this 
change to the standardization campaign, particularly the work of the Cured 
Fruit Exchange.31 
Heartened by these favorable reports, the growers expanded the stan­
dardization movement, but they soon realized that voluntary efforts alone 
would not succeed. Some growers, desiring the quick profits resulting 
from sales early in the season, continued to disregard the long-run benefits 
of securing wider markets for their fruit and shipped immature specimens 
east. Others, unwilling to accept temporary losses on damaged crops, also 
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ignored long-term possibilities and deluged their markets with inferior 
produce. These actions aroused the suspicions of eastern buyers and made 
it difficult for even the highest grade of fruit to find purchasers at a good 
price. Searching for a legal basis with which to enforce their standards, 
those belonging to voluntary associations turned to the passage of state 
legislation. Only legislation, they reasoned, could lay down compulsory 
statewide standards.32 Californians took legislative steps against a back­
ground of similar actions in other parts of the nation. In 1903, Washingto­
nians set standards for their state's pear and apple crops, and eight years 
later the Florida legislature enacted measures specifying maturity stan­
dards for all oranges destined for out-of-state markets. The federal gov­
ernment entered the picture in 1913 with laws establishing requirements for 
the packaging of fruit sent abroad.33 
Within this context of national agitation, Assemblyman L. B. Cary of 
Fresno introduced a bill in the 1913 legislature to create a commission 
empowered to set standards for all fruits, nuts, and vegetables raised in 
California. The grape growers from Cary's district lent strong support to 
this measure, and many deciduous fruit men in the San Joaquin and 
Sacramento valleys also backed it. As the chairman of the Placer County 
Growers and Shippers Association explained, the measure would "give 
permanency to the rules of standardization, protect the industry, and 
relieve those who are voluntarily endeavoring to perfect our standards." 
Some growers, however, fought Cary's proposal. Although admitting the 
need for government participation in the standardization movement, they 
claimed the bill tried to do too much too quickly. They especially objected 
to the inclusion of fruit and vegetables sold within California under its 
terms, for Los Angeles, San Francisco and other cities throughout the state 
had long been dumping grounds for goods unable to meet export standards. 
Lacking statewide grower support, Cary s proposition passed the assembly 
but died on file in the senate.34 
During the next two years work on regulatory measures continued. 
Members of the California Fruit Growers Association resolved at their 
meeting in late 1913 that "it is the sense of this convention that we should 
have a statewide standardized pack of all fruit for interstate shipment'' and 
appointed a special committee to draft legislation for the standardization of 
the table grape pack.35 At a conference called by the state horticultural 
commissioner in 1914 fruit growers and packers agreed to press for 
standardization laws at the next session of the state legislature. A bill drawn 
up by H. E. Butler of the Penryn Fruit Packing Association, F. B. 
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McKevitt, a prominent grower and head of the California Fruit Dis­
tributors, and State Senator C. B. Mills of Sacramento received the 
meeting's backing. It set uniform standards of maturity, quality, and 
packing for all of California's out-of-state deciduous fruit shipments ex­
cept apples. Containers were to bear labels describing where and by whom 
the fruit was packed, and fines penalized any deviations from the standards 
proclaimed. Only uncrated fruit sold in bulk was exempt from the terms of 
this bill. More limited in scope than Cary's proposal of 1913, this measure 
regulated only out-of-state shipments and did not apply at all to vegetables 
or citrus fruits. Apple growers prepared a special bill for their crop. Unlike 
the more general deciduous fruit bill, it did not make standardization 
compulsory, but instead provided the growers with stamps they could afix 
to their crates of apples, if they met the standards established by the state. 
The growers were to pay inspectors to examine their fruit, and state 
certification would, in turn, the growers hoped, improve its status on the 
eastern markets.36 
Supported by the growers as "a message to the East that it will get the 
highest grade of fruit from California," both measures won quick approval 
from the legislature in 1915 and went into effect the following year.37 State 
officers chosen by civil service examinations worked under the guidance of 
the state horticultural commissioner to inspect the fruit as it was crated in 
the packing sheds. By 1918, the horticultural commissioner could report 
that the laws had proven "very satisfactory" in improving the market for 
California fruit.38 Most growers agreed with him. The Watsonville Apple 
Distributors, an association that marketed 600,000 boxes under the terms 
of the Apple Standardization Act, received ten cents more per box in 1916 
than those growers and shippers who decided not to place their packs under 
state supervision, and the association's president praised the act as being 
"most beneficial to all interests."39 F. J. Mason, another fruit grower and 
packer, noting that "there are less rejections, less complaint, and a greater 
demand at satisfactory prices," labeled the deciduous fruit standardization 
act "a wonderful success."40 Nearly all deciduous fruit men soon came to 
see the value of state legislation. In November 1915, the California Fruit 
Growers Association passed resolutions endorsing the two standardization 
laws, and in succeeding years its members labored ardently for their 
enforcement and expansion.41 
Citrus growers moved to standardize their crops for the same reasons as 
the deciduous fruit men. They faced increasingly stiff competition from 
Florida orange and lemon growers. At the same time production in Califor­
 27 Agriculture: Growers Against Consumers
nia was exploding; in the decade after 1904 the acreage planted in oranges 
and lemons more than doubled.42 These developments alarmed Califor­
nians. They feared the rivalry of the Florida growers, and came to believe 
that only by offering a pack of uniformly high quality could they secure 
national markets for their expanding production. Their main problem was 
to eliminate immature and frost-damaged fruit from their out-of-state 
shipments. Although inferior fruit might bring temporarily high prices at 
the opening of each season, it often ruined the markets for the better grades 
that came later. Few consumers would, after once biting into a sour orange, 
soon purchase another. Yet, for a long time growers did little to alter this 
situation, for none were individually willing to forgo the high profits often 
received for early carloads of fruit. As in the deciduous industry, stan­
dardization was finally accomplished only by collective action and the 
passage of state legislation. 
Growers made some efforts to standardize their shipments as early as 
1911, but not until the results of a severe freeze two years later shocked 
them out of their complacency did they achieve much progress. In 1911, 
the United States Department of Agriculture published a report that de­
tailed handling methods that would reduce losses from decay, and its 
authors urged the growers to "be sure your pack is uniform and true to 
grade."43 State Horticultural Commissioner Jeffrey also exhorted orange 
and lemon growers to improve the quality of their crops, and the California 
Fruit Growers Exchange established uniform grades for all oranges packed 
under its Sunkist label.44 However, much of California's citrus fruit 
continued to go ungraded and without examination for maturity or disease. 
In 1913, a particularly hard frost damaged over half of the state's Valencia 
orange crop. Many growers, hoping to salvage something from this disas­
ter, hastily shipped their injured fruit to the eastern markets. Though not all 
followed this practice (the California Fruit Growers Exchange refused to 
handle blemished oranges), enough bad fruit reached the East to ruin the 
reputation of California's oranges. The Chicago Board of Health con­
demned the damaged oranges as unfit for human consumption and prohi­
bited their sale within the city's boundaries.45 The manager of the Califor­
nia Fruit Growers Exchange complained in 1914 that "as a result of the 
unprecedented frost" California "lost its commanding position in the 
leading markets of the country, especially in the East."46 
Hurt by the rejection of their crops, the growers worked with state and 
federal officials to devise tests to separate sound from damaged fruit. Fruit 
men in Riverside quickly discovered a simple way to differentiate frost­
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damaged from unfrosted oranges. In 1914, scientists in the United States 
Department of Agriculture, after several years of experimentation, found a 
method to test the maturity of oranges. They decided that an orange was 
edible if its ratio of soluble solids to acid was not less than eight to one.47 
The growers and packers experienced trouble in putting these tests into 
operation. The California Fruit Growers Exchange adopted the eight-to­
one standard for oranges in 1915 and extended its standardization efforts to 
lemons in the next few years.48 Some local bodies not associated with the 
exchange also screened their packs for maturity and frost damage, and the 
Fresno County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance requiring use of 
the eight-to-one rule for all oranges grown within its jurisdiction.49 How­
ever, these actions failed to end the shipment of inferior fruit to eastern 
markets. As the manager of the California Fruit Growers Exchange 
lamented, some growers and shippers "who are unmindful of the interests 
of the industry as a whole" continued to market "fruit which may be 
orange in color but falls below the 8 to 1 quality standards."50 
Thwarted in their voluntary attempt, the larger citrus growers and 
packers turned to state legislation. In late 1914, the manager of the 
California Fruit Growers Exchange called upon the federal and state 
governments to prevent interstate commerce in frost-damaged oranges.51 
Responding to his wishes and those of other fruit men, the 1915 session of 
the state legislature enacted a law, modeled upon a measure passed in 
Florida four years before, forbidding out-of-state shipments of frost-
damaged oranges.52 Claiming that only statewide controls would permit 
Californians to compete successfully with Florida growers, the manager of 
the California Fruit Growers Exchange also pressed for government regula­
tion of maturity standards. Again the solons acceded to the growers' 
desires and in 1917 enacted a bill applying the eight-to-one standard to all 
oranges sent out of California.53 Although they did not immediately 
eliminate all inferior California fruit from the eastern markets, these 
measures won the praise of the state's leading growers and helped them 
improve the national standing of their citrus fruit. 
California farmers selling a wide variety of produce in out-of-state 
markets emulated the fruit growers. In 1913, Washington, Oregon, and 
Idaho quarantined California potatoes, because they suffered from fungus 
infections and infestations of tuber moths. Californians looked to the state 
horticultural commissioner for guidance and, under his supervision, estab­
lished quality standards for all of the state's crop. Within a few seasons 
California potatoes were again finding buyers throughout the West.54 
Olive growers also standardized their output. Standardization would, one 
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grower explained, "increase the demand for California olives as effec­
tively as the demand has been increased by a like method for California 
raisins and citrus fruits." Working with state agricultural officials, the 
olive men established maturity tests for their crops and in 1917 secured 
passage for state legislation incorporating these standards.55 By this time 
many other farmers had joined the standardization drive. Vegetable grow­
ers and, at one point, even alfalfa farmers tried to expand their sales by 
imposing uniform quality standards throughout California.56 
Like the establishment of cooperative marketing associations, the stan­
dardization campaign benefited California's farmers. Again, it is hard to 
tell exactly how much, for it is difficult to separate the effects of this 
movement from the general price rise most American agricultural products 
experienced in the first two decades of the twentieth century. There is no 
doubt, however, that California's fruit growers and farmers attributed their 
prosperity to the standardization movement and cooperative marketing. 
The Consumers' Revolt 
Consumers throughout California agreed with the farmers' analysis of 
the situation, but, rather than praising the cooperative marketing and 
standardization campaigns, they denounced the movements for increasing 
the cost of food. Consumers also recognized that farmers were shipping 
their choicest produce out of state and blamed the cooperative marketing 
and standardization drives for the poor quality of produce available in 
California markets. By 1913, consumers were organizing to fight for lower 
food prices and a higher quality of produce. Food shortages caused by the 
First World War exacerbated the conflict between farmers and consumers. 
After 1914 food prices jumped in all parts of the nation, and the outcries of 
aggrieved consumers forced the federal government to move in the direc­
tion of managing the prices of selected items of food.57 The cost of food 
rose dramatically in California as well.58 However, few agriculturalists or 
consumers in California correctly assessed the impact of the First World 
War, and struggles between these groups continued to revolve around the 
role cooperative marketing and agricultural standardization played in hik­
ing food prices. 
Historians have generally applauded the efforts of farmers to increase 
the prices of their products.59 This tendency has been pronounced in 
writings in California history. California historians have treated growers 
and the state officials who sought to aid the agriculturalists as heroes 
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battling on behalf of a downtrodden people.60 Yet, as the conflict between 
farmers and consumers in the Golden State demonstrated, consumers also 
had needs and desires that required consideration. 
Consumers angry about food quality and prices founded public markets 
in Los Angeles, Sacramento, Oakland, and seven other California cities as 
early as 1913. Part of a nationwide movement, the drive to set up municipal 
markets aimed at reducing expenses by bringing farmers into direct contact 
with consumers.61 At these marts farmers sold their produce to consumers 
without going through middlemen. By dispensing with the services of 
commission agents, advocates of these "free" markets hoped to lower the 
cost of food without diminishing returns to the fanners. They also believed 
that by cutting the time required for handling they could secure higher 
quality produce, for they expected that farmers within a twenty- or thirty-
mile radius of each market would bring in their fruits or vegetables and sell 
them to city dwellers on the spot.62 
From their separate efforts the proponents of municipal markets turned 
to the state legislature to extend their sphere of action. In 1915, Assembly­
man H. E. McPherson sponsored a measure providing for the establish­
ment of model commission markets in one of California's major urban 
centers. If this experiment proved successful, the state would later set up 
others. The director of the state markets would, under the terms of this 
proposal, accept fruits and vegetables on consignment from farmers for 
immediate sale to consumers. Those favoring the measure argued that by 
cutting out the middlemen the proposal would benefit consumers without 
hurting the growers. The measure's backers insured the approval of farm­
ers by including a provision calling upon the state government to gather and 
disseminate eastern market information among California's agricul­
turalists. Supporters of the bill also claimed that, besides aiding both 
farmers and consumers, the commission market act would further the 
conservation of California's natural resources. They pointed out that tons 
of edible fish were used as fertilizer every year and that bushels of apples 
rotted on the ground each fall because of prohibitive handling charges 
assessed by the private commission houses. By eliminating the need for 
farmers and fishermen to work through such houses, McPherson's pro­
posal would, they concluded, end the wastage of food.63 
The commission market act encountered little opposition in Sacramento. 
The measure passed the assembly by a vote of forty-four to one, and 
Senator William Brown of Los Angeles shepherded it through the upper 
house by nearly as large a margin. Although the commission market act 
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would soon become the hottest item in California politics, it attracted 
relatively little attention at the time of its passage. Carrying an appropria­
tion of only $25,000, it was ignored by most politicians. Governor Hiram 
Johnson was puzzled about the meaning of the act and asked members of a 
state commission then working on a rural credits measure to advise him on 
how best to implement it. After waiting a full six months, Johnson ap­
pointed Harris Weinstock, the chairman of the rural credits commission, as 
market director. 
Weinstock had long been interested in the problems of California's 
farmers. Though himself a Sacramento merchant, Weinstock believed that 
his state's economic progress depended upon rural prosperity. Beginning 
in 1885, he frequently participated in the state fruit growers' conventions 
and assisted in the organization of many of California's early cooperative 
marketing bodies. In 1908, Weinstock retired from active business life a 
wealthy man to devote the rest of his life to political reform. He concerned 
himself mainly with civic improvements and the reform of a local govern­
ment. Yet, he also retained his earlier concern in improving the lot of 
agriculturalists, for he continued to push for cooperative marketing and, in 
1913, served as a delegate of the American Commission on Agricultural 
Credit and Cooperation. Not surprisingly, Weinstock's appointment as 
market director won the hearty approval of the state's farmers, and mem­
bers of the California Fruit Growers Association passed a resolution 
endorsing Johnson's choice of Weinstock at their convention in Novem­
ber, 1915.64 
The confidence of the agriculturalists was well placed, for Weinstock, 
ignoring both the letter and spirit of the commission market act, neglected 
the state's consumers and labored, instead, to secure prosperity for the 
farmers. He sought to open new markets for their products and, upon 
taking office, visited eastern cities to survey the demand for California 
fruits and vegetables. In addition, Weinstock wrote South American im­
porters on behalf of fruit growers and tried to interest Governor Johnson in 
financing a shipping line to carry fresh fruit to England.65 All of these 
efforts convinced Weinstock that only by setting up a better system of 
distribution could Californians exploit the potential national and interna­
tional markets for the goods. Accordingly, he helped establish nine 
cooperative marketing associations during his first year in office.66 
Weinstock also tried to set up state bureaus to rationalize the distribution of 
California's shipment of fruit to eastern markets. Under his plan state 
officers would provide daily market information to fruit men by which they 
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would route their carloads east. The growers, in turn, were to furnish the 
state officials any data, including their sales figures, that they possessed 
about market conditions.67 
However, the leading citrus and deciduous fruit organizations refused to 
participate in this scheme, and it never materialized. After considerable 
vacillation, the members of the California Fruit Growers Exchange de­
cided to abstain, because they believed the value of the confidential 
information they would have to provide would not be balanced by any 
comparable gains.68 Those belonging to the California Fruit Exchange also 
rejected Weinstock s entreaties. The association had just enjoyed several 
prosperous years, and its members agreed to join only if they would be 
assured of even greater profits in the future. When no promises meeting 
their specifications were forthcoming, they decided not to cooperate with 
the market director.69 
Although solicitous about the needs of California's farmers, Weinstock 
did little to help the state's consumers. He set up no commission markets. 
Condemning those who believed in the efficacy of these institutions as 
misinformed and unrealistic, Weinstock asserted that such markets could 
neither relieve the pressure of the exploding production on the state's 
farmers nor reduce the cost of living for consumers.70 The only project 
Weinstock undertook to assist consumers was the formation of a fish 
exchange in San Francisco. In 1915, the legislature had approved an 
appropriation of $20,000 for the state fish and game commission to 
examine the price of fish in California. The following investigation dis­
closed that prices were high, but not because of the machinations of a' 'fish 
trust" as some newspapers claimed. The fish business was a one-day-a­
week proposition, for nearly all sales occurred on Friday. During the rest of 
the week an enormous wastage offish ensued, with much of the catch being 
sold for fertilizer. Fishermen had to make enough profit on Fridays to cover 
losses on other days. Prodded by Weinstock, San Francisco's fish dealers 
voluntarily agreed to meet daily and set maximum prices. Organized as the 
Northern California Fish Exchange, the dealers also mounted an advertis­
ing campaign to encourage the consumption of fish throughout the entire 
week. State officials applauded these steps, for they felt the actions would 
both increase the consumption and lower the retail price of fish. These 
moves would also, they hoped, end wastage and insure the treatment offish 
as "a natural resource" for the benefit of all the state's residents.71 
When the state legislature convened in 1917, Weinstock moved to 
legitimize his actions. At his request Senator E. A. Luce introduced a bill 
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drastically altering the duties of the market director. Under the terms of this 
proposal the market director was to concentrate upon organizing Califor­
nia's farmers into cooperative marketing associations. He was also to 
furnish advice on eastern market conditions and foster standardization 
movements. The measure said little about the state's consumers and 
contained no provision for the establishment of public markets. With this 
proposition Weinstock hoped to obtain legal sanction for shifting his 
attention from the state's consumers to the farmers.72 
Luce's measure brought to the surface the growing unrest with 
Weinstock's policies. The failure of the market director to abide by the 
terms of his appointment, combined with his efforts to win sanctions for his 
change in policy, caused the pot of consumer discontent to boil over. The 
ensuing controversy pitted consumer bodies against farm organizations 
and raised fundamental questions about the role of the state government in 
the development of California's economy. 
Groups of consumers quickly organized to spearhead an attack on the 
state market director. By the end of 1916, the residents of California's 
larger cities, hurt by the spiraling cost of food, had come to view the market 
director as their oppressor. Consumers in Berkeley formed a High Cost of 
Living Committee, which denounced Weinstock for "organizing com­
bines all over the state and boosting prices beyond reason" and called for 
the defeat of Luce's bill.73 Women's clubs in Southern California united as 
the Los Angeles Housewives' League. The league condemned the new 
market commission act and asked Governor Johnson to impose an embargo 
on all food exports from California as a way to lower prices within the 
state.74 Municipal authorities supported these organizations. The Los 
Angeles city council demanded Weinstock's removal from office and 
urged Governor Johnson to set up a public market in their city.75 The San 
Bernardino board of supervisors tried to drive speculators out of business 
by assessing food in storage at its full market value for tax purposes.76 
When an investigation revealed that 300,000 sacks of potatoes were being 
held off the market in San Francisco, that city's board of supervisors also 
considered raising taxes on warehoused foodstuffs. One supervisor com­
plained that Weinstock had done nothing to help " the consuming public,'' 
and called for the defeat of Luce's bill.77 
Weinstock mounted a spirited defense of his work and labored for the 
passage of Luce's bill. Weinstock claimed that the 1915 measure had not 
actually required him to set up state-run markets; this provision, he incor­
rectly asserted, was only discretionary. At any rate, Weinstock continued, 
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by organizing marketing associations he had lowered distribution costs and 
assured consumers of a steady food supply. He attributed price increases to 
the operations of speculators not yet driven out of business, the still 
imperfect system of distribution for agricultural products, inefficiency in 
home management, and shortages caused by the First World War.78 
California's farmers rallied to support Weinstock and backed Luce's mea­
sure. Local granges passed resolutions endorsing the proposed market 
commission, and the officers of cooperatives handling crops ranging from 
pigs to peaches spoke out on its behalf. The managers of the California 
Fruit Growers Exchange, the California Fruit Distributors, and more 
specialized marketing associations like the Walnut Growers Exchange 
journeyed to Sacramento to argue for the proposal.79 
Luce's bill triggered a bitter legislative contest. Senators William Brown 
and J. W. Ballard of Los Angeles offered stiff opposition to the measure. 
Brown, who had pushed the 1915 act through the senate, hammered at 
Weinstock for misusing his power to establish "food trusts inimical to 
consumers." He demanded the removal of Weinstock from office and 
called for a return to the original intentions of the commission market act.80 
Ballard complained that the ' 'commission cannot operate for the producer 
without hitting the consumer" and joined Brown in trying to block Luce's 
proposal.81 Their efforts proved ineffective. After a prolonged struggle in 
committee and lengthy floor debates the market commission act won 
approval in the assembly by a margin of fifty-eight to eighteen and in the 
senate by twenty-seven to ten. As would be expected, most of the negative 
votes came from representatives of California's larger urban centers.82 
Flushed with success, Weinstock moved quickly to implement the terms 
of the new law. He stepped up his efforts to establish cooperative market­
ing associations and again tried to link all of the state's farmers together in a 
single marketing organization. The provisions of the 1917 act relieved 
Weinstock of any obligation to establish public markets, and he ignored the 
state's consumers. As before he claimed that the best interest of consumers 
lay in assuring that agriculturalists remain in business and that this end 
could best be achieved by ensuring them of reasonable profits.83 
As wartime shortages accentuated the problem of high prices in Califor­
nia, consumers renewed their quest to lower the cost of food. San Francis­
cans tried to establish a chain of privately operated markets at which 
agricultural produce would be sold to the public at cost.Although backed 
by such well-known and diverse figures as Rudolph Spreckles, the sugar 
king, John Neylan, the former chairman of California's board of control, 
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Daniel Murphy and Paul Scharrenburg, the president and secretary of the 
State Federation of Labor, Marion Delaney, the president of the Civic 
League of Women's Clubs, and Russella Ward of the San Francisco 
Federation of Women's Clubs, the scheme collapsed when its proponents 
failed to raise the required capital.84 Across the bay former members of the 
High Cost of Living Committee headed new organizations in Oakland, 
Alameda, and Berkeley that called for Weinstock's removal from office 
and the regulation of food prices by federal or municipal authorities.85 
Most galling to many urbanites was Weinstock's handling of the fish 
problem. In 1917, consumer bodies and the market director had worked 
together, in a rare show of fellowship, to secure passage of a law placing 
fish prices under Weinstock's control. By the terms of this act the market 
director daily set the wholesale and retail prices of all types of fish sold in 
the state. When the prices failed to drop as quickly as many had hoped, 
consumer groups charged Weinstock with being in the pay of a "fish 
trust," and by early 1918 the inhabitants of several cities were asking for 
the fitting out of municipally owned fishing fleets.86 
City officials again backed the demands of consumers. The San Fran­
cisco board of supervisors started an investigation into the cost of food.87 
Oakland opened a city market that sold produce at cost and contemplated 
operating a municipally owned fishing fleet to supply it with food.88 A plan 
to convert Lake Merritt, a nearby salt-water estuary, into a huge striped 
bass fishery from which citizens would be permitted to net their dinners 
free of charge also received serious consideration.89 Los Angeles con­
vened a grand jury to look into the cause of high food prices, and the Los 
Angeles district attorney examined the possibility of bringing antitrust 
proceedings against the Poultry Producers of Southern California, a 
cooperative marketing association set up with Weinstock's aid. However, 
other law suits, in which the market director appeared on behalf of the 
farmers, upheld the legality of cooperative marketing, and the district 
attorney dropped his charges.90 
The rising chorus of protest found expression in the 1919 legislature. 
Senator Brown sponsored a measure revamping the duties of the state 
market director. Aimed at reducing food prices, it required the market 
director to establish state-run markets throughout California and forbade 
him from helping farmers form marketing associations.91 In the same 
session Senator William Scott of San Francisco introduced a measure 
designed to lower the cost offish. His bill transferred the market director's 
price-fixing authority to the head of the state fish and game commission 
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and, in addition, empowered the commission to establish state-operated 
markets to sell fish directly to consumers.92 
Familiar lines of cleavage appeared during the struggle over Senator 
Brown's proposal. Once again farmers backed Weinstock's work. 
Cooperatives selling milk, almonds, apples, eggs, peaches, raisins, pears, 
honey, alfalfa, and oranges denounced Brown's measure. By mid-
February the Fresno Republican could accurately report that "the growers 
and producers of the state and especially of the San Joaquin Valley" had 
formed a "powerful offensive against the attempt to legislate the state 
market director out of office. " 9  3 Just as predictably, groups of consumers 
and municipal authorities supplied Brown with the bulk of his support. 
Councilmen in Oakland and Berkeley passed resolutions favoring Brown's 
proposal, and Richmond's city attorney traveled to Sacramento to testify 
on its behalf. City officials, representatives of merchant bodies, and 
consumer advocates in the San Francisco area banded together as the Bay 
Cities Food and Fish Commission, which criticized Weinstock for having 
permitted an increase in food prices and sent representatives to lobby for 
Brown's act in the state capital.94 In Southern California the Los Angeles 
Federation of Women's Clubs and municipal authorities came out in favor 
of Brown's proposition.95 
Yet, consumers gained little from the legislature. As they had two years 
before, solons from California's agricultural areas outgunned those repre­
senting urban centers. The senate buried Brown's measure by the margin of 
twenty-four to nine, and a similar bill failed in the assembly, though by 
only four votes.96 
Senator Scott's fish bill also became the subject of intense debate. 
Consumer groups throughout California backed the measure. More sur­
prisingly, so did the state's fishermen. In a series of dramatic moves 
protesting Weinstock's pricing policies fishermen from San Diego to San 
Francisco went on strike.97 They refused to take their boats out to sea until, 
as one of their spokesmen explained, prices were again "regulated by 
supply and demand" rather than by the whims of government officials.98 
Willing to use any method available to attack Weinstock, the fishermen 
gave their backing to Scott's proposal. The reason became apparent when 
the bill emerged from committee. In its amended form Scott's proposal 
authorized the establishment of a series of state operated fish markets but 
did not provide for price-fixing by any state official. Favored by the 
fishermen as a means of securing higher wholesale prices for their catches 
and by consumer groups as promising lower retail prices, the proposition 
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met opposition only from the disorganized fish dealers and sailed through 
the legislature with few dissenting votes. However, Weinstock viewed the 
bill as an erosion of his authority and worked against it from its inception. 
When it passed the legislature despite his efforts, Weinstock convinced 
Governor William Stephens to kill it with a pocket veto ." 
Far from abating, the attacks on Weinstock's action as market director 
intensified after the legislature adjourned. Consumer organizations never 
relented in their assaults. The San Francisco Bay Area's Mother and Parent 
Teachers Association condemned Weinstock for not clamping down on the 
soaring price of milk and called for his dismissal from office.100 In 
Oakland and Berkeley consumers urged President Woodrow Wilson to 
intervene on their behalf and asked Governor Stephens to call a special 
session of the legislature to consider a new state market act.101 In Southern 
California women's clubs endorsed Senator Brown's request for a special 
legislative session and began circulating petitions demanding that 
Weinstock be replaced by someone else as market director.102 Municipal 
authorities also kept the pressure on Weinstock. The climax came in 
November, 1919, when mayors from 145 West Coast cities met in Sac­
ramento to discuss ways to lower food prices. Dominated by the California 
delegation, this conference considered boycotting all products sold by 
cooperative marketing associations. Only Weinstock's timely intervention 
on behalf of the farmers thwarted this move. The convention did, however, 
pass resolutions proclaiming milk a public utility subject to governmental 
regulation and urging Governor Stephens to summon the California legisla­
ture into session to devise measures that would reduce the cost of living.103 
Stephens rejected these entreaties. Acting upon the market director's 
advice, he refused to convene the legislature. When the mayors of Oakland 
and Los Angeles, rebuffed by this ploy, focused their energies upon a 
petition drive against Weinstock, the governor announced that under no 
conditions would he remove him from office. Political considerations 
influenced these decisions. As Hiram Johnson's political heir, Stephens 
hoped to avoid offending Weinstock who was one of Northern California's 
strongest Progressives. Then too, he recognized that the farm vote (and the 
state's farmers remained staunch supporters of the market director) was 
still potent in California.104 
The consumer s revolt against high food prices came to a natural end. 
After a three-week-long illness that left his health seriously impaired, 
Weinstock retired from office in January, 1920. Governor Stephens, 
desiring broad-based support for his plans to reorganize the state govern­
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ment, disregarded Weinstock's advice that the manager of a cooperative 
marketing association succeed him as market director.105 He chose a 
nonentity, Gilbert Daniels, the superintendent of the state motor vehicles 
department. Trying to conciliate both farmers and consumers, Daniels 
interpreted the powers of his office narrowly, and took care to offend no 
one.106 He did not even publish an annual report in 1921. Daniels's 
timidity must have been a welcome change to California's consumers and 
probably did much to damp the fires of discontent. More important, 
however, was the drop in food prices. After rising steadily for five years, 
they fell dramatically throughout California, and by 1921 the cost of living 
no longer received attention from the state legislature.107 
The struggle between consumers and farmers in California demonstrates 
the difficulty in viewing contests involving business legislation in terms of 
party politics. In fact, rifts cut across party lines. In the conflict between 
farmers and consumers geographic divisions proved crucial, with the 
legislators from the cities backing bills favored by consumers while those 
from agricultural areas supported measures desired by farmers. Even the 
leadership among Progressives split on these issues. Whereas Weinstock 
and Governor Johnson sided with the agriculturalists, other progressives 
from urban centers, especially Los Angeles and San Francisco, responded 
to the wishes of their constituencies, the consumers. As was often the case 
in California politics, party labels proved irrelevant in explaining the 
behavior of politicians. In particular, the fight over food prices raises the 
question of the validity of analyzing California politics in terms of "re­
form" and "reaction," for in no sense can the many pieces of legislation 
offered during the contest between farmers and consumers be considered 
"progressive" or "reactionary."108 
The contest also raised questions, never completely resolved, about the 
role of the state government in California's economy. Most importantly, 
the conflict revealed, as would contests over other pieces of business 
legislation, that it was often impossible to benefit one segment of Califor­
nia's population without injuring another. The result was a jockeying for 
power by organized interest groups. As the most highly organized and first 
group on the scene, the agriculturalists won the initial victories, but they 
never achieved total hegemony over the state legislature. As consumers 
became increasingly organized, they won fuller consideration for their 
demands in Sacramento. Though originally at a disadvantage in terms of 
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organization, consumers had several long-run advantages over agricul­
turalists. By 1915, California had become a highly urbanized state in which 
consumers of farm products clearly predominated over farmers in terms of 
numbers. Moreover, consumers succeeded, while farmers did not, in 
appealing beyond the bounds of narrow self-interest to win support for their 
cause. More than just high prices for food was at stake, consumer advo­
cates claimed. The very health of the state's population became an issue; 
the San Francisco Bay Area's Mothers and Parent Teachers Association, 
for instance, accused the "milk trust" of stunting the growth of babies by 
hiking the price of milk. Possessing these long-term advantages, consumer 
organizations were eventually able to stop Weinstock's efforts to organize 
agricultural cooperatives and, had not the food issue died a natural death, 
would probably have won still further legislative victories. 
The Oil Industry 
California's oil men, like the state's fruit growers, encountered a bewilder­
ing set of difficulties thrust upon them by the rapid development of their 
industry. The opening of new fields in quick succession created a surplus 
production of crude oil in the early twentieth century, and the question of 
how to profitably dispose of their excess crude became the overriding 
concern of California oil men. The control of pipelines was intimately 
related to the problem of overproduction. Small-scale producers, who 
lacked the capital to construct their own networks, sought guarantees that 
they would be able to ship their crude through the lines of the state s larger 
concerns. Only with such assurances could they drill for oil without fear of 
bringing to the surface more than they could market. Finally, in addition to 
their economic problems, Californians had to adapt their technology to the 
scientific challenges met in exploration, drilling, and refining. 
Oil men in other parts of the nation dealt with problems similar to those 
hindering Californians, but California's geographic isolation and the un­
usual chemical properties of California's crude accentuated the difficulties 
California producers faced. Because no pipelines connected California 
with the rest of the United States until the 1950s, the state developed as a 
separate oil province. California petroleum found few markets beyond the 
West Coast, and only rarely did Californians import oil from other re­
gions.1 The inability of Californians to send their petroleum east or secure 
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out-of-state supplies widened any local disparity between the production 
and consumption of crude on the Pacific Slope.2 The lack of options to 
which they could put their petroleum redoubled the vulnerability of 
Californians to the dangers of overproduction. The high viscosity of 
California oil further increased the handicaps under which operators la­
bored.3 As late as 1909, nearly two-thirds of the state's output was under 
19°B., and as a result Californians refined a much lower percentage of their 
crude than did oil men in other areas.4 The high sulphur content of their 
crude caused difficulties in refining not encountered in refining oil from 
many of the nation's oil fields. Combined with problems in discovery and 
drilling, the impurities in their crude led Californians to rely heavily upon 
scientific knowledge to rationalize their operations. By 1920, California 
possessed the most technologically advanced oil plants in the United 
States.5 
Production Controls 
Sustained large-scale production of petroleum began in California in the 
late 1890s, and a chronic imbalance between production and consumption 
characterized the California oil industry in succeeding years. In rapid order 
drillers brought in new fields in the upper San Joaquin Valley—the 
Coalinga, McKittrick, and Kern River. These discoveries boosted produc­
tion from under 2 million barrels in 1897 to almost 30 million seven years 
later.6 This increase far outran California's consumption needs, and the 
price received at the well for crude fell by over two-thirds.7 As early as 
1901, those in the petroleum business were reporting that "the problem of 
securing a market" was "agitating the mind of the oil producer."8 Within 
three years operators had capped 424 wells and were holding 10 million 
barrels of oil off the market in tanks and open earthen sumps.9 
However, Californians soon succeeded in developing new markets for 
their crude, and between 1906 and 1908 the demand for their oil outran 
supplies. On the West Coast, a coal-poor region with long distances and 
high transportation costs, it proved economically feasible to substitute 
crude petroleum for coal as a fuel, and Californians led the nation in this 
endeavor. In the first decade of the twentieth century railroads, public 
utilities, and some factories switched from coal to petroleum. By 1912, the 
Southern Pacific Railroad alone was taking 13 percent of California's 
annual output of petroleum.10 As consumption exceeded supply, the price 
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of crude rose, though not to the pre-1900 level, and the stocks of petroleum 
in storage dropped.11 
New gushers brought in after 1909 shattered the hopes of oil men for 
continued prosperity. Production again outstripped consumption, and 
prices fell considerably.12 In September, 1912, the Standard Oil Company 
of California, with 10 million barrels of crude in storage, ceased buying 
any crude of less than 19°B. This action led many smaller operators, whose 
only access to market was through the Standard's pipelines, to shut down, 
for the company refused to ship the oil of independents through its 
pipelines. By the end of 1912, 1,147 of California's 5,626 wells had been 
temporarily capped, and the state's closed-in production amounted to 
25,000 barrels per day.13 Most oil men suffered during the next three 
years. In spite of increased well closures, consumption caught up with 
production only in 1915.14 Prices rose little, and many producers operated 
at a loss. Most of the smaller and some of the larger companies failed to 
cover their costs in 1914 and 1915, even after prices had recovered from the 
nadir to which they sank in 1912 and 1913. Only the outbreak of war, 
resulting first in larger exports abroad and then in increased domestic 
demands, brought higher prices to California's hard-pressed producers.15 
The efforts of oil men to deal with the imbalance between the production 
and consumption of crude molded the structures of their individual compa­
nies. In times of excess production they first formed combinations, pools, 
and horizontally integrated companies to store and market their crude. 
When none of these attempts significantly altered the prices they received, 
the operators recognized that substantial profits in the oil business could be 
realized only in the carriage and refining of crude and the marketing of 
kerosene and gasoline. In their quest for security and profits, some then 
took the additional step from horizontal to vertical integration. By 1915, 
several of the loosely organized combinations had evolved into tightly 
structured firms that owned refineries and pipelines in addition to oil lands. 
Vertical integration less frequently occurred in the reverse manner. When 
crude was in limited supply, firms that had previously been involved only 
in transportation and refining entered into production as well. While 
profiting greatly from the overproduction of crude during much of the early 
twentieth century, those engaged in refining felt the pinch of crude short­
ages between 1905 and 1910 and in the years after 1915. To assure 
themselves of steady and ample supplies, they purchased and developed 
their own oil lands and pipelines. 
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San Joaquin Valley oil men led the early movements for combination. 
The larger producers in the Kern River and McKittrick fields formed the 
Associated Oil Company in 1901. Those joining the new corporation 
turned over their land and sales contracts in return for its stocks and bonds. 
Within two years the Associated had 600,000 barrels of crude in storage 
and was trying to make contracts at prices greater than those other compa­
nies received.16 Even as the Associated began marketing crude, oil pro­
ducers in other regions were setting up similar organizations. In 1904, the 
Pacific Coast Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil), with more 
petroleum in storage than it could refine, slashed its purchase price for 
crude and then stopped buying it altogether. To find a new market for their 
oil, operators in the Kern River field established the Independent Oil 
Producers Agency.17 The agency leased the lands of its members and, in 
turn, licensed each member to develop its own properties. Those belonging 
to the association empowered its board of directors to dispose of all their 
crude for a five-year period. In 1907, producers in the Coalinga field 
followed suit with an organization modeled on the Kern River agency.18 
None of these bodies achieved much success, for operators in some 
districts remained outside their ranks. Without control over all of Califor­
nia's fields they could neither curtail the state s burgeoning output of crude 
nor increase the prices obtained for it. Moreover, the agencies possessed no 
pipelines, refineries, or systems of distribution for gasoline and kerosene. 
They had to sell their crude to those few companies that specialized in these 
services, and the efforts of firms engaged in refining and selling finished 
products to keep the price paid for crude as low as possible added to the 
difficulties of the operators in the field.19 
California producers learned from their early experiences and in later 
years moved in the direction of vertical integration, particularly when 
production again exceeded consumption after 1909. The Associated Oil 
Company took the first steps. In 1905, the firm bought a pipeline running 
from the Coalinga field to Monterey Bay, and three years later finished 
construction of a line from the Kern River district to San Francisco Bay. 
The Southern Pacific Railroad acquired control of the Associated in 1909, 
and from that point on the company's main function was to supply the 
railroad with fuel for its locomotives. However, as early as 1906, the 
Associated possessed refineries, and, since its lands produced more oil 
than the Southern Pacific could use, the firm marketed refined goods up 
and down the West Coast.20 
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Producers throughout California followed this example. In 1910, the 
Independent Oil Producers Agency and the Coalinga Oil Producers Agen­
cy merged, adopting the title of the first body. The new organization 
concluded long-term contracts to dispose of its members' crude through the 
Union Oil and Associated Oil companies. Oil men expected these 
agreements to stabilize prices and place the petroleum business "upon a 
dependable basis."21 The agency also built extensive storage reservoirs in 
which to hold oil off the market in times of excess supply and tried to 
restrict the production of crude among its members.22 The Independent Oil 
Producers Agency soon became, however, more than a marketing organi­
zation. In 1910 and 1911, it cooperated with the Union Oil Company in 
constructing a high-capacity pipeline from the San Joaquin fields to tidewa­
ter at Port Harford, and several years later it entered the refining business. 
In taking this course of action the agency adopted a restrictive membership 
policy and sought profits for its stockholder-members alone.23 Still other 
producers in the Midway-Sunset, Lost Hills, Santa Maria, and Coalinga 
fields formed the General Petroleum Company in 1912. Though estab­
lished first simply as a selling agency, within a few years thefirm owned an 
extensive pipeline network and large-scale refineries. Conducting a 
wholesale business, it marketed its products throughout the Pacific Coast 
and much of the Southwest.24 
Oil companies also achieved vertical integration through backward 
linkages. Having first entered the retail end of the oil industry, they later 
developed their own oil lands to escape fluctuations in the supply and 
prices of crude. The Standard Oil Company broke into the California 
market as a seller of kerosene and, despite its purchase of the Pacific Coast 
Oil Company in 1900, continued to rely upon others for the bulk of its 
crude during the opening years of the twentieth century. As late as 1904, its 
California subsidiaries produced only 120,000 barrels of crude petroleum. 
Its vulnerability to supply shortages led the Standard into the production of 
crude. Between 1906 and 1910, the company built up a producing depart­
ment that searched for oil in untapped areas. Largely by drilling on its own 
lands the Standard climbed to first place among California oil producers by 
1919.25 The Shell Company of California (a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company) evolved in a similar manner. Beginning as an im­
porter of gasoline from Indonesia for California's retail trade, the Shell 
Company soon developed local sources of crude and refined goods. To 
avoid paying independent crude operators high prices and to assure itself of 
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adequate supplies, the firm purchased producing companies in the 
Coalinga region that it then linked by pipeline to refineries on San Fran­
cisco Bay.26 
Variations in California's crude output influenced the expansion of the 
Union Oil Company the least of any firm, but uncertainties affected even 
its growth. From its formation in 1890 Union Oil owned oil lands, 
pipelines, and refineries. However, in the face of the overproduction of 
crude in the early twentieth century, company officers placed growing 
emphasis on refined goods. In 1906, Union Oil began shifting from 
marketing fuel oil and asphalt to selling kerosene and gasoline, and these 
efforts were accelerated in later years.27 
By the outbreak of the First World War five or six vertically integrated 
companies dominated the oil business in California. No single firm ob­
tained a monopoly position in any phase of California's oil industry. Yet, 
this situation did not insure competition, for the companies reached 
agreements between themselves on prices and market territories. Oil men 
jointly drew up arrangements to end rate wars and circumscribe competi­
tion in both the fuel-oil and refined-products markets. The price of fuel oil 
varied with the output of crude, but, within limits set by fluctuations in 
production, most firms followed Standard Oil's lead in fixing prices. An 
investigator for the Federal Trade Commission reported that, as a result, 
prices in West Coast cities were' 'changed either simultaneously, or almost 
so, by the large marketing companies."28 Firms retailing gasoline and 
kerosene entered into more elaborate agreements. Following a three-year 
price war, a group of small refiners in Los Angeles formed the Independent 
Petroleum Marketers Association in 1915, and the General Petroleum, 
Union Oil, and Associated Oil companies soon became members. Only the 
Shell and Standard Oil companies remained outside its ranks. The associa­
tion set prices for refined products on the Pacific Coast, standardized 
customer classifications, and established market territories.29 
Neither vertical integration nor agreements between firms could, how­
ever, completely alleviate the pressure of overproduction. Most small 
operators lacked the resources needed to integrate their firms, and the 
decision of the Independent Oil Producers Agency to restrict its member­
ship deprived many of outlets for their crude. Even those belonging to the 
agency failed to escape the hardships resulting from the overproduction of 
crude, for the agency never developed sufficient refining facilities and had 
to rely upon more fully integrated firms to absorb some of the output of its 
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members. Nor did pacts between companies solve the problems of the oil 
men. Some firms always violated the agreements, and price wars con­
tinued despite the best efforts to reach agreements. 
Unable to restrict the production of oil by private agreements, indepen­
dent oil men turned to the state legislature for help. They sought the 
passage of laws limiting the output of crude in California. They hoped that, 
as demand caught up with supply, the prices they received for their crude 
would rise. Geologists, state officials, and others concerned with the 
conservation of natural resources joined the oil men in pressing for legisla­
tion. They feared that the soaring production would quickly deplete 
California's oil reserves and pointed out that in times of excess supply, 
drillers would profit by leaving the oil underground until consumption 
balanced production. 
Legislative action in California took place against the background of 
widespread concern about the nation's oil reserves. Geologists in the 
service of the federal government predicted that at the present rate of 
exploitation the reserves would be expended within twenty years. To a 
nation just coming to recognize that her natural wealth might not be 
inexhaustible, these warnings demanded remedial steps. Oil men in other 
sections of the United States faced the same problems as Californians, 
overproduction and low prices, and also called for limitations on the output 
of crude. When overproduction threatened the profits of Oklahoma natural 
gas men in 1913, they secured passage for a bill limiting the output from 
major pools. Oklahoma crude-oil producers won approval for a similar 
measure two years later. Texas oil men also invoked the aid of the state to 
help them out of their difficulties. In 1915, they pushed a bill through their 
legislature empowering the state corporation commission to close down 
any industry when there was danger of waste through overproduction.30 
Petroleum engineers and state officials began the campaign to conserve 
California's oil. As early as 1912, geologists attached to the state 
mineralogist's office pointed out that the state's oil pools were limited in 
volume and, once depleted, could not be replenished.31 After pondering a 
report prepared by three leading independent geologists in the same year, 
members of the Commonwealth Club of California urged officers of the 
state's oil companies to reduce their output of crude.32 In 1913, a special 
commission appointed by Governor Hiram Johnson to study California's 
natural resources labeled many of the practices of the state's oil producers 
as wasteful and inefficient, and a year later the state mineralogist began 
issuing monthly bulletins on production and market conditions in an 
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attempt to discourage further drilling.33 As output continued to soar, the 
state mineralogist condemned California oil men in late 1914 for their 
"extravagence and wastefulness."34 
Mark Requa, an independent petroleum engineer who became the head 
of the Oil Division of the Fuel Administration during the First World War, 
offered the most far-reaching analysis of the relation between overproduc­
tion and conservation. In a speech delivered before the American Institute 
of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers in 1912, he presented the argu­
ments emphasized by the proponents of conservation. Requa declared that 
crude should be produced only when its sale price at the well equaled or 
exceeded the cost of bringing it to the surface plus a normal profit. He 
denounced the excess storage of oil above ground as both technologically 
inefficient (because of losses caused by evaporation and fires) and econom­
ically unsound (since large amounts of petroleum in storage depressed 
prevailing crude prices). Like most Californians, Requa defined conserva­
tion as the economic and efficient use of natural resources and judged waste 
in terms of private profits and losses.35 
Long-standing demands for state legislation came to a head in 1915. As 
early as 1911, the legislators enacted a measure prohibiting the wastage of 
natural gas.36 A year later some of the smaller Los Angeles oil men formed 
the Oil Conservation Association and drafted a bill providing for state 
regulation of petroleum production.37 Nothing came of this proposal at that 
time, but, as excess supplies of crude continued to rise, oil men renewed 
their interest in legislation. By the winter of 1914-15, they were discussing 
measures for setting minimum prices for crude, creating a commission to 
regulate the drilling of new wells, and establishing ceilings on the profits of 
pipeline owners.38 Finally, in April, 1915, Senator William J. Carrof Los 
Angeles introduced a bill in Sacramento designed to end the overproduc­
tion of crude. Similar to the Texas law enacted earlier in the same year, the 
measure defined waste as the production or storage of oil in excess of 
current consumption needs and empowered the state railroad commission 
to prevent such wastage.39 In public hearings on his bill Carr spoke of it 
both as a way to stop evaporation losses suffered by supplies of crude held 
in storage and as a tool to abolish excess production.40 
Senator Carr's measure split the ranks of the state's oil men. The small 
independent producers who sold their output of crude without refining it 
favored the bill. Many of them were operating at a loss and would have 
accepted any proposition that promised to boost the price of crude. As one 
noted, they were being "drowned in their own output." The bill's 
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strongest support came from the Independent Oil Producers Agency whose 
president traveled to the state capital to lobby for its passage. Firms 
engaged in the finished products end of the petroleum business opposed the 
measure. Believing that its enactment would raise crude oil prices, they 
feared the measure might cut into their profits. Representatives of the Shell 
Company, which at this time depended upon other producers for much of 
its crude, denounced Carr's bill as "discriminatory and unjust" and 
threatened that, if it passed, their corporation would look elsewhere for 
investment opportunities. Even California's most highly integrated firms, 
the Standard and Union oil companies, still purchased substantial quan­
tities of their crude from independent producers and probably worked 
against the proposal.41 
Despite a favorable report from the committee on oil industries, Carr's 
measure failed in the senate by a vote of twelve to twenty-one. The 
divisions separating the different groups of oil men damaged its chances for 
success. Able to obtain support only from the small producers, Senator 
Carr found it difficult to convince his colleagues that his proposition was 
the best way to protect the state's oil resources, particularly since some of 
the companies opposing his bill had instituted conservation practices on 
their own several years before. Questions concerning the bill's constitu­
tionality, especially the wide powers given the railroad commission, also 
detracted from its appeal. Finally, in mid-1915, the consumption of oil 
began catching up with production, and this unexpected occurrence under­
cut the arguments of those backing Carr's proposal. Within a few years 
wartime demands boosted the price of crude, and overproduction ceased to 
be an issue in state politics until the discovery of new fields again created 
surplus crude supplies in the mid-1920s.42 
State Regulation of Pipelines 
Like the fields discovered in Texas and Oklahoma, most of California's 
oil pools were far from centers of petroleum consumption, and the oil men 
had to devise a cheap and efficient way to ship their output to market. In the 
early days strings of tank wagons drawn by as many as forty braying mules 
hauled crude from wells in the San Joaquin Valley to the nearest rail­
roads.43 This method of transportation proved extremely costly and disap­
peared when the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroads completed spurs 
into the oil districts in the opening years of the twentieth century. Yet, 
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railroad rates remained high even after the introduction of tank cars, and 
service was at times unreliable.44 Shipment by ocean-going tankers and 
barges was more economical, and Californians pioneered in this type of 
transportation. However, even where such shipments were feasible, oil 
men had to first get their output to tidewater.45 Pipelines provided the 
solution to the difficulties Californians faced, and, by 1920, the state's oil 
companies had blanketed California with five major systems of gathering 
and trunk lines.46 
Oil producers found access to pipelines essential, for the costs of 
transportation by pipeline were far below those by rail, but they met 
numerous obstacles in shipping their output to market by this mode of 
conveyance.47 Few operators possessed the capital needed to build their 
own lines. The Standard Oil Company's pipeline from the San Joaquin 
fields to its refinery at Richmond on San Francisco Bay required an 
expenditure of over $3,000,000, a sum few other firms could have 
raised.48 Nor could the smaller producers rely upon competition among the 
companies owning pipelines to provide outlets for their crude. Many had 
connections with only one pipeline system. Before 1908, only the Standard 
Oil's lines served the Kern River, McKittrick, and Midway fields. Even 
after other firms constructed pipeline systems, lease arrangements, pur­
chase options, price agreements, and interlocking directorships limited 
competition among the pipeline companies.49 California's excess produc­
tion of crude heightened these problems. Pipeline companies favored oil 
from their own wells in scheduling shipments when their lines were being 
utilized at full capacity. Moreover, some refused to transport any petro­
leum except their own. This policy could bar their facilities to independent 
producers, for in periods of excess production the pipeline companies often 
ceased purchasing any crude from outside sources. 
Crude producers in other regions facing similar problems turned to their 
state legislatures and Congress for aid. From the 1870s on, oil men in the 
Appalachian fields sought laws making pipelines common carriers, and, as 
new fields opened, operators in them also pressed for regulatory legisla­
tion . The crude operators frequently blamed the pipeline owners for the 
low prices they obtained and worked for the common-carrier legislation as 
one way to increase their profits. Largely as a result of their agitation, 
Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, Kansas, and Ohio had, by 1906, 
declared pipelines common carriers. In 1905, the federal government also 
entered the picture. At the request of crude producers the Bureau of 
50 The Politics of Business in California, 1890-1920 
Corporations investigated the oil industry, and a year later a section of 
the Hepburn Act empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
regulate pipelines that crossed state boundaries.50 
Californians began their campaign for state control in 1905. Senator E. 
J. Emmons of Kern County, oneof the state's major oil regions, introduced 
a bill in the legislative session of that year proclaiming pipelines common 
carriers. Under its terms the state railroad commission was to supervise 
rates and conditions of service. Presenting his proposal at the end of five 
years of excess crude production, Emmons asserted that "under the present 
conditions the small producers'' had to make "contracts with the Standard 
Oil for the sale of their oil atridiculously low prices or else close down their 
wells." Only if pipelines were defined as common carriers could, Emmons 
claimed, firms like the Standard "be made to take the commodity offered 
for transportation from any person offering it." In the assembly J. R. 
Dorsey, also of Kern County, presented an identical bill, and its supporters 
employed similar arguments in its favor.51 Opposition to these measures 
came mainly from the Standard Oil's subsidiary, the Pacific Coast Oil 
Company. B. C. Carroll, the firm's vice-president, appeared in Sac­
ramento to fight the advocates of regulation. Like the opponents of regula­
tion in other states, he argued that, because the pipelines had been built at 
private expense, they were private property not subject to state supervi­
sion. Carroll casually brushed aside claims that, since the legislature had 
granted pipeline companies the power of eminent domain and because they 
crossed public highways, pipelines could be regulated by the state.52 
The opposition of the pipeline companies was persistent and effective, 
and the bills introduced by Emmons and Dorsey died without coming to a 
vote. The crude producers never mounted a well-organized drive on behalf 
of the measures. The subject was so new (the first long-distance line had 
been completed in California only two years before) that they lacked 
experience and knowledge in dealing with it. Moreover, confusion existed 
as to whether overproduction or transportation difficulties were hurting the 
small operators. Even many producers conceded that the surplus of crude 
rather than monopolistic control of pipelines was responsible for the low 
prices of their output, and this admission undercut the arguments of those 
backing Emmons and Dorsey.53 
State regulation of pipelines again became a burning issue when crude 
production outstripped consumption in the years after 1909. The decision 
of Standard Oil, in September, 1912, to restrict its purchases of crude acted 
as a catalyst for those desiring legislation. Since the Standard refused to 
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ship any petroleum other than its own, this move threatened the livelihood 
of many of the state's operators. Lacking adequate alternate lines, a large 
number capped their wells and organized to press for relief by political 
means. Led by Timothy Spellacy, a shut-down producer who headed the 
Mascot and Cresceus oil companies, they again sought the regulation of 
pipelines as common carriers.54 
Turning first to the national government, the operators worked for 
supervision by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Although recogniz­
ing that none of California's pipelines crossed state boundaries, they 
pointed out that nearly all passed over public domain without proper 
authorization and urged federal officials to force a common carrier status 
upon them. Representatives of the Standard Oil Company moved to pre­
vent such an eventuality by seeking an extension of an act of Congress that 
had given private pipelines rights-of-way through federal lands in Arkan­
sas. In the maneuvering that followed issues became clouded and lost in 
committee hearings. The Standard failed to win approval for its measure, 
but the Interstate Commerce Commission declined to accept supervision of 
California's pipelines.55 
Thwarted in Washington, the crude producers went to Sacramento. In 
1913, Senator L. R. Hewitt of Los Angeles introduced a bill declaring oil 
pipelines common carriers under the jurisdiction of the state railroad 
commission. The producers strongly backed this measure and employed 
Francis Heney, an attorney who had gained renown for his prosecution of 
San Francisco's corrupt boss Abe Ruef, as their lobbyist. They asserted 
that since the Standard had stopped buying their crude, no sufficient outlets 
were available to get their crude to market. Competition among pipeline 
companies was, they argued, more apparent than real, for lease 
agreements, purchase options, and location differences had created a 
community of interest among pipeline owners. Not even the Independent 
Oil Producers Agency that, in conjunction with the Union Oil Company, 
possessed a line from the San Joaquin fields to Port Harford protected their 
interests. Spellacy testified that its restrictive membership policy and rigid 
price arrangements with the Union Oil Company had ended its usefulness 
to most independent producers. The operators had no qualms about the 
state's power to regulate pipelines. Since most pipelines had exercised the 
right of eminent domain and because all crossed public roads, the lines fell, 
they believed, within a realm of state supervision.56 
Pipeline owners offered sharp resistance to Hewitt's bill. Though the 
officers of the Standard Oil Company avoided the fray because they felt 
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any actions they took would be counterproductive, the executives of most 
pipeline companies showed less reticence. Representatives of all of the 
state's other major pipeline companies, including the president of the 
Independent Oil Producers Agency, testified against the common carrier 
measure. Some raised technical objections, that oil of varying degrees of 
gravity could not be transported in the same lines. Others asserted that the 
regulation of prices by the state would, in effect, deprive them of their 
property rights without due process of law and would, therefore, violate the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. From these de­
fensive positions the officers of pipeline corporations moved to the offen­
sive. Far from assuring the existence of competition, a common carrier law 
would, they claimed, stifle it. Hewitt's proposal would fill up the pipelines 
of Standard's competitors with low-gravity oil, useless for refining and 
would, they stated, prevent successful competition in gasoline and 
kerosene.57 
Despite the attacks by pipeline owners, Hewitt's bill became law. It 
declared oil pipelines common carriers whose rates and conditions of 
service were to be set by the state railroad commission. Two other mea­
sures gave the act clout. One required pipelines over thirty-five miles long 
that were not operated as common carriers to pay a prohibitive tax of fifty 
cents per barrel on oil transported across public highways. The other 
forbade any relations between railroads and piepline companies in restraint 
of trade. 
Several reasons explain why legislation that failed in 1905 passed eight 
years later. The enactment of a law providing for state regulation of 
railroads and public utilities in 1911 helped pave the way for control of 
pipelines. Then, too, by 1913, government supervision of pipelines was 
more common. Oklahoma declared pipelines common carriers in 1909, 
and the Mann-Elkins Act strengthened federal control over interstate 
pipelines a year later. Most importantly, the refusal of the Standard Oil 
Company to purchase or transport the crude of independents clarified for 
many a hitherto confused question. The Standard's action focused atten­
tion on one aspect of the complex problem of the regulation of the 
production and transportation of petroleum. Gone were the doubts of those 
working for common carrier legislation in earlier years. By 1913, nearly all 
legislators believed that monopoly control rather than overproduction was 
the main problem. Finally, the crude producers succeeded in presenting 
their measure as one that would aid not just themselves, but the general 
public at large. Consumers, in particular, the crude operators averred, 
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would benefit from decreases in the cost of oil carriage. As Spellacy often 
argued, the common carrier measure would prove "an effective check to 
monopoly" and "a wise and just measure for the good of producers and 
consumers."58 
The crude oil producers realized that the passage of common carrier laws 
did not insure their enforcement. In the summer of 1913 the larger San 
Joaquin operators and some of the industrial consumers of fuel oil in the 
Los Angeles area organized the Oil Producers and Consumers League to 
safeguard their interests. The association planned to establish an informa­
tion bureau that would report runs of petroleum by the pipeline companies 
and all orders that might be used to sidetrack the shipments of the smaller 
producers. Yet, only the Standard Oil Company agreed to operate its 
pipelines as common carriers, and the rates it charged, combined with the 
conditions it set for the use of its lines (one requirement was that only lots of 
100,000 barrels or more would be handled), left the small producer little 
better off than before. The other firms waited to see how the railroad 
commission would administer the common carrier laws and refused to 
transport any crude but their own.59 
After lengthy hearings and investigations the railroad commission an­
nounced its policy for the future in late 1914. Its members found that the 
state's leading pipeline companies had "secured the control and monopoly 
of the transportation of crude oil, petroleum and the products thereof from 
the San Joaquin Valley oil fields." To change this situation the commis­
sioners ordered those firms to employ their lines as public carriers. How­
ever, the commission felt that the coastal oil districts presented substan­
tially different conditions. Here many short lines connected the fields with 
the tidewater, and, because the commissioners believed real competition 
existed, they allowed these carriers to continue business as private con­
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Even before the railroad commission announced its findings the pipeline 
companies took legal actions to negate the common carrier laws. In 1913, 
the Associated Oil Company secured an injunction temporarily enjoining 
the railroad commission from enforcing the acts. Four years later the 
California Supreme Court, accepting the firm's claim that, since it shipped 
only oil produced on its own lands, it should be permitted to do business as 
a private carrier, ruled in favor of the Associated. In 1919, Standard Oil 
used a stockholder's suit against the company to have the federal courts 
strike down as unconstitutional the law that levied a fee on oil shipped 
across public highways in pipelines not operated as common carriers. 
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Thus, by 1920, legal decisions had dismantled most of the common carrier 
legislation enacted seven years before. However, with the relative decline 
of the San Joaquin oil districts and the opening of new fields closer to 
tidewater after the First World War, the topic of pipeline regulation 
receded in importance.61 
Science and Technology 
Exacerbating their economic problems were the numerous scientific and 
technical difficulties California oil men met in finding, producing, and 
refining their petroleum. California's scrambled rock formations baffled 
oil-seekers accustomed to the more predictable strata of other areas. The 
chemical properties of California crude made it extremely hard to refine, 
and, as a result, for many years most went to market as fuel oil. Probably 
the most vexing problem was how to keep water out of the wells, for in the 
early twentieth century the intrustion of water threatened the very existence 
of California's major fields. The oil men first tried to solve these problems 
independently or through voluntary cooperation. However, when it be­
came evident that their private efforts alone would not suffice, they 
obtained the aid of state officials. 
California oil companies led the nation in employing geologists to search 
for oil. In 1897, subsidiaries of the Southern Pacific Railroad established 
the first geology department in the petroleum industry, and two years later 
the Union Oil Company set up a similar division.62 By 1915, all of 
California's major producers had geologists in the field looking for un­
tapped pools and supervising production in the older ones. Discoveries in­
creasingly depended upon knowledge about structural formations, anti­
clines and synclines, and less on finding surface indications. Despite the 
feelings of some pioneers in the business that scientists were about as 
useful "as tits to a boar pig," trained geologists had become an essential 
feature of California's oil industry by the outbreak of the First World 
War.63 State agencies also provided sorely needed help in developing new 
discovery techniques. The state mineralogist's office issued bulletin after 
bulletin analyzing California's geology and pointing out signs by which oil 
fields could be recognized.64 
From the earliest days of the California oil industry the high viscosity 
and impurities of the state's crude puzzled refiners. A chemist employed by 
the Union Oil Company in 1894 emphasized the uniqueness of California 
petroleum. "The trouble with California oil is," he asserted, that "no one 
knows anything about it."65 A decade later a scientist attached to the state 
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mining bureau lamented that the chemistry of California crude was still 
shrouded in "considerable obscurity."66 State sponsored research and 
experiments by individual companies ultimately resulted in the develop­
ment of successful refining techniques. The Union Oil Company hired 
professional chemists to find ways to distill kerosene in the early 1890s, 
and, in 1896, E. A. Starke, a powder-explosives expert employed by the 
Pacific Coast Oil Company, discovered how to rid California crude of its 
carbonaceous properties.67 This breakthrough proved the value of scien­
tific research and led to further work by. company chemists and state 
officials. The California Bureau of Mining publicized advancements in 
bulletins distributed at state expense and in articles written for California's 
oil journals. The discovery of new uses for oil, especially as the base for 
gasoline, required continuous research to improve refining methods. The 
building of the Shell Company's refinery at Martinez in 1915 and 1916 
highlighted the progress Californians had made. Using both European and 
American processes, it was one of the most advanced plants in the United 
States.68 
The infiltration of water into their oil fields, more than any other 
technical problem, threatened the profits of California oil men. In many 
fields strata containing water existed above or below those holding oil. 
When drillers pierced the impermeable layers of clay or sandstone that 
separated the oil and water bearing sands, the water often seeped into the 
petroleum and rendered it useless for either refining or fuel oil. Because 
more than one company usually drew its oil from the same underground 
pool, water hit in one firm's drilling operations could easily hinder the 
work of others. By 1914, the damage was widespread. In the Coalinga 
field, which probably suffered the most, over one-quarter of the wells were 
producing more than 10 percent water. One operator, surveying the 
devastation around him, caustically remarked that the oil industry was "the 
most important water business in the state!"69 
Because the larger companies had the most to lose from water damage 
and possessed the capital needed to experiment with ways to prevent it, 
they led the campaign to end the intrusion of water. In 1903, Union Oil 
crews devised methods of cementing well casings to stop the flow of water 
between different strata, and six years later Standard Oil adopted a similar 
process in Midway field. However, these efforts hardly made a dent in the 
problem. The neglect of a single company could let water into an entire 
field. Small operators working on a shoestring found the cementing pro­
cesses prohibitively expensive, and in many fields only the larger firms 
could afford suitable casing. Abandoned wells presented a similar diffi­
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culty, for, unless they were correctly filled, they might also let water into 
the field. Since bankrupt companies lacked the funds to accomplish this 
task, complaints about improperly abandoned wells were chronic.70 
Oil men soon realized that they needed police power to halt water 
intrusion, and political action began in 1903. In that year oil men obtained 
legislation that set standards for casing techniques, but, lacking any en­
forcement mechanism, the measure had little effect on drilling practices.71 
In 1909, the legislature strengthened this law with an act that held anyone 
letting water into his well liable for the cost of closing it. County oil 
commissioners paid by county funds were to administer the law. This 
measure failed to control the situation, for few counties appointed oil 
supervisors, and those who took office were overworked and underpaid. 
Small operators violated the law with impunity, and not even all the larger 
firms supported it, because some still felt the answer to their difficulties lay 
in their own individual efforts.72 
During the next four years concern over damage to California's oil 
reserves mounted, and the larger companies established cooperative or­
ganizations to stem the flow of water. In early 1912, operators in the 
Sunset, Midway, and McKittrick districts set up the Kern County Oil 
Protective Association. Farther north, producers formed the Coalinga 
Water Arbitration Association. Both organizations were dominated by 
large firms that feared losing their investments due to damage caused by 
their smaller neighbors. The associations worked closely with county 
officers in correlating the well logs for each field. In this manner the oil 
men put together accurate descriptions of the strata that enabled them to 
predict at what levels they would hit water. Association members also 
advised each other on ways to shut off water. However, neither of the 
bodies proved successful, for without legal sanctions they could not force 
their regulations upon those who chose not to join.73 
Recognizing the failure of voluntary cooperation, the larger producers 
returned to the state legislature. They desired legislation, because water 
infiltration cut into their present earnings. As the opposition of many of 
these same firms to legislation limiting crude production demonstrated, 
they cared little about conservation as an end in itself or even as a means to 
guarantee production in the future. Only when conservation promised 
quick dividends, would oil men back it. Because the drive to restrict the 
output of crude threatened the profits of their firms, they fought it. When, 
on the other hand, the intrusion of water reduced their income, they 
supported conservation measures designed to eliminate it. 
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State officials and petroleum engineers worked with the oil men in their 
campaign to end water damage. Mark Requa, a leader in the movement to 
limit crude production, also appeared in the vanguard of those who viewed 
water infiltration as a hindrance to oil conservation. In 1910, he pointed 
out that in the past it had been "the eventual fate" of all oil fields to be 
"drowned in water" and urged the major producers to adopt practices to 
avert this eventuality in California.74 Two years later he expressed more 
concern. In a report prepared for the Commonwealth Club of California in 
1912 he rated water infiltration as the number one problem facing oil men 
and called for the taxation of all producers to provide funds with which the 
state mining bureau could fight it.75 The state mineralogist and Governor 
Johnson's conservation commission also recommended the enactment of 
new legislation to avoid further injury.76 
In 1913, a legislative contest over measures to prevent water infiltration 
laid bare divisions within the California oil industry. The Kern County Oil 
Protective Association secured consideration for a bill drafted by its mem­
bers. The proposal provided for the creation of oil districts headed by state 
officials empowered to take any steps necessary to keep out water. The oil 
men, who were to possess votes proportional to the amount of land they 
owned and actually had in production, would elect the officials. The larger 
companies, joined by conservation advocates, strongly backed this mea­
sure. Representatives of the smaller firms, however, presented sharp 
opposition to it. They pointed out that its voting arrangements discrimi­
nated against them and complained that they lacked the funds to comply 
with strict terms for cementing wells. Officers of the Kern County Oil 
Company, the F C. Berry Company, C. F Brant, Inc., and about one 
hundred other concerns presented a petition to the legislature denouncing 
the bill. Despite their protests, the measure unanimously passed both the 
senate and assembly. Governor Johnson, however, vetoed it. He recog­
nized the danger of water damage, but he agreed with the small operators 
that the plan gave too much power to the large producers. For this reason he 
asked the oil men to rework their proposal for the next leg islative session.7 7 
Pressure for legislation increased during the following two years, and 
the oil men achieved success in 1915. After visiting the San Joaquin fields, 
R. P. McLaughlin, who headed the petroleum division within the state 
mining bureau, concluded that "immense qualities of liquid wealth" were 
being lost to "the encroaching floods of water."78 Meetings between oil 
men and state officials generated broad-based support for a new mea­
sure.79 The bill that emerged from these conferences called for the creation 
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of a new department, the office of oil and gas supervisor, within the state 
mining bureau. The proposal empowered the supervisor, aided by deputies 
in the field, to secure well logs and any other information possessed by 
private companies on the question of water infiltration. Upon the complaint 
of three operators within one mile of any well the supervisor or one of his 
deputies would investigate the situation and recommend remedial actions. 
A board of three arbitrators (one appointed by the complainants, one by the 
well owner, and one by the state mineralogist) would examine and rule 
upon the supervisor's report. County superior courts could subject the 
board's findings to still further review. This complicated procedure with its 
many checks and balances both placated the small producers and promised 
relief for the larger companies. The bill obtained legislative approval with 
little dissent and quickly secured Governor Johnson's signature to become 
law.80 
R. P McLaughlin, the first oil and gas supervisor, worked closely with 
the oil producers in administering the new measure. He solicited their 
advice upon how to implement the law and employed "practical oil men" 
as his deputies in the fields. After his first year on the job McLaughlin 
reported that conditions were "almost ideal," largely as a result of "the 
hearty cooperation by a large majority of the oil operators throughout the 
state."81 State Mineralogist Fletcher Hamilton also stressed the need for 
government-business understanding. He noted that although the oil and gas 
supervisor could compel the repair of wells letting in water, he hoped that 
the supervisor would act not "as a prosecuting officer, but rather as an 
advisory department to the operators."82 
In its first few years of existence the office of oil and gas supervisor won 
only a partial victory over water intrusion. The department's advice helped 
individual operators, but the infiltration of water into California's major 
fields continued. The supervisor concentrated the work of his deputies in 
the San Joaquin fields and in 1915 and 1916 ordered that water be shut off 
in 414 wells in these regions.83 However, regardless of the supervisor's 
claims about the cooperation of the state's producers, small operators 
evaded and appealed his orders. In some districts the damage done by water 
actually increased. In the Westside portion of the Coalinga field, for 
instance, drillers were making 29 percent water in 1916, but over 40 
percent five years later. Despite the best efforts of the larger companies and 
state officials, the intrusion of water seriously hindered operations into the 
1920s.84 
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As was true in California's other leading industries, oil men sought to 
solve their problems by a mixture of individual actions, voluntary coopera­
tion, and state legislation. However, attempts to deal with the overproduc­
tion of petroleum, the regulation of pipelines, and water damage revealed 
more divisions than unanimity among the state's oil men. Rifts between 
large and small producers, refiners and producers, and the owners and 
nonowning users of pipelines quickly opened. The conflicts that developed 
within the oil industry could often be resolved only in the legislative arena. 
Many of the issues at stake, especially those involving conservation 
matters, attracted the attention of elements outside of the oil industry. In 
most cases those oil men who could best appeal for support beyond their 
own narrow interest group proved most successful in getting their way in 
Sacramento. Thus, the backing of independent geologists and of offi­
cials in the state mining bureau was of great help to those desiring strict 
measures to halt the flow of water into California's oil fields. By the same 
token, the smaller independent crude producers finally succeeded in 
having pipelines declared common carriers, at least in part, because they 
argued that taking such action would benefit oil consumers, not just 
themselves. 
The contests over legislation to limit the output of crude and end the 
intrusion of water also shed valuable light on the attitudes of California 
businessmen toward conservation. Most oil men backed conservation 
measures only when they promised immediate benefits. In this respect they 
were remarkably myopic and took few precautions for the future. Only the 
larger companies performed any long-term planning, and even their efforts 
were, at best, rudimentary. Yet, most other California businessmen shared 
this outlook. The state's lumbermen supported conservation proposals for 
their industry only when assured that they would profit by doing so. Few 
businessmen considered the public consequences resulting from their ac­
tions. Instead, nearly all thought of conservation simply in terms of private 
gains or losses. 
The Lumber Industry and Scientific Forestry 
California lumbermen faced situations analogous to those troubling the 
state's farmers and oil men. As the number of trees cut mounted each year, 
production outran consumption. Confronted with rising costs at a time 
when the prices they received for their products remained steady, the 
lumbermen found themselves in a perilous situation. Yet, at the same time, 
the newly completed railroad network and, at a later date, the opening of 
the Panama Canal, promised a rosy future if proper marketing arrange­
ments could be secured. Questions of conservation also concerned lum­
bermen and were directly related to their problem of overproduction. 
Lumber interests long recognized the advisability of fire prevention and 
reforestation measures, but they actively supported scientific forestry only 
when rising lumber prices and a scarcity of timber made it economically 
feasible and desirable. 
None of the problems Californians encountered were completely new, 
for the rapid expansion of the lumber industry caused difficulties for 
lumbermen in all parts of the nation in the nineteenth century. Yet, 
although they faced few wholly unique situations, California lumbermen 
often devised original solutions, particularly with regard to conservation. 
When they reached the Pacific Coast, lumbermen could no longer migrate 
to new territories once they had logged over an area. In California and the 
other Pacific Coast states lumbermen reached their last frontier and, for the 
first time, had to grapple seriously with conservation issues. When they 
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finally realized that American forests were of limited extent, California 
lumbermen pressed for novel forestry measures and land-taxation policies 
as the only way to guarantee the future survival of their industry. 
Lumbermen and Overproduction 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Californians found 
themselves caught in a squeeze between rising costs and relatively steady 
prices received for their lumber. Between 1899 and 1916, the annual cut of 
pine and redwood in California nearly doubled, and lumbermen correctly 
blamed this rapid increase for preventing any significant rise in prices.1 
The prices of redwood and pine, while climbing temporarily during the 
rebuilding of San Francisco after the earthquake and fire of 1906, generally 
fluctuated little in the two decades before the outbreak of the First World 
War.2 At the same time the costs of production soared. Logging operations 
required increasingly complex machinery. Donkey engines replaced oxen 
in yarding the felled trees, and steam locomotives took over the chore of 
transporting them to the mills. In the mills single- and double-band saws 
supplanted the older circular saws. Although mechanical improvements 
eventually increased the profits of the lumber companies, their initial 
impact was detrimental. Financed mainly out of current earnings, the 
innovations raised operating expenses. Mounting labor costs and the rising 
price of timberlands also bit into income. In a painstakingly detailed 
examination made for the Department of Agriculture in 1915, Swift Berry, 
a forestry expert, concluded that the prices pine men received barely 
covered their costs of production, and the same situation existed in the 
redwood industry as well.3 
Overproduction and low prices had bothered lumbermen from the time 
their industry became a big business at the close of the Civil War, and the 
efforts of timber barons in other areas to deal with these problems fore­
shadowed the actions of Californians at a later date. As their expenses 
rose in the 1870s and 1880s, many firms in the Great Lakes states turned to 
vertical integration. By controlling every step of lumbering, from felling 
the trees to marketing the finished products, company officials hoped to 
retain all the profits of the business for themselves. To capture economies 
of scale, company officers increased the size of their firms, and many of 
the smaller establishments merged. On the industry-wide level, lumber­
men set up trade associations to control output, quality standards, and 
prices. Timbermen also sought government aid, especially tariff protec­
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tion from Canadian imports. When they moved west and south in the 
1890s and the opening years of the twentieth century, lumbermen tried 
to protect themselves in the familiar ways. Large, vertically integrated 
companies dominated the industry, and trade associations took on a new 
strength, particularly in the Pacific Northwest.4 
Like their counterparts elsewhere, California lumbermen responded to 
the narrowing of their profit margins by restructuring their firms along the 
lines of vertical integration. Redwood companies that had once contracted 
with independent drivers to float their logs downriver to the mills took over 
this task themselves, and, as they logged off areas accessible to the river 
driving, they constructed railroads to transport their timber. In the early 
twentieth century the redwood companies also began building and operat­
ing their own coastal schooners to ship lumber to San Francisco and other 
points. In the Sierra pineries the same changes occurred. Independently 
operated flumes gave way to company-owned railroads as the chief means 
of carrying lumber. By the same token, firms that produced only un­
finished lumber in the 1880s and 1890s expanded their operations to 
include drying kilns, planing mills, box factories, and sash and door plants. 
Lumbermen discovered new uses for what had once been considered waste 
materials; redwood bark and sawdust, for instance, found profitable mar­
kets. 
Individual companies also increased in size. As early as the 1890s, 
reduced profits began forcing small concerns to merge or go out of 
business, and in the twentieth century this trend became still more pro­
nounced. As the manager of California's largest lumber trade association 
pointed out in 1917, heavy capital investments made large-scale produc­
tion "an economic necessity." The growth in individual sawmill capacity 
illustrated the tendency toward bigness. In 1900, small mills with circular 
or single-band saws still cut much of California's lumber, but two decades 
later large mills employing double-band saws clearly predominated. Al­
though the total production of the mills greatly increased during this 
period, their number fell by one-fifth. By 1920, mills with an annual output 
of 10 million or more board feet apiece prepared 85 percent of Califor­
nia's lumber.5 
The development of the Diamond Match Company in Butte County 
epitomized the movement toward vertical integration and bigness. Migrat­
ing from the East, the firm's officers started purchasing timberlands in 
1902 and within a few years had acquired nearly 70,000 acres of mixed 
conifer woodlands in the Sierras. Relegating match production to the 
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background, the company entered into all phases of the lumber business. 
The firm logged its lands with sophisticated equipment constructed in its 
own machine shops. From the forest the company's narrow-gauge rail­
roads carried the felled timber to its sawmills and plywood and veneer 
factories near Chico. From this locality a thirty-two-mile standard-gauge 
line built by Diamond Match at a cost exceeding $ 1,500,000 connected the 
plants with the Southern Pacific's branch through the Sacramento Valley.6 
Even the officers of such highly organized concerns as Diamond Match 
soon learned, however, that they could not insulate their firms from 
fluctuations in supply and demand by their own independent actions and 
formed trade associations to protect their market positions and profits. 
Selling specialized products and operating in an industry dominated by a 
few large firms, redwood lumbermen found it relatively easy to cooperate 
in the pursuit of common goals. Because their side of the lumber business 
contained many companies of all sizes manufacturing a multitude of 
products, pine men found cooperation more difficult. Yet, by 1916, even 
they possessed a comprehensive trade association dedicated to raising the 
prices members received for their goods. 
Redwood men made their first significant effort to set up an industry-
wide organization with the establishment of the Redwood Manufacturers 
Association in 1893. Organized at a time when, as one leading lumberman 
noted, "money has been and is being lost on every stick of timber 
produced," the association set monthly production quotas for member 
mills and published price lists for their products. The body also sought to 
enter eastern and foreign markets and obtained some reductions in trans­
continental freight rates. Yet, the association lasted for only a few years. 
Prices and quotas, and the red tape involved in establishing them, caused 
innumerable disagreements. More importantly, several companies refused 
to join and consistently undercut the published prices. By 1898, the 
association had disbanded, and each mill was again "a law unto itself."7 
Chronically low prices led to renewed efforts to organize the redwood 
business in the twentieth century. In late 1903, many of the larger firms 
formed the Redwood Manufacturers Company, which constructed a single 
large plant at tidewater in Contra Costa County. Controlling three-quarters 
of California's annual output of redwood, this company operated drying 
kilns to season wood, planing mills, and a sash and door factory. Aided by 
demands resulting from the rebuilding of San Francisco, the Redwood 
Manufacturers Company commanded high prices for its products through 
1908. However, during the next few years consumption and prices 
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dropped, and, in 1912, the Casper Lumber Company bought the facilities 
for its own use.8 Lumbermen tried a different approach with the creation of 
the California Redwood Association in 1916. Composed of companies 
representing 80 percent of California's yearly cut of redwood, this body 
publicized the advantages of redwood in home construction and other uses. 
It maintained a sales agency in New York and established uniform grades 
of lumber to meet the specifications of East Coast buyers. The organiza­
tion's manager also tried, with some success, to secure reductions in 
transcontinental freight rates. The California Redwood Association made 
no attempts to fix prices or production quotas, and, probably because it 
limited the scope of its actions, the association still exists today.9 
Lumbermen in the pine regions were somewhat slower in forming trade 
associations. In 1896, the owners of seventy-four mills set up the Central 
Lumber Company of California to deal with the question of overproduc­
tion. Pine-mill capacity on the Pacific Coast at that time greatly exceeded 
consumption, and "ruinous competition" had, according to the president 
of the new establishment, driven prices below the costs of production. A 
loose confederation rather than an operating firm, the Central Lumber 
Company tried to fix uniform prices and grades for its members' products, 
but the organization disappeared within several years. Too many firms 
remained outside its ranks to make its price lists effective, and competition 
from Pacific Northwest lumber further eroded its power.10 The collapse of 
the Central Lumber Company left the pine operators unorganized for over a 
decade. Finally, in late 1910, at a meeting called by the manager of the 
National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, they formed the Sugar and 
White Pine Manufacturers Association of California and Adjacent States. 
Designed only to define market territories for its members, the organiza­
tion obtained no control over production and failed to raise prices.11 
The pine operators, like the redwood men, made a new departure in 
1916. Joined together as the California White and Sugar Pine Manufactur­
ers Association, they concentrated on opening markets rather than fixing 
prices or production quotas. Their association trumpeted the values of 
western pine throughout the nation, and, in conjunction with the lumber­
men of Idaho, eastern Washington, and eastern Oregon, enforced strict 
grading standards for its members' products. Representing nearly three-
quarters of the pine lumber cut in California, the association also entered 
politics on railroad matters. In 1917, it sent exhibits to the national capital 
protesting a proposed transcontinental rate hike, and two years later its 
traffic committee worked for the passage of Albert Cummins's federal 
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railroad bill. Moreover the organization, working in cooperation with other 
regional and national associations, circulated trade statistics and in this 
manner may have dampened price competition.12 
Californians, like lumbermen in the Great Lakes states before them, 
discovered that neither the vertical integration of their companies nor the 
formation of trade associations could adequately assure them of profits in 
times of excess production. Single firms could not cope with industry-wide 
problems. Nor were trade associations completely successful. Tight or­
ganizations designed to limit output and fix prices failed, because they 
could never gain a monopoly over their markets. Some firms, desiring 
immediate profits or able to operate at a lower cost than their neighbors, 
always remained outside and undercut their prices. Looser associations set 
up to expand markets found it easier to attract members but did little better 
in raising prices. The increases that came after 1915 resulted more from 
wartime demands than the actions of trade associations. Coordination 
between the various regional trade associations could, perhaps, have 
helped solve the problems of California lumbermen, but only isolated 
instances of cooperation took place. California pine competed with pine 
from the South and the Pacific Northwest, and even redwood often had to 
contend with fir and pine from Washington and Oregon in many markets. 
Although relying chiefly upon restructuring their firms and establishing 
trade associations as ways of solving their problems, Californians also 
worked through the state and federal governments. Lumbermen consis­
tently sought tariff increases to protect forest products from foreign compe­
tition. In the early 1890s, lumbermen from the Pacific Coast and the Old 
Northwest fought attempts to place lumber on the free list. Despite their 
defeat on this issue with the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Act in 1894, 
Californians remained vocal advocates of a high tariff for the next several 
decades.13 Both pine and redwood operators desired lower railroad rates to 
open new territories for their products. They supported state and federal 
railroad regulatory measures and frequently appeared before the California 
Railroad Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission to request 
lower rates and better service.14 Some California lumbermen also advo­
cated the enactment of a "pure lumber" law by Congress in 1916. Inspired 
by the Pure Food and Drug Act of ten years before, it would have set 
standard grades for lumber sold anywhere in the United States. By improv­
ing the quality of their products, the lumbermen hoped to increase the 
consumption of their goods. Nothing, however, came of this proposal.15 
California lumbermen further sought official sanction for the price­
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fixing and quota-setting activities of their trade associations. In this en­
deavor they faced the twin barriers of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright 
law, a California antitrust act modeled on the federal legislation. The 
lumbermen opposed the passage of the Cartwright Act in 1907 and worked 
for its repeal during the next legislative session. Thwarted in these efforts, 
they turned their fire on the Sherman Act. Though not troubled much by its 
provisions in the 1890s, they grew more concerned as progressive politi­
cians began applying it to other industries in the twentieth century. Both the 
California Redwood Association and the California White and Sugar Pine 
Manufacturers Association worked for the modification of the Sherman 
and Clayton Antitrust acts. In 1918, they, along with other business groups 
throughout the nation, won a partial victory with the passage of the 
Webb-Pomerene Act. This measure allowed the formation of combina­
tions among businessmen to meet the competition of foreign cartels in 
international trade. Even before the final passage of the bill the California 
Redwood Association set up a subsidiary agency, the Redwood Export 
Company, to push sales in the Far East, and by the early 1920s it was 
selling 10 percent of the nation's redwood overseas. Pine men, although 
they had worked for its passage, were slower to take advantage of the 
Webb-Pomerene Act. The California White and Sugar Pine Manufacturers 
Association appointed a committee to study European markets but took no 
further steps to enter them until the 1920s.16 
The Movement for Scientific Forestry 
Like most other forested states in the nation, California experienced a 
scientific forestry movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In California, as was usually the case elsewhere, the campaign 
for scientific forestry revolved around two major issues: the prevention and 
extinction of forest fires and the reforestation of cut-over timberlands. Both 
matters became entwined with the economic problems lumbermen faced, 
for lumbermen proved willing to adopt scientific forestry measures only 
when they promised to produce profits for their firms.17 
It was farmers requiring irrigation and urban dwellers in water-poor 
regions, not lumbermen, that began the fight for scientific forestry in 
California. They did so out of a concern for their state's watersheds. 
Farmers in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys and orange growers in 
Southern California depended upon irrigation and viewed the destruction 
of forest watersheds by fires and logging as a threat to their livelihood. 
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Trees, they rightly believed, aided agriculture by absorbing rainfall, retard­
ing stream runoff, and reducing soil erosion. City dwellers in the arid 
regions around Los Angeles, worried about municipal water supplies, 
employed similar arguments and joined the farmers in their quest for 
scientific forestry. These advocates of scientific forestry concentrated 
upon winning approval for legislation designed to prevent forest fires. 
Reducing the fire danger, they argued, should take precedence over re­
forestation and other conservation measures. It would be futile, they 
pointed out, to replant cut-over lands only to have them consumed in a 
holocaust a few years later. 
Most lumbermen initially resisted forestry legislation as uneconomical, 
given the nature of their industry. Operating in a business characterized by 
excess supply and low prices, they opposed anything that threatened to 
raise their immediate costs of production. Many recognized that their 
logging methods and forest fires were wasteful, but they pointed out that as 
long as low prices prevailed and the stands of virgin timber lasted, it would 
be impractical for them to adopt more efficient techniques. As late as 1913, 
T. B. Walker, the owner of one of the largest tracts of pine lands in 
California, noted that "competition and adverse conditions kept the prices 
of common lumber below the profit point." He concluded that, as aresult, 
lumbermen had no choice but to cut "only the finest trees and take only the 
best logs that would make clear lumber'' and leave ' ' the rest of the trees of 
those cut and the much larger number left uncut all subject to fire and 
decay."18 Lumbermen also opposed forestry legislation, because they 
feared that state intervention in this sphere of activity might broaden to 
include other aspects of their businesses. They preferred to work, instead, 
through their own cooperative associations or with county officials on 
forestry matters. 
California led most of the rest of the United States in setting up a board of 
forestry in 1885. Created by the actions of a loose coalition of agricul­
turalists, sportsmen, and nature lovers, the board accomplished little. 
Hamstrung by a lack of funds and technical knowledge, the agency passed 
out of existence eight years after its formation as a result of reductions in 
the state's budget.19 Proponents of scientific forestry won few successes in 
the following decade. Several of the largest pine operators established 
skeleton fire patrols, but the vast majority of lumbermen trusted to chance 
and fought fires only when they threatened their mills. As one national 
forester explained, too much virgin timber remained for lumbermen to 
worry about the future.20 
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Scientific forestry advocates redoubled their efforts in the opening years 
of the twentieth century. The annual convention of the American Forestry 
Association meeting in Los Angeles in 1899 stirred up new interest, and at 
about the same time California's agricultural and horticultural societies 
formed several organizations dedicated to winning governmental support 
for conservation policies. The most important of these, the California 
Water and Forest Association, claimed 5,000 members. In 1903, this body 
secured a legislative appropriation of $100,000 for an examination of 
California's forest resources. The United States Forest Service, paid with 
these state funds, undertook the survey. Inaugurated personally by Gifford 
Pinchot, the investigation studied reforestation methods, ways to prevent 
forest fires, and cutting practices.21 
The California Water and Forest Association next turned its attention to 
the formation of a new state board of forestry. At their annual meeting in 
the summer of 1904 the association's members directed their executive 
council to draft a fire protection bill. The council, in turn, referred the 
matter to E. A. Sterling, a national forester who had taken part in the 1903 
survey. After conferring with representatives of the United States Forest 
Service and the Sierra Club as well as with members of the Water and 
Forest Association, Sterling drew up a measure calling for a four-man 
board of forestry headed by a professionally educated forester to be 
appointed by the governor. The state forester's main duty would be to 
prevent and extinguish forest fires, and for these purposes the bill empow­
ered him to appoint an assistant forester and ten salaried district fire 
wardens. The state and the counties were to split the expenses of fire 
fighting and maintaining fire patrols.22 
Sterling's proposal received ardent backing from a wide variety of 
sources outside of the lumber industry. Officers of the Water and Forest 
Association emphasized the necessity of halting the devastation of Califor­
nia's mountain watersheds. They claimed that soil erosion resulting from 
forest fires and poor logging practices had already clogged many streams 
with silt and that rainfall, instead of seeping into the soil to be gradually 
released for agricultural use, flowed out to sea in torrential floods.23 
Agricultural societies endorsed the stand of the Water and Forest Associa­
tion and sent lobbyists to Sacramento to work for Sterling's measure. 
Chambers of commerce in towns and cities throughout Southern Califor­
nia, concerned about their water supplies, passed resolutions favoring the 
bill; and mining groups, worried about the depletion of lumber supplies 
essential for their industry, also came out for it.24 The proposal's advo­
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cates, taking their cue from Gifford Pinchot, stressed that they had no 
intention of injuring the lumber business. Sterling, for instance, repeatedly 
emphasized that scientific forestry advocates desired not "to preserve in 
park form the trees now existing, but to cut them to supply the needs of 
civilization."25 
Such assurances failed, however, to satisfy lumbermen, and most of 
them opposed Sterling's measure. Confusion about forest fires kept some 
lumbermen from backing the bill. A large number of them believed that 
small fires, whether set on purpose or accidentally, were beneficial, 
because they eliminated underbrush upon which larger conflagrations 
might otherwise feed. Many lumbermen also feared that the costs of the 
board of forestry would require increases in their property taxes, and they 
worked against the proposal for this reason. Representatives of the South­
ern Pacific Railroad, which owned large tracts of timberlands in Northern 
California, were particularly outspoken on this point. Still others, though 
willing to accept the expenses of fire protection, opposed Sterling's mea­
sure, because they viewed it as the opening wedge for state regulation of all 
aspects of their business. As events were soon to demonstrate, they 
preferred to rely upon county organizations or trade associations rather 
than state agencies to combat fires.26 
Legislative committees emasculated Sterling s bill. The arguments of 
lumbermen before the committees proved effective, and few of the mea­
sure's original provisions remained intact. Many legislators agreed with 
the lumbermen that the proposal tried to do too much too quickly. They 
particularly disliked being presented with such a comprehensive, ready-
made bill. The provisions for state taxation came under especially heavy 
fire, for legislators outside of timbered regions objected to charging all 
Californians for services that they felt would benefit only certain areas. The 
amended version of Sterling's bill still provided for a state board of forestry 
headed by a professional forester, but it severely restricted the forester's 
ability to combat fires. It contained no provisions for state fire wardens, 
and it strictly limited the funds the state could expend for fire fighting. 
Instead, the forester was instructed to cooperate with county officials and 
depend upon voluntary fire wardens. Governor George Pardee, an ardent 
conservationist, had to intervene personally to obtain passage for even this 
drastically altered measure.27 
With the enactment of the Fire Protection and Forest Management Law 
California again took a place in the forefront of the nationwide movement 
for scientific forestry through state legislation. Minnesota had set up a state 
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forestry board in 1899, and Wisconsin, after decades of neglect, followed 
suit four years later. Farther west, irrigationists in Colorado and Arizona 
were seeking legislation to shield their watersheds from damage, and 
lumbermen in Washington and Oregon secured state fire protection laws 
and formed their own associations to fight fires. In all, by 1905, some 
twelve states possessed forestry commissions of varying effectiveness.28 
Even with the changes made by the California legislature, Sterling's act 
surpassed those of most of the other states in scope and power.29 Gifford 
Pinchot found ample praise for it. "If the counties will take advantage of 
the authority contained in the bill and appropriate a reasonable amount to 
pay for fire fighting, it will," he predicted, "rank in its practical effect 
higher than any other state forest law."30 California conservationists, 
though worried about the delegation of power to the counties, also ap­
proved the law. Sterling felt that it signaled "the beginning of a new era in 
the forest movement in California," and members of the Water and Forest 
Association claimed that with it California "takes first place among the 
states that have attempted to deal with the problems of forest fires and 
forest management."31 
The course of events shattered these high expectations. The state forester 
urged county officials to establish fire patrols as "a sound business invest­
ment' ' to reduce property losses and thus bolster their counties' tax bases, 
and, by 1912, twenty-two counties were cooperating in some manner with 
him. Yet, these efforts proved ineffective. As some conservationists had 
feared, the counties, strapped for funds, spent a minimal sum for fire 
protection. In 1912, for instance, they appropriated a total of only $ 10,995, 
and as a result fires blackened nearly 300,000 acres of brush and timber­
lands.32 
Lumber companies, operating independently of the forestry commis­
sioner, made only minimal progress in the direction of scientific forestry in 
these years. Diamond Match, the McCloud River Lumber Company, and 
some of the other major pine firms instituted or expanded fire protection 
programs, and a few of the larger redwood companies began constructing 
fire lanes and clearing out underbrush. Yet, even the actions of the most 
advanced firms were inadequate. The total annual expenses of the 
McCloud River Company for fire protection came to only $600, or less 
than four cents per acre; a single patrolman toured the company's vast 
holdings. Lumbermen also set up cooperative associations to fight forest 
fires, and, by 1913, three such bodies existed. The California Fire Protec­
tive Association, formed by some of the largest pine and redwood compa­
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nies, was the most important. Inspired by similar bodies in the Pacific 
Northwest, the association carried on a publicity campaign against forest 
fires in newspapers throughout California and assisted in the establishment 
of county organizations of fire fighters. Yet, the efforts of the cooperative 
organizations, like those of the independent firms, proved inadequate. 
Surveys undertaken by the state forester in 1914 and 1917 revealed just 
how spotty the progress was. They demonstrated that all but a handful of 
the largest firms failed to take even the simplest precautions against forest 
fires. As several forestry analysts pointed out, lumbermen could not yet 
absorb the costs of scientific forestry. Excess mill capacity and overpro­
duction continued to depress prices, and, as a result, few lumbermen felt 
that they could afford to experiment with fire prevention or efficient 
logging methods.33 
Recognizing the defects of the 1905 Fire Protection Act, the state 
forester, prodded by agricultural groups, called for further legislation. 
State Forester E. T. Allen complained that his office could achieve little 
under existing laws and asked for changes as early as 1906.34 A year later 
the Water and Forest Association and the state forester prepared measures 
designed to regulate the disposal of logging slash and increase the board of 
forestry's powers. However, lumbermen and large landowners claimed 
that they could not afford the expense of the bills and kept them from 
becoming law.35 Pressure for forestry measures grew in the next several 
years. The National Irrigation Congress, meeting at Sacramento in late 
1907, urged the state forester to examine private timber holdings on the 
watersheds of irrigable streams and set rules for lumbering operations on 
them. The state forester favored these proposals and, in 1909, again 
worked with farm organizations to obtain legislation enlarging the state's 
role in preventing forest fires and supervising logging methods. Introduced 
late, his bills disappeared in the crush of other business. At the succeeding 
legislative session the state forester obtained more control over the dis­
posal of slash, but requests for additional funds and authority to combat 
forest fires died in committee.36 
During the following two years agitation for forestry measures centered 
upon the work of the California Conservation Commission established by 
Governor Hiram Johnson in 1911. Inspired by the conservation efforts of 
Theodore Roosevelt and stemming indirectly from the conference of gov­
ernors held in 1908, the commission investigated forestry proposals for the 
Golden State. In March, 1912, its secretary drew up a fire protection bill 
modeled upon British Columbia law, and later in the month the commis­
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sioners met with represenatives of the state's redwood and pine companies 
to discuss logging methods and fire protection.37 
This three-day conference uncovered divisions of opinion between the 
pine and redwood lumbermen. Officers of many of the larger pine firms 
voiced a growing willingness to accept an increase in the state forester's 
powers. Although not completely breaking away from their past opposition 
to mandatory scientific forestry legislation, they did, at least, begin to see 
its value. Pine timber was particularly prone to fire damage, and pine 
lumbermen had just suffered through several bad fire seasons. As a result, 
the manager of the Sugar and White Pine Manufacturers Association 
pledged his organization's backing to additional legislation designed to 
prevent forest fires. Clinton Walker, of Thomas Walker and Company, and 
George Hoxie, who owned 20,000 acres of pine lands in Northern Califor­
nia, joined him in calling for new laws. The spokesman for the Southern 
Pacific Railroad, which had earlier opposed forestry measures, offered the 
most concrete plan for state action. He suggested that the state forester 
appoint salaried fire wardens throughout California and that the state 
should assume most of the costs of fighting fires. A tax levied on all 
properties within fire districts as defined by the forester would pay for these 
expenses. The redwood men, however, refused to sanction such a 
heightened role for the state. They claimed that their timber was less 
susceptible to fire damage than pine and that state legislation was, there­
fore, unnecessary for them. Redwood operators also used fire as an integral 
part of their logging process, and in the hearings before the conservation 
commission they defended their use of fire to dispose of slash even during 
the dry season, despite the fact that these fires sometimes ran out of control. 
Finally, they felt that, since the rivers running through their timberlands 
served few farms, the protection of their watersheds was not a legitimate 
concern of the state. Redwoods, they concluded, should be exempt from 
any legislation dealing with forest fires.38 
Largely because of the publicity aroused by the hearings of the conserva­
tion commission, forest fire prevention measures again became major 
issues in the state legislature just prior to the outbreak of the First World 
War. In 1913, the conservation commission and the California Fire Protec­
tion Association jointly drafted a new fire protection bill. Although the 
measure increased state funding to extinguish forest fires, it continued the 
state forester's dependence on county officials and voluntary associations 
and restricted his freedom of action in other ways as well. State Forester 
 73 The Lumber Industry and Scientific Forestry
George Homans condemned this proposal and countered with a much 
stiffer measure of his own. The introduction of these two bills in the 
legislature resulted in a stalemate. This same deadlock, pitting the state 
forester against the lumbermen and the conservation commission, re­
mained unbroken in the next two legislative sessions, and, as a result, no 
significant forestry measures won approval.39 
It was the outbreak of the First World War, more than any other single 
event, that made scientific forestry, and, in particular, forest fire preven­
tion measures, acceptable to California lumbermen. Throughout the pre­
war years most lumbermen had opposed strict scientific forestry legislation 
as too expensive, given the overproduction and low prices endemic to their 
business. The war dramatically changed this situation. It boosted demands 
for lumber and caused a sharp rise in the prices California lumbermen 
received for their products. These price increases made it possible, as 
lumbermen themselves pointed out, for lumber companies to afford at least 
rudimentary scientific forestry practices. The war furthered the cause of 
scientific forestry in other ways as well. Most importantly, it riveted 
attention on forests as resources essential for national security and made the 
prevention of their destruction a matter of public concern. Even lumber­
men came to realize that the virgin stands of timber might be exhausted and 
expressed alarm at the rate at which forests were disappearing before fires 
and the woodsman's axe. 
In California, officials from the United States Forest Service, lumber 
industry representatives, and faculty members of the University of Califor­
nia formed the Forest Industries Committee of California to deal with 
forestry problems arising in the war years. Working with State Forester 
Homans, who was its chairman, this group set up county fire-fighting 
organizations throughout the state. When these county associations failed 
to prevent particularly bad fire losses in 1918, lumbermen took the 
unprecedented step of joining the state forester in calling for remedial 
legislation.40 
During the 1919 legislative session lumbermen and the state forester 
finally reached agreement on effective forest protection measures. The 
bills they jointly agreed upon passed both houses of the legislature unani­
mously and fundamentally altered California fire protection laws. Under 
their terms the state forester divided California into fire districts watched 
over by rangers employed by the state, and the state assumed the major 
costs of combatting blazes. The new laws did what Sterling's measure of 
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1905 had envisioned. They gave the state forester the authority and funds to 
provide fire protection for the entire state and ended his dependence upon 
cooperation with county officials.41 
The links between the state forester and the lumbermen, forged in the 
heat of the war years, grew stronger in the 1920s. By this time most 
lumbermen had come to realize that unless they adopted scientific forestry 
practices they would soon exhaust their timber. The desire to avoid strict 
federal laws also pushed lumbermen into the arms of the state forester. 
Though discussed earlier, measures to regulate the lumber industry won 
serious consideration from Congress only in the postwar period. Many 
lumbermen hoped to block national legislation by demonstrating that they 
could work harmoniously with state officials, and some probably also felt 
that they could in this way gain the support of state foresters in their drive 
against federal legislation. 
A meeting of California's major lumbermen with State Forester Homans 
in late 1920 foreshadowed the course forestry would take in succeeding 
years. The lumbermen unanimously passed resolutions calling upon the 
legislature to increase funds for the state forester's fire protection efforts, 
and both pine and redwood operators agreed to adhere to new strict 
guidelines on the disposal of slash. The same conference condemned the 
Capper Bill, a federal measure that would have established nationwide 
standards for lumbering, and called for its defeat by Congress. The state 
forester praised the lumbermen for their backing of his work and, in turn, 
went on record as opposing the Capper Bill. State officials cooperating 
with lumbermen could, he claimed, accomplish more in the way of scien­
tific forestry.42 
By 1920, lumbermen had drastically altered the position they held on 
fire prevention legislation. Whereas they had once opposed fire prevention 
measures as uneconomical, lumbermen came to accept and work for them. 
Blessed with good prices but threatened by the depletion of their virgin 
timber, lumbermen became leaders in the movement to prevent forest fires. 
Developments in the campaign to reforest California's logged-over 
timberlands closely paralleled the evolution of the state's drive for fire 
protection legislation. Begun by the state forester backed by agricul­
turalists who were worried about their mountain watersheds, the campaign 
changed in nature in its later years. As had happened in the movement to 
prevent forest fires, it became a drive dominated by the lumbermen and 
concerned mainly with insuring the continued existence and profitability of 
the lumber industry. 
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When scientific forestry advocates began calling for reforestation in 
California in the opening years of the twentieth century, they considered 
two approaches to the problem. First, the state could purchase cut-over 
lands from private owners and reforest them; or, second, the state could, 
through tax incentives, encourage reforestation by the lumber companies. 
A third option—state management of virgin forest reserves with reforesta­
tion as trees were cut, an option being tried elsewhere at this time— 
received little consideration in California, mainly because the state had 
already sold most of its timberlands to lumber companies.43 
The state forester and agricultural groups initiated the early efforts at 
reforestation. As early as 1904, members of the Water and Forest Associa­
tion recognized the hurdle that the state's tax system placed in the way of 
reforestation. Each year lumbermen, rather than pay the annual property 
tax on their cut-over lands, forfeited thousands of acres to the state, for they 
felt they could not afford the expense of an annual tax on vacant land or 
second growth timber that might require thirty or more years to mature.44 
Rather than alter the tax laws, however, spokesmen for the association 
suggested that the state take over and replant lands abandoned for the 
nonpayment of taxes. The state forester backed this proposal and re­
peatedly called upon the legislature to appropriate funds for the reforesta­
tion of tax delinquent lands and the purchase of cut-over tracts still in 
private hands. Little came of these ideas. Concerned mainly with fire 
protection measures, neither the state forester nor the agriculturalists spent 
enough time or effort to get their proposals through the legislature, and they 
perished in committees.45 
From these beginnings lumbermen assumed the leadership of the re­
forestation movement. A survey undertaken by the state forester in 1912 
showed that many of California's larger lumbermen disliked the state's 
annual property tax and desired, instead, a yield or severance tax that 
would be levied on timber only when it was cut. Lumbermen also de­
nounced the assessment of timberlands by county officials. This practice, 
they claimed, led to numerous inequities that only statewide audits could 
abolish. Condemning the yearly levy on timberlands, the state forester 
endorsed the lumbermen's petitions. Several of California's leading lum­
bermen, again backed by the state forester, repeated their requests at 
hearings before Governor Johnson s conservation commission and added 
that they now also favored state reforestation efforts.46 
During the war years the lumbermen turned to Sacramento for aid. In 
1915, the assemblymen from California's major redwood area introduced a 
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bill appropriating funds for the state to buy cut-over lands for forest 
reserves. As amended in committee, the measure also instructed the state 
forester to develop a comprehensive plan for managing all state-owned 
timberlands along the lines of scientific forestry. Backed by the state 
forester and members of the conservation commission as well as lumber­
men, the proposal passed both houses of the legislature unanimously, only 
to die at the hands of an inexplicable pocket veto from Governor 
Johnson.47 Thwarted on this front, lumbermen turned their attention to tax 
reform. In 1917, they supported a bill to shift the power for setting 
assessments from county to state officials. This change would, they 
claimed, end differences between counties and result in uniform, predict­
able collections by the state. Opposition from county tax assessors and 
other local officials, however, defeated the measure.48 
Lumbermen stepped up their drive for reforestation after the war. In 
1920, a meeting of pine and redwood men with the state forester urged the 
state legislature to appropriate $ 150,000 for the forester to begin reforesta­
tion work. The legislature, then dominated by elements trying to cut state 
expenditures, refused this request. In the same session Assemblyman A. F. 
Stevens, a redwood lumberman, sponsored a constitutional amendment to 
separate the taxation of land from timber and to provide for a yield tax on 
timber. County officials, fearing the erosion of their tax bases, fought the 
proposal. Lumbermen and the state board of forestry were themselves 
divided on details of the plan, and it never came to a vote.49 Conferences 
between groups of lumbermen and the state forester smoothed over differ­
ences during the next few years, and in 1925 lumbermen finally obtained 
their desires. A constitutional amendment to exempt second growth 
timber, as distinct from the ground upon which it stood, from taxation 
easily passed the senate and assembly. Backed by lumbermen's organiza­
tions, the state forester, and the County Assessors Association, it won 
approval in the following general election. The measure made it econom­
ically feasible for lumbermen to begin large-scale reforestation projects, 
and with its enactment the lumber industry took a long step in the direction 
of efficient production.50 
The campaign for scientific forestry in California received its impetus 
from several sources. It began as a movement undertaken by farmers and 
others concerned with their state's mountain watersheds. Aided by state 
officials, most notably the state forester, these organized groups pushed the 
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initial scientific forestry measures through the state legislature. In its later 
years the scientific forestry movement changed. As lumbermen came to 
dominate the movement, the emphasis on watershed protection (which, for 
instance, the federal Capper Bill would have furthered) yielded, for the 
most part, to considerations of continued profits within the lumber indus­
try. As the prices they received rose after 1914 and as mounting demands 
threatened the last stands of virgin timber in the continental United States, 
lumbermen recognized the wisdom of sustained yield harvesting and 
worked to make it a reality. From a speculative and crudely exploitive 
industry, lumbering in California was emerging in the 1920s as a more 
rational business dominated by considerations of efficiency and order. 
The adoption of scientific forestry by lumbermen was not, however, 
easily achieved. As was the case in the oil industry, divisions rent the ranks 
of the lumbermen well into the war years. The larger companies, which 
were interested in long-term yields, were more favorably inclined to 
scientific forestry than the smaller firms that often operated on a shoestring 
and sought short-run, speculative profits. Splits opened on other lines as 
well. Redwood men, who used fires as part of their logging process, were 
less willing to accept fire prevention measures than the pine operators who 
saw millions of dollars of damage done to their property by fire each year. 
Moreover, all lumbermen feared lest the movements for fire prevention 
and reforestation be expanded to encompass other aspects of their busi­
nesses as well. The support of lumbermen for scientific forestry came 
reluctantly and then only when such backing promised direct economic 
gains. 
Railroad and Public Utility Regulation 
In the early twentieth century California businessmen spearheaded move­
ments to set up a new railroad commission with vastly increased powers 
and to bring public utility companies under state supervision. The driving 
force for railroad regulation came from emergent shipping interests desir­
ing lower rates to expand their markets and from merchants seeking 
alterations in the state's rate structure to give them trade advantages over 
their rivals. Public utility officers led the campaign for state regulation of 
their firms. They hoped state supervision would help them both enlarge and 
rationalize their systems of public utilities to meet the needs of California's 
burgeoning population.1 
The Movement for Railroad Regulation 
The growth of new economic interests—agricultural cooperatives, inte­
grated oil companies, and large lumber firms—provided much of the 
stimulus for railroad regulation. All of these business groups harbored 
grievances against the state's railroads, particularly the Southern Pacific. 
Each wanted better service and lower rates to allow them to tap larger 
markets for their goods. As their economic power increased, farmers, oil 
men, and lumbermen sought private redress for their problems, and their 
efforts to obtain satisfaction from the railroads helped pave the way for 
stricter state regulation. 
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California's agriculturalists held the most enduring complaints against 
the railroads and were among the first businessmen to challenge their 
economic and political grip on California. From the 1870s on, associa­
tions of fruit growers requested better service and lower rates. They 
enjoyed little success before the formation of comprehensive cooperatives 
to market citrus and deciduous fruits and, as late as 1895, proved unable to 
influence the state's leading railroads. Lengthy hearings held by the state 
railroad commission in that year resulted in only negligible relief.2 Yet, 
little more than a decade later the citrus fruit men, by then thoroughly 
organized, secured a substantial reduction on rates for the shipment of 
oranges across the country. When the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe 
railroads tried to restore charges to their former levels in 1909, the Cali­
fornia Fruit Growers Exchange successfully contested the proposed hike 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The deciduous fruit men 
followed the example of the citrus growers in 1911. After a week-long 
conference with the nation's transcontinental lines, they secured a large 
rate decrease on shipments to points east of Chicago.3 
The actions of the state's oil companies also foreshadowed the course of 
future events. Though dependent upon the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific 
railroads for the carriage of much of their crude as late as 1910, the oil men 
had considerable resources of their own. In the early twentieth century, the 
larger firms exacted rebates totaling $200,000 annually.4 Even the smaller 
operators wielded some power. In 1901, in a rare show of cooperation, the 
large and small producers obtained a 10 percent reduction of rates for the 
shipment of crude by the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe lines.5 Four years 
later the oil companies nearly won approval from the state legislature for a 
demurrage measure setting strict requirements for the supplying of tank 
cars by railroads to producers of crude.6 
California's lumbermen, particularly those engaged in the redwood 
trade, also held grievances against the railroads. In the 1890s, the lumber 
companies began searching for markets outside of California to relieve 
their chronic problem of overproduction. In doing so they collided with the 
railroads, for high transcontinental rates excluded them from eastern mar­
kets. Like the agriculturalists, the lumbermen tried to secure lower rates 
and better service through cooperative action. The trade associations of the 
pine and redwood operators won some concessions, but their inability to 
achieve total success insured that lumbermen would be active in the 
movement for stricter state regulation of railroads. 
Discrimination in rates between localities and intercity rivalry for mar­
kets further spurred Californians toward tighter railroad regulation. As 
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centers of population, commerce, and industry shifted in California, mer­
chants in the affected areas often blamed the railroads for their troubles. 
Businessmen in towns with expanding hinterlands called for a change in 
the old rate structures to meet the altered conditions. Merchants in cities 
threatened by the new developments sought to bolster their positions by 
maintaining, or even increasing, the nineteenth-century rate differentials. 
Both San Francisco and Los Angeles businessmen were displeased with 
parts of the state's rate structure. The losses suffered in their contest with 
Los Angelenos for the trade of the San Joaquin Valley led many San 
Francisco merchants to endorse stronger railroad regulation measures, for 
they felt that tougher regulation would result in rate differentials more 
favorable to their metropolis. Merchants in Los Angeles, though they had 
won much of the commerce of the San Joaquin Valley with the aid of the 
Southern Pacific, thought they had suffered at the hands of the line and 
joined their neighbors to the north in the demands for stricter state supervi­
sion. The fight to gain control of their harbor at San Pedro rankled most in 
the minds of Los Angelenos. In a twenty-year contest involving lengthy 
court battles and maneuvering in the state and national legislatures the 
Southern Pacific tried, for reasons of its own, to block Los Angeles's quest 
for a deep water port. Only in 1911 did the city gain control of its tidelands 
at San Pedro.7 Nor did the Southern Pacific's rates always favor Los 
Angeles. In 1910, it cost as much to transport goods from Los Angeles to 
its port at San Pedro, a distance of 24 miles, as it did over the 126 miles 
separating Los Angeles from San Diego.8 
Businessmen in other areas joined their counterparts in San Francisco 
and Los Angeles in condemning the policies of the Southern Pacific. 
Anxious to extend their cities' hegemony over the surrounding coun­
tryside, they laid the blame for any checks upon their progress, sometimes 
rightly but often wrongly, at the feet of the state's railroads. All asked to be 
designated as terminal points for transcontinental traffic, and between 
1873 and 1910 the number of terminal points in California rose from four to 
ninety-seven. When the expected growth in trade often failed to materialize 
(partly because so many cities obtained the same privileges at the same 
time), the outraged merchants denounced the railroads.9 
By 1909, the Southern Pacific had, in one way or another, antagonized 
most of California's businessmen. As an expert on railroad rates in 
California noted in 1922, the Southern Pacific could alter scarcely a single 
schedule without injuring some of California's merchants.10 Local ship­
pers compained of high charges and discrimination on intrastate ship­
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ments. Even those businessmen who cared primarily about transcontinen­
tal rates, over which a state commission could have little control, desired 
closer supervision of intrastate charges, particularly rates between points in 
the countryside and the terminal points from which goods began their 
transcontinental journeys. 
State supervision of railroads in California started in the 1870s. The state 
constitution adopted in 1879 set up a three-man regulatory commission 
elected by district. Empowered to lower rates upon the complaints of 
shippers and to enforce uniform bookkeeping practices for railroads, the 
commission would, Californians believed, bring the state's lines to heel. 
The commission failed to fulfill these hopes. The Southern Pacific cor­
rupted many of the commissioners, and even those who remained honest 
found themselves hampered by inexperience and the lack of expert knowl­
edge. The complexities of rate-making particularly baffled them. Unfavor­
able court decisions further eroded the commission's effectiveness. Rul­
ings by the United States Circuit Court for Northern California in 1896 and 
the Superior Court of San Francisco several years later severely limited the 
rate-fixing powers of the commission.11 
With the failure of its first commission California fell behind other states 
and the federal government in railroad regulation. At the opening of the 
twentieth century reformers throughout the nation were calling for stricter 
regulation, and many states tightened their laws. By 1905, fifteen states 
had established railroad commissions empowered to set rates on their own 
initiative, and another eight possessed agencies allowed to change rates 
upon the request of complainants. Dramatic events in Wisconsin captured 
the attention of the nation. Business groups and politicians, led by Gover­
nor Robert LaFollette, overcame the intense opposition of the state's 
railroads to secure new regulatory legislation in 1903 and 1905. The laws, 
while not as far-reaching as LaFollette desired, established a commission 
to investigate abuses and set rates. The growing power of the federal 
government over interstate lines, like developments on the state level, 
underlined the need for new measures in California. In 1902, the Elkins 
Act forbade rebating, and four years later the Hepburn Act gave the 
Interstate Commerce Commission the right to fix maximum rates subject to 
judicial review.12 
California's twentieth-century campaign for railroad regulation opened 
with federal and state investigations into railroad practices. In 1906, the 
United States Bureau of Corporations revealed that California's larger oil 
companies were receiving rebates on their intrastate shipments.13 A year 
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later Interstate Commerce Commissioner Franklin K. Lane uncovered 
further instances of favoritism. He found little evidence of rebating on 
interstate traffic but reported numerous instances of it on intrastate ship­
ments.14 These revelations goaded state officials into action. In 1908, the 
state railroad commission and California Attorney General U. S. Webb 
examined the conduct of the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroads. At 
public hearings the Traffic Association of California, an organization of 
San Francisco shippers formed in late 1907, documented many cases of 
discrimination.15 However, because of the inadequacy of the state's laws, 
officials undertook no prosecutions. The results of these proceedings led 
Attorney General Webb to declare that the shippers were "practically 
helpless" and to call for an enlargement of the state's power over rail­
roads.16 
Efforts by the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe lines to increase their 
charges on transcontinental shipments in early 1909 set the tinder afire. A 
month before the proposed rates were to become effective the Traffic 
Bureau of the San Francisco Merchants Exchange lodged a protest with 
the railroads and threatened to appeal to the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission. Several days later the Traffic Association of California called a 
meeting of shippers and merchants who would be affected by the hike. 
Businessmen from throughout the state attended the conference in San 
Francisco. Delegates represented California's leading agricultural associa­
tions and cooperatives, mercantile and manufacturing firms (particularly 
those of Sacramento and San Francisco), and the chambers of commerce of 
towns from all sections of the state. The convention endorsed the stand of 
the Traffic Bureau and pledged its support of that body. The meeting then 
passed resolutions condemning the rate increases and demanding an inves­
tigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The conference also 
denounced local charges and service. In fact, many businessmen com­
plained more about the problems met in intrastate shipments than the 
difficulties and expenses of the longer cross-country hauls. 
At the conclusion of its meeting the convention chose fifteen of its 
members, known collectively as the California Shippers Executive Com­
mittee, to examine local conditions and work for the creation of a stronger 
railroad commission at the coming session of the state legislature. The 
Executive Committee immediately began preparing for a Freight Rate Day 
protest. Just one week before the legislators convened in Sacramento 
groups of merchants and shippers in some fifty towns held rallies that 
criticized both instate and transcontinental rates and asked for intervention 
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by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the state railroad commis­
sion. Many of these convocations further instructed their representatives in 
the state legislature to revamp the makeup and powers of the railroad 
commission.17 
California's superheated atmosphere brought the 1909 legislative ses­
sion to a boil. Governor James Gillette urged its members to enact regula­
tory legislation to keep California in step with the rest of the nation. Senator 
John Stetson quickly introduced a measure drafted by Attorney General 
Webb designed to give California one of the strongest state railroad 
commissions in the nation. Under the provisions of Stetson's bill, the com­
mission could modify rates and freight classification schedules without 
waiting for the complaints of shippers. Moreover, the commission was to 
set absolute, that is, fixed or uniform, rather than just maximum rates. The 
proposal also allowed the commission to make physical evaluations of 
railroads to aid in determining rate bases. On behalf of the railroads, 
Senator Leroy Wright presented a counterproposal. Under its terms the 
railroad commission could establish only maximum rates (and, thus, 
railroads could continue to favor large over small shippers), and it could set 
these only if shippers questioned the reasonableness of the tariffs put into 
effect by the railroads. Wright's measure gave the commission no power to 
make physical evaluations of railroad property or define freight classifica­
tions. Nor was it as tough as the Stetson bill in providing for the punishment 
of those violating its terms.18 
Merchants and railroad men soon clashed on these proposals. Shippers 
and merchants rallied to Stetson's measure. The Traffic Bureau of the San 
Francisco Merchants Exchange and the California Shippers Executive 
Committee agreed to work together for its passage. Seth Mann, a San 
Francisco lawyer who had earlier acted as counsel for the Traffic Associa­
tion of California, represented them at public hearings in Sacramento. He 
argued that on intrastate shipments discrimination between shippers and 
places rather than the level of rates irritated businessmen the most. Speak­
ing before the Senate Committee on Corporations he asserted that "stabil­
ity of rates is more important to the shipper than the rates themselves.'' The 
Stetson bill, with its provisions for absolute rates, could alone, he con­
cluded, provide the stability merchants sought. A little later, in an appear­
ance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he struck hard at discrimina­
tion between localities, which he labeled "the great railroad problem of the 
future."19 San Francisco merchants, stung by their trade rivalry with Los 
Angeles, found this approach particularly appealing.20 Spokesmen for the 
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railroads, led by P. F Dunn, an attorney for the Southern Pacific, coun­
tered these arguments by raising the issue of the constitutionality of the 
Stetson bill's provision for absolute freight rates. Interpreting the state 
constitution and legal decisions in a light favorable to their clients, they 
claimed that the railroad commission could be authorized to fix only 
maximum rates. This tactic worked. Largely because of the confusion on 
its legality, the Stetson bill failed to win approval; and, rather than lose 
everything, the merchant bodies reluctantly accepted Senator Wright's 
proposal incorporating the principle of maximum rates.21 
The shippers did, however, secure passage for a mutual demurrage act to 
insure them of a constant supply of railroad cars. Two years before a car 
shortage at the height of the harvest season led the Southern Pacific to 
divert its cars from California which possessed no demurrage law to 
Oregon and Texas which did. This action infuriated the Golden State's fruit 
growers, and, in 1909, E. O. Miller of Visalia introduced a tough demur­
rage measure on their behalf. Oil men, who had long desired such a law, 
joined the fruit men in supporting Miller's proposal. Despite spirited 
railroad opposition, Miller's demurrage bill passed both houses of the 
legislature and became law.22 
Businessmen and politicians intensified their demands for a new railroad 
commission during the next two years. At the end of its 1909 session the 
legislature held a series of hearings to examine railroad rates. The outcome 
was a senate resolution denouncing rate hikes by the state's express 
companies and railroads. The solons called upon the state railroad commis­
sion to extend the investigation and take whatever remedial steps it could. 
When the commission pigeonholed the issue, the legislators, sitting in 
special session in the fall of 1910, approved a resolution condemning the 
body s inactivity.23 At their annual meetings and conventions fruit grow­
ers, lumbermen, merchant organizations, and other associations of ship­
pers also continued to press for relief from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the state railroad commission.24 
Political expression was given this continued agitation in Hiram 
Johnson's bid for governor in 1910. A progressive Republican, Johnson 
toured California in a flashy, red automobile and attracted crowds wher­
ever he went by attacking the Southern Pacific "machine." Throughout 
his campaign Johnson emphasized, almost to the exclusion of other sub­
jects, the need to free state government from the railroad's grip.25 "The 
issue is," he repeatedly thundered, "shall the people of California take to 
themselves the government of the state or shall the Southern Pacific be 
Railroad and Public Utility Regulation 85 
continued in sovereign power?"26 With Johnson's candidacy the move­
ment for state railroad regulation assumed new dimensions. What had 
begun as a contest between California's emergent business groups and the 
state's established railroads broadened to include the general public as 
well. With this change, the campaign to place railroads under effective 
state control assumed a new urgency. Railroad domination of California, 
Johnson warned, was hurting, not just the state's economic development, 
but also the political freedom of its inhabitants. 
Johnson's victory at the polls assured that railroad regulation would be 
the major topic facing the state legislature in 1911. In his inaugural address 
Governor Johnson urged the legislators not to let "the bogieman of the 
railroad companies, unconstitutionality'' deter them from enacting a mea­
sure with the absolute rate principle.27 A committee appointed by the 
Republican party drafted a bill based upon Stetson's proposal of two years 
before. Containing representatives of the merchant organizations of both 
San Francisco and Los Angeles, this body argued for the measure in much 
the same terms used to support the Stetson bill in 1909. Governor Johnson, 
relying upon arguments and figures supplied by the president of the San 
Francisco Merchants Exchange, sent the measure to the legislature with a 
ringing denunciation of railroad discrimination between shippers and 
places.28 
In a move that puzzled political observers at the time and still defies 
definitive analysis today, the railroad men offered no opposition to 
Johnson's bill. Though they attended public hearings on the proposal, none 
spoke against it. As the chairman of the Senate Committee on Corporations 
noted, the railroad lobbyists exhibited " a spirit of bashfulness and back­
wardness" completely at odds with their behavior two years before.29 
Several reasons may account for this turnabout. The forces favoring strict 
regulation were more numerous in the 1911 legislature than in 1909, and 
their dominance, combined with Johnson's election, may have led railroad 
men to view tougher laws as inevitable. In addition, the main argument of 
those fighting the principle of absolute rates had been discredited. In a 
speech before the Commonwealth Club of California, State Supreme Court 
Justice Lucien Shaw declared that no legal foundation existed for the 
charge that absolute rates were unconstitutional, and proponents of 
Johnson's bill stressed this point in hearings on the measure.30 Then, too, 
by 1911, railroad leaders may have felt that a law specifying uniform rates 
might actually work to their advantage by ending the costly rebates on 
intrastate traffic and by shifting the burden of defending the rate schedules 
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of cities competing for the same trade from the railroads to the state railroad 
commissioners. F. G. Athearn, who headed the Southern Pacific's bureau 
of economics, asserted that "regulation is good for us" and came out in 
favor of the constitutional amendments embodying Johnson's proposal as 
"vastly superior to the articles of the constitution it is intended they should 
replace."31 
Unhindered by railroad opposition, Johnson's measure sped through 
both houses of the legislature without dissent, and constitutional amend­
ments incorporating the act's terms won ratification in the following 
general election. The new law gave California one of the most advanced 
railroad commissions in the country. Possessing all of the powers provided 
by the original Stetson bill of 1909, the commission would, Governor 
Johnson predicted, open "a new era wherein justice, fair dealing and the 
rights of the people shall prevail."32 
The Campaign for Public Utility Regulation 
Governor Johnson's measure gave the railroad commission control over 
only steam railroads, but within a few years further acts extended its 
jurisdiction to include nearly all public utilities in California. Devel­
opments in other parts of the nation directly affected the movement for state 
regulation in California. By 1911, New York, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, 
Texas, and at least seven other states had set up commissions to supervise 
the rates and services of utilities within their boundaries.33 Public utility 
officers in California viewed the work of these commissions as beneficial 
to the public service corporations affected and campaigned for state regula­
tion in California. They hoped that state regulation would end competition 
between their firms, enhance the value of their companies' stocks and 
bonds, and allow them to escape continual wrangling with county and 
municipal authorities. 
Public utility men felt that state regulation would enable them to elimi­
nate competition between their companies and thus insure the development 
of a unified, rational system of power and telephone networks in Califor­
nia. A wave of reorganizations and mergers in the opening years of the 
twentieth century left California blanketed with three or four major power 
companies, and the same trend was apparent in other public utilities. 
Company officers looked upon their firms as natural monopolies that 
should be protected from competition. They claimed that such a policy 
would benefit the public as well as their firms by ending the duplication of 
facilities, the costs of which were reflected in higher rate bases.34 Closely 
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related to the issue of competition was that of financing. The construction 
of regional and statewide utility networks to meet the needs of California's 
rapidly growing population proved extremely costly for the companies 
involved and greatly raised their demands for capital. They financed much 
of their expansion by bond flotations on the New York market, and many 
public utility men believed that the investigation and approval of proposed 
security issues by a state agency would increase their value and ease of 
sale. Most agreed with a San Francisco representative of an eastern broker­
age house when he claimed that state regulation of public service corpora­
tions "almost without exception had a beneficial bearing on their securi­
ties."3 5 
Public utility officers also hoped that state regulation would make it 
possible for them to end constant haggling with municipal authorities. 
They thought that city politicians, elected for short periods of time and 
having no special knowledge of the utility business, lacked the training 
necessary to reach equitable decisions on rates and service. Even worse, 
corrupt councilmen and mayors, public service corporation officers 
lamented, often demanded expensive payoffs to grant franchises or guaran­
tee profitable rate levels. Graft prosecutions in San Francisco had, indeed, 
revealed numerous instances of collusion between corporate and city 
officials. The United Railroads of San Francisco paid $200,000 in boodle 
for a trolley permit in 1906. Nor did such arrangements always prove 
dependable. The Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company gave 
$51,000 to San Francisco's board of supervisors in 1906 to keep its rival, 
the Home Telephone Company, out of the city. The supervisors pocketed 
this sum and then granted the Home Telephone Company the coveted 
franchise in return for the still larger bribe of $125,000.36 Fear of munici­
pal ownership added to the distrust company officers had of city officials. 
Even before 1900, twenty municipalities had acquired ownership of their 
water systems in California, and in the first decade of the twentieth century 
twelve cities adopted charters permitting them to operate their own gas or 
electric plants. State regulation would, public utility men felt, knock the 
wind out of the sails of municipal ownership advocates and remove this 
threat to their businesses.37 
John Britton, vice-president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
initiated the drive for state regulation with a lengthy article in California's 
leading financial journal in early 1909. State regulation would, he claimed, 
solve many problems for public utility officials. Writing just after graft 
prosecutions in San Francisco, Britton blamed the corruption on the greed 
of the supervisors and warned that without state regulation "each corpora­
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tion would be at the mercy of as pitiless a pack of howling destroyers, as 
would the lonely traveller on the Siberian steppes be against the gaunt and 
hungry wolves." Besides freeing themselves from the grip of venal politi­
cians, state supervision would, according to Britton, help public utility 
officers restore public confidence, and particularly the faith of investors, in 
their companies. Only a panel of experts (Britton wrote with favor on the 
commissions of Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin) chosen by the 
governor would, he believed, be able to decide "mooted questions" of 
financing, rates, and franchises in "calm deliberation and not in political 
heat." Finally, Britton concluded that only by the creation of such a body 
could public utilities escape "that unreasonable demon and destroyer, 
Municipal Ownership."38 
Public utility officers throughout California quickly joined forces to 
back Britton's stand. At the 1909 meeting of the Pacific Coast Gas 
Association, the vice-president of the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Com­
pany called for state supervision "on account of the growing desire on the 
part of our city governments to regulate our affairs."39 Several months 
later officers of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company again came out in 
favor of state control modeled upon the commissions in Massachusetts, 
Wisconsin, and New York. These agencies, company officials observed, 
were "composed of specially qualified men of known integrity" and set 
rates influenced by neither "sentiment nor partisanship, by neither gallery 
nor graft."40 In 1910, the president of the Pacific Coast Gas Association 
denounced municipal authorities as "pirates'' and urged the establishment 
of a state commission to "insure us fair rates and a much more settled 
condition as to competition, thus enhancing the value of our securities.  "4 1 
The Pacific Lighting Company, the Los Angeles Gas and Electric 
Company, and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company set up a committee to 
lobby for state regulation at the coming legislative session, and in 1911 
these efforts bore fruit.42 Constitutional amendments preparing the way for 
supervision of public utilities by the state railroad commission passed the 
legislature and won approval in the following general election. After their 
enactment Max Thelen, an attorney for the railroad commission, inspected 
railroad and public service commissions in eleven states throughout the 
nation. John Eshleman, the president of the California Railroad Commis­
sion, then embodied Thelen's findings and suggestions in the Public 
Utilities Act that he and several members of the state senate drafted. This 
proposal increased the size of the railroad commission and extended its 
authority to cover power and light companies, street railroads, telephone 
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and telegraph companies, and public wharves. Under the measure's terms 
the commission was empowered to grant franchises, set rates and condi­
tions of service, and investigate proposed securities issues of the state's 
public utilities.43 
The Public Utilities Act received wide publicity and came under lengthy 
discussion at hearings before the railroad commission. All of the public 
utility officers attending these hearings favored the measure. However, 
representatives of California's largest power and telephone concerns 
sought modifications. They feared that under the bill's provisions it would 
be impossible to set different rates for the same product sold under different 
circumstances. Electric company officers felt, for instance, that they 
would have to charge mountain towns, which were close to the source of 
energy, the same rates as other areas farther away. Some also requested 
that stock and bond issues already authorized by their companies be 
excluded from inspection by the railroad commission. Thelen and Eshle­
man assured them that rates could vary according to the different classes, 
conditions, and locations of service. However, they rejected pleas that 
securities authorized previous to the passage of the proposal be excused 
from the provisions of the bill. After meeting with the railroad commis­
sioners, John Britton of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Tirey 
Ford of the Sierra and San Francisco Light and Power Company declared 
that "we are glad to be regulated for our own sake'' and lent their support to 
the measure.44 The inclusion of a section allowing incorporated areas to 
maintain supervision of public utilities within their boundaries mollified 
city officials and municipal ownership proponents. As originally drawn 
up, the bill required all cities to hold elections at which voters would decide 
whether or not to transfer the regulation of their utilities to the state. 
However, the proposal was amended, at the insistence of city officials, to 
require elections only if three-fifths of a city's board of supervisors or 10 
percent of the voters requested it. Otherwise, utilities serving incorporated 
areas would remain under municipal control.45 
Encountering almost no opposition, the Public Utilities Act easily se­
cured approval from a special session of the state legislature and went into 
effect in March, 1912. 
California's public utility officers praised the new law; in fact, their only 
criticism was that cities would still be able to regulate their own utilities. 
The general agent of the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company 
declared that "from the first this corporation has been in favor of a central, 
high powered, high salaried, long term commission" and expressed regret 
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that "the framers of the law, contrary to the urging of the utilities in­
terested, saw fit to weaken the commission by one sided, elastic 
provisions in connection with the retention and surrender of certain powers 
by municipalities." The act would, he predicted, make it easier to market 
public utility securities and limit wasteful competition between compa­
nies.46 Pacific Gas and Electric officers echoed these words. Lamenting 
only that the commission lacked "complete control similar to the other 
progressive states where so much has been accomplished," they urged all 
public utility men to "hail this new law with acclaim and play a part in 
insuring its successful operation."47 In his presidential address to the 
Pacific Coast Gas Association in 1912, William Baurhyte, vice-president 
of the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Company, voiced the same ideas and 
like the others felt "it is unfortunate" that the Public Utilities Act "still 
permits municipal regulation under certain conditions. " 4  8 The secretary of 
the Southern California Edison Company called the Public Utilities Act a 
"long step [forward]" and emphasized that it would provide "absolute 
stability of our securities and protection from unnecessary competition. " 4  9 
In the next few years, company officials campaigned to place those 
public utilities located in cities under state control.50 Max Thelen, then 
president of the railroad commission, drafted a bill embodying their desires 
in 1915. In open hearings representatives of the Pacific Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and the Home Telephone Company urged the speedy 
passage of the measure as "necessary for the preservation of the peace of 
every public utility in California."51 Public utility officers obtained their 
wishes; the railroad commission received complete jurisdiction over all, 
except municipally owned, public utilities in California. 
The Activities of the Railroad Commission 
Between 1911 and 1915, the new railroad commission demonstrated a 
liveliness not shown by its predecessors and laid down guidelines that 
would be long followed in California. The commission investigated 4,040 
complaints; by way of comparison only 113 complaints had been disposed 
of in the preceding thirty-two years.52 In resolving the cases before it the 
commission tackled three major problems: the setting of reasonable rail­
road and public utility rates, the establishment of standards of competition 
for these concerns, and the investigation of proposed securities issues of 
those companies under its jurisdiction. 
In most cases the commission relied upon the expense of providing 
service in setting rates and had, therefore, to face the question of determin­
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ing which costs should be included in rate bases. The commissioners 
considered two possibilities: the original cost of constructing the physical 
plant and the present cost of replacing that plant. Breaking with precedents 
established by the United States Supreme Court and other state regulatory 
bodies, the California Railroad Commission found the replacement cost 
method unsatisfactory. If it were used as the rate base, the public service 
corporations would, the commissioners reasoned, benefit unjustly from 
any appreciation in the value of lands and other properties they held. A rise 
in the value of a utility's property would raise the expense of replacing it 
and hence justify an increase in rates.53 Therefore, the commissioners 
applied the original cost method in determining most rate bases.54 The 
commission took particular care to avoid including watered stock or false 
construction expenses in estimating rate bases. For instance, it cut the rates 
of the Southern Pacific Railroad and its tributary lines in Kern County on 
the grounds that company books had inflated the costs of building the 
railroads.55 
The commission also brought competition under state supervision. The 
commissioners sought to eliminate discrimination in rates between 
localities and shippers, for they reasoned that these types of discrimination 
formed artificial barriers to trade and felt that they unjustly benefited some 
businessmen at the expense of others. While acting against what they 
viewed as unfair discrimination, the members of the railroad commission 
adopted the stance of many "New Nationalist" progressives that railroads 
and public utilities were natural monopolies and should, therefore, be 
protected from competition in their spheres of operation. By limiting 
competition the commissioners hoped to end what they felt was the ineffi­
cient duplication of facilities by public utilities. The commissioners were 
quick to point out that the costs of duplication were ultimately borne by 
consumers in unnecessarily high rates. By the same token, the commis­
sioners viewed rate wars as detrimental to the best interests of both the 
utilities and the consumers and sought to dampen them. ' ' Vigorous compe­
tition with violent voluntary rate reductions," the president of the railroad 
commission explained, often led to "consolidation and subsequent in­
creases in rates above all previous levels."56 
Under the prodding of local merchants and businessmen, the commis­
sion first worked to abolish discrimination in rates and service. The 
policy-making decision in this field pitted Los Angeles against the South­
ern Pacific and San Pedro railroads. In 1911, the Los Angeles Board of 
Harbor Commissioners challenged the justness of rates on the branch lines 
of these railroads between Los Angeles and its harbor at San Pedro. In the 
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ensuing investigation the railroad commission found that charges for the 
carriage of goods from Los Angeles to San Pedro and San Diego, which 
was much farther away, were identical. Declaring that "we believe it is the 
duty of any rate-making body to eliminate artificial conditions," the 
commissioners lowered the rates between Los Angeles and San Pedro.57 
Further rulings upheld and expanded the implications of this decision. In 
1912, after lengthy hearings, the commissioners acceded to the wishes of 
San Francisco merchants by reducing rates for the transportation of their 
products into the San Joaquin Valley.58 The commission also acted to end 
rebating and other forms of discrimination among shippers. It denied the 
application of the California Western Railroad to carry the timber of 
several lumber companies at lower rates than those charged their com­
petitors in return for right-of-ways through their properties.59 Similarly, 
the commissioners refused to allow railroads to raise the minimum carload 
weights for the shipment of concrete pipes, because they felt that such an 
increase would favor large over small manufacturers.60 
To foster the growth of efficient public utility and railroad networks in 
California the railroad commission sought to limit competition between the 
various systems. Arguments of efficiency persuaded the commissioners to 
let the Pacific Coast subsidiary of the American Bell Telephone Company 
purchase the Home Telephone Company of San Francisco and other 
independents throughout California. The commission granted approval, its 
bond expert explained, "in the interest of vastly improved service and a 
correspondingly decreased rate."61 Following the same policy, the com­
missioners denied the Oro Electric Company permission to compete with 
the Western States Gas and Electric Company in serving Stockton. 
Stockton's officials backed the Oro Electric Company s plea as offering 
"real competition in the bidding for public lighting" and asserted that the 
rates it proposed would be lower than those of the Western States.62 
Nonetheless, the commissioners refused to grant the franchise to the Oro 
Electric, because they thought that Stockton already received adequate 
service and that competition would lead to an unnecessary duplication of 
facilities.63 
For similar reasons the state railroad commissioners supported the 
Southern Pacific Railroad in a lawsuit brought by United States Attorney 
General James McReynolds to dissolve the line's connection with the 
Central Pacific Railroad. McReynolds claimed that the links between the 
two railroads were stifling railroad competition on the West Coast. The 
California Railroad Commission countered with the argument that dissolu­
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tion would "impair the efficiency of what is now a strong and unified 
transportation system." Many of California's commercial and shipping 
organizations backed the stand of the railroad commission and, in 1923, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled in favor of the Southern 
Pacific.64 
The railroad commission also facilitiated the sale of new securities by 
public utilities and railroads, while, at the same time, protecting investors 
from shaky or fraudulent projects. Examination of their securities by the 
commissioners probably aided company officers in placing new flotations. 
Within the first nine months of its operation the new railroad commission 
approved over $50,000,000 of stocks and bonds for public utilities alone, 
and by the beginning of 1915 $500,000,000 in securities had won authori­
zation. Not all companies, however, received permission to issue securi­
ties. When the United Railroads of San Francisco applied for the right to 
float bonds, an investigation by the railroad commission revealed that the 
corporation was already overcapitalized. Until the firm agreed to set up 
adequate sinking funds and eliminate a fictitious surplus from which 
dividends were being paid to the detriment of equity, the commission 
prohibited further bond sales. The commissioners emphasized that their 
supervision of securities benefited everyone. "The public is protected," 
explained the commission's bond expert, "by an insurance that service 
shall not be impaired nor rates raised merely to pay interest on excessive 
debt." The investor secured "a more careful safeguard of the securities 
which are issued." Even the public utilities gained, he thought, "by the 
pressure of an outward force to keep their debt down."65 
Shippers and merchants responded favorably to the actions of the rail­
road commission. Oil men praised the commissioners for lowering the 
rates of the Southern Pacific in the upper San Joaquin Valley. The editor of 
California's leading oil journal stated that this reduction signified that an 
"era of justice seems to have been ushered in." Fruit growers and mer­
chants in the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys obtained numerous local 
rate adjustments, and the railroad commissioners often appeared on their 
behalf in cases pending before the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Lumbermen were also pleased with rate decreases. San Francisco mer­
chants, though they believed still larger reductions were in order, approved 
of the lowering of rates between their city and points in the San Joaquin 
Valley. Los Angelenos were, predictably, incensed by these cuts, but the 
decrease in freight rates to and from their port at San Pedro at least partially 
appeased them.66 
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Public utility and railroad officers, while often disturbed by specific rate 
reductions, found much to praise in the work of the railroad commission. 
They singled out the commission's policy of stopping rate wars and its 
certification of new securities for special commendation. In 1914, John 
Britton, then president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, lauded the 
commission for ending ''unrestrained competition'' and declared that "the 
prevention of. the destruction of capital is one of the greatest works of 
a commission, and I am happy to be able to say that it has been the 
dominant note of the commission of this state." He added that the commis­
sion, by ruling on stock and bond offerings, had "done in two years more 
to inspire the investor with confidence in California securities than all the 
gilt-edged promises of promoters in the years past."67 The manager of the 
securities department of the Northern Electric Railway spoke in a similar 
vein. The commission had, he thought, "enhanced the value of 
securities" by withholding approval from "any project financially un­
sound or wildly speculative in its character."68 William Herrin, the vice-
president and former political manager of the Southern Pacific, also 
praised state supervision. Writing three years after the passage of Governor 
Johnson1 s railroad act, he noted that "the cut-throat competition between 
railroads by means of rebates was in some measure responsible for the 
uncertain conditions of railroad finance" and doubted that any "railroad 
manager would agree to dispense with government regulation at the cost of 
returning to the old conditions."69 
As was frequently the case with other pieces of business legislation, the 
struggle over railroad regulation exposed deep divisions within Califor­
nia's business community. Everyone favored regulation; the issue turned 
on what kind of regulation. California's new business groups—especially 
agriculturalists, lumbermen, and oil men—first sought private redress 
from the state's railroads and, when these efforts proved inadequate, 
supported stiff measures to bring the lines to heel. In this endeavor they 
were joined by local merchants seeking to uphold or win trade advantages 
for their towns or cities, as the battle between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles amply demonstrated. The railroads, recognizing that some type of 
supervision was unavoidable, pressed for weaker proposals that would 
have left the rate-making initiative in their hands. 
The contest over railroad regulation was, then, essentially a battle 
between competing business interest groups. In this regard, it closely 
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resembled the struggle for scientific forestry measures that, in its early days 
at least, pitted business farmers against lumbermen. This fact does not, 
however, mean that the general voting public was unimportant in the drive 
for railroad regulation. It was, for the businessmen and shippers ultimately 
won success by appealing beyond their own interest groups for support. 
Though the movement for railroad regulation was of long standing in 
California, it came to fruition only when Hiram Johnson's campaign for 
governor provided the state' s emergent businessmen with a popular vehicle 
to carry their grievances to audiences throughout California. By emphasiz­
ing the threat the Southern Pacific political "machine" posed to political 
democracy, Johnson dramatized the issue of strict railroad regulation and 
hastened its arrival in California. 
The movement for public utility regulation revealed more unanimity of 
purpose. Nearly all of California's public utility officers pressed for state 
supervision, had the same goals in mind, and were instrumental in obtain­
ing passage for the Public Utilities Act. Yet, they probably could not have 
achieved success had the state's legislators viewed this law as inimical to 
the utilities' customers and, indeed, it would be wrong to see too sharp a 
dichotomy between the best interests of the utilities and the general public. 
Though in the matter of rate-making consumers gained at the expense of 
the public utilities by the commission's decision to use the original cost 
instead of the replacement cost in establishing the rate bases, all profited 
from the commission's policy on competition. By protecting public service 
corporations within their fields of operation, the commission both 
strengthened the financial positions of the utilities and prevented rate wars 
and the duplication of facilities that, as the commissioners frequently 
pointed out, added to the charges levied on consumers. 
Banking and Bank Legislation 
Adequate banking services, no less than transportation facilities, were 
needed for California's economic development. With the changes in the 
state's economy came increased demands for credit, capital, and a more 
flexible money supply by farmers and businessmen. As the various sec­
tions of the state became increasingly interdependent, it also became 
necessary for bankers to improve connections among themselves and with 
financiers outside of California. Finally, the growing complexity of the 
state's businesses led banks to begin providing a full range of banking 
services—savings, commercial, and trust—rather than specializing in a 
single type.1 
As agriculture based on irrigation developed and the petroleum and 
lumber industries became big businesses, the capital and credit require­
ments of Californians soared. New banks sprang up to supply the credit 
facilities, and, as in the rest of the United States, most of these institutions 
were state rather than national banks. These state banks generally pos­
sessed less capital than the national banks, and most were located in the 
countryside, especially in the interior farm valleys and in Southern 
California. By 1905, the assets of banks outside of San Francisco rivaled 
those of the metropolis. Because their prosperity was usually closely linked 
to the local economic situation, the country banks were often forced to 
close their doors or declare bankruptcy during recessions or depressions. 
These failures disturbed the larger-city bankers, especially San Francis­
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cans, for they believed that any bank failure shook public confidence in all 
banks, including their own institutions. How to increase the supply of 
capital and credit for businessmen while reducing bank failures and gener­
ally stabilizing banking in their state became an overriding concern for 
many California bankers.2 
With the spread of banking into new areas within California, the estab­
lishment of dependable communications among California bankers be­
came a pressing problem. The main difficulty lay in reconciling the often 
divergent aims of country and city bankers. The need for mutual under­
standing between these two groups increased when country bankers began 
depositing their reserves with San Francisco rather than New York banks.3 
By the same token, the maintenance of regular connections between 
California bankers and their correspondents on the eastern seaboard as­
sumed a new significance.4 The national marketing requirements of 
California fruit-growers particularly heightened the dependence of 
California bankers on their eastern correspondents. In times of financial 
panics the actions of eastern bankers could imperil California institutions, 
and Californians became increasingly concerned with protecting their 
banks from national economic fluctuations. 
Changes in California's banking structure matched the growing com­
plexity of the state's and the nation's economy. Banking became more 
complicated as banks took on new functions. As was happening in New 
York and elsewhere, California institutions began providing a full range of 
services: savings, trust, and commercial banking. When trust companies 
invaded the field of commercial banking, the commercial banks retaliated 
by entering the trust business. By 1909, nearly all of California's banks 
were engaging in more than one form of banking.5 This practice further 
upset banking conditions, for damage to one type of banking often had 
repercussions in other areas. The failure, for instance, of a bank's commer­
cial department could well cause trouble for its savings department. These 
circumstances presented yet another difficulty for California financiers: 
how, in the competitive situation that existed, to offer a full range of 
banking services without impairing the soundness of their institutions. 
California bankers faced, then, a set of interrelated problems. They 
needed to supply their state's industries and agriculture with capital and 
credit without endangering the solvency of their banks. It sometimes 
proved impossible to obtain both of these goals, and many bankers opted 
for stability at the expense of credit expansion, much to the dismay of some 
businessmen. Second, California bankers sought to improve relations 
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among themselves and tried to insulate their institutions from national 
economic fluctuations. Finally, California bankers recognized the neces­
sity of presenting a complete line of banking services for businessmen. 
Yet, at the same time, they feared that the expansion of banking services 
might undermine a bank's financial soundness and felt that steps should be 
taken to prevent too rapid a growth in this direction. 
Unlike many European nations, the United States did not possess a 
central banking system that could have dealt with these problems. Prior to 
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 the United States had a 
mixed banking system composed of both state and national banks. National 
banks were chartered and regulated by the federal government and were 
empowered to issue their own bank notes. State governments chartered and 
supervised the state banks. Although for all practical purposes the state 
banks could not issue bank notes, they possessed certain advantages over 
the national banks: lower reserve and capital requirements, the ability to 
make loans on land, and a general laxer form of government regulation. 
With little central control, America's post-Civil War banking system 
was inherently unstable, and economic expansion and diversification in the 
1880s and 1890s exacerbated the instability of the system.6 
Lacking a central banking system, California bankers, like their coun­
terparts throughout the United States, tried to cope with their difficulties 
through a mixture of private actions and state legislation. Bankers in San 
Francisco, Los, Angeles, and other cities set up clearing houses and later a 
statewide trade association to help them solve their problems. B ankers also 
took the lead in initiating and securing passage for banking legislation at 
Sacramento, particularly after the financial panic of 1907. And, in an 
attempt to alter their relationships with each other and the general public, 
bankers began to define themselves as professional men with duties and 
obligations to the rest of society. 
Banking Associations 
California bankers initiated private efforts to solve their problems with 
the formation of the San Francisco Clearing House Association in 1876. 
In the early 1870s, California banks settled accounts in gold, an awkward 
and risky method of doing business. The clearing house eliminated the 
need for trundling bullion through the streets of San Francisco, for repre­
sentatives of member banks met daily to exchange and cancel drafts drawn 
upon each other. With the rapid spatial development of their city resulting 
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from a land boom in the early 1880s, Los Angelenos also felt the need for a 
clearing house, and, in 1887, they established an organization modeled 
upon the San Francisco association. Like the San Francisco Clearing 
House, it sped transactions among member banks, some of which were by 
this time separated by considerable distances.7 
Considerations of convenience rather than a concern for the stabilization 
of banking dominated the nineteenth-century work of these clearing 
houses. Bankers showed little disposition to control the business practices 
of their fellows. Making credit and capital available to business and 
agriculture was more important to most financiers than the soundness of 
their state's banking system. The San Francisco Clearing House neither 
set capital requirements nor demanded financial examinations for banks 
seeking admittance to its ranks. Moreover, nonmembers could clear 
through the association by using the services of banks that belonged. The 
clearing house possessed well-defined procedures for the expulsion of 
members in perilous financial straits, and the power of expulsion could 
have been an effective tool in policing the city's commercial banks. 
However, the directors of the clearing house took no actions against banks 
in unsound conditions. Nor did they try to aid any of the banks in trouble. 
At least partly as a consequence of these policies several clearing-house 
banks were forced to close their doors in the hard times of the 1890s. 
Virtually the same story was repeated in Los Angeles. Eager to build up 
their area, most bankers could countenance no restrictions on their freedom 
of action. Only a few of the larger bankers wanted the Los Angeles 
Clearing House to impose discipline and high business standards upon its 
members, and, as in San Francisco, nothing came of these suggestions 
until the twentieth century.8 
In setting up clearing houses Californians were imitating actions already 
taken by bankers elsewhere, but neither the San Francisco nor Los Angeles 
clearing houses assumed all of the functions of their counterparts in eastern 
cities. Besides easing the settlement of accounts between their members, 
clearing houses outside of California sometimes sought to relieve monetary 
stringencies in financial panics by issuing loan certificates collectively 
backed by their members, which then circulated as money. This procedure 
began in New York in the 1860s and had become widespread by the 1870s 
and 1890s. Clearing houses also often fostered standard banking practices. 
Some, for instance, set uniform interest rates paid depositors and charged 
for collections. California bankers, concerned more with rapid economic 
growth than with economic stability, took few steps in these directions in 
the nineteenth century.9 
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It required the panic of 1907 to fundamentally alter the nature of 
California's clearing houses. While still retaining their role of expediting 
financial transactions, the clearing houses now assumed new functions as 
well. They tried to moderate financial disturbances and enforce uniform 
banking practices. They issued clearing-house loan certificates to member 
banks and scrip for public use to compensate for the lack of money and to 
protect banks from runs by their depositors. These procedures had been 
adopted by eastern bankers at an earlier date, but Californians soon went 
further. To prevent bank failures in the future the clearing houses 
toughened their regulation of institutions using their services and appointed 
highly paid inspectors to periodically check the financial soundness of their 
members. In these actions Californians were preceded only by New York 
bankers who had initiated periodic inspections of clearing-house banks 
several years before. 
The panic of 1907 caught Californians in a vulnerable position. Few 
bankers expected the crisis, and none anticipated the shortages of specie 
that quickly developed. Banks in New York, Chicago, Boston, and 
Philadelphia informed their Pacific Coast correspondents that they would 
not be allowed to withdraw funds on deposit with them. The eastern banks 
agreed to pay drafts drawn upon them only with clearing-house loan 
certificates. These actions proved especially harmful to California bank­
ers, for they had just placed the returns of a large fruit crop in New York 
banks. Strapped for funds, sixteen California banks closed temporarily, 
and four failed, one with liabilities exceeding $8,000,000.10 
Clearing houses throughout the state tried to blunt the impact of the 
crisis. San Franciscans led the way. Upon depositing acceptable securities 
with a loan committee, clearing-house members received certificates that 
they could use to settle clearing-house accounts, thus freeing their limited 
supply of specie to meet the demands of their depositors. To satisfy 
business needs for a circulating medium the San Francisco Clearing House 
supplied scrip in amounts of from one to twenty dollars. Banks desiring it 
placed clearing-house loan certificates with the loan committee and ob­
tained scrip in return. At one point member banks had $12,339,000 in 
clearing-house loan certificates and $6,784,929 in scrip outstanding.11 
Bankers throughout California dealt with the panic in a similar way. The 
Los Angeles Clearing House issued $2,022,000 in loan certificates and 
$3,396,650 in scrip. Bankers in other cities relied upon clearing-house 
notes, and some certificates circulated even in Nevada.12 
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The panic of 1907 also led clearing houses to tighten their controls over 
member banks. Both the San Francisco and Los Angeles associations 
toughened their membership requirements. To belong to the San Francisco 
Clearing House banks now had to pass inspection by an entrance commit­
tee and possess a paid-in capital of $500,000 (nonmembers operating 
through clearing house banks needed a capital of at least $200,000). The 
Los Angeles Clearing House set its capital requirement at $200,000.13 For 
the first time the clearing houses made provisions to regularly check the 
financial soundness of their members. Any bank using clearing-house loan 
certificates in San Francisco had to acquiesce in a weekly inspection of its 
books, and this detailed scrutiny continued after the panic. In 1908, the 
clearing house hired a full-time examiner at the princely annual salary of 
$15,000 to inspect all member banks at least once each year. He reported 
any discrepancies to a central committee that then decided whether to aid 
the bank in trouble or expel it from the clearing house.14 The Los Angeles 
Clearing House appointed an examiner in the same year, and he operated 
on terms similar to those of the San Francisco inspector.15 
Bankers hoped that the clearing houses would stabilize their industry, 
and the associations partially realized these desires. Examinations in Los 
Angeles revealed, according to the president of that city's clearing house, 
that many institutions were "of a mushroom character, illy [sic] organ­
ized as to personel [sic], under-capitalized, addicted to unethical meth­
ods." To change this situation the clearing house enforced new rules 
adopted in 1908, and this move helped touch off a wave of mergers and 
liquidations that led to the closing of thirteen of the city's forty-six com­
mercial banks. The resulting banking structure proved strong enough to 
weather the crisis of 1914 with only a single bank closing. Furthermore, 
in the one case of failure, the clearing house reimbursed all the depositors 
of the member bank that failed. The collapse of any bank, those belonging 
to the organization agreed, should be avoided, because it lessened public 
confidence in banking as a whole.16 In San Francisco, too, the power of 
examination and the threat of expulsion gave the clearing house real power, 
since, as one San Franciscan noted, for a commercial bank exclusion 
amounted to "financial suicide." While it is difficult to accurately mea­
sure the impact of the clearing house's actions upon San Francisco bank­
ing, it is worth noting that many bankers felt its new rules and inspections 
would prevent bank failures in the future. Most agreed with one of the 
city's leading financiers, when he observed in 1909 that "the feeling of 
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security in dealing with our neighbors" made clearing house examinations 
"worth all that it costs."17 
Businessmen were ambivalent in their attitude toward these efforts to 
stabilize the state's banking structure. They generally applauded attempts 
to eliminate bank failures. Yet, their approval was tempered by concern 
lest these actions restrict the amount of credit and capital available for 
business expansion. When they could not obtain the funds they desired, 
businessmen often blamed the bankers. Insurance men and other busi­
nessmen in Los Angeles accused that city's clearing house of acting as an 
artificial barrier to entry into commercial banking. They asserted that it was 
"almost impossible for another bank to start business in Los Angeles, so 
carefully has the Clearing House guarded its interests.'' They claimed that 
clearing-house members were discouraging the formation of new banks 
because "the more banks, the more their power would have been jeopar­
dized, and the less would be their profit'' and feared that such actions might 
impede the growth of local industry.18 San Franciscans voiced similar 
complaints. The California Promotion Committee, a heterogeneous group 
of San Francisco businessmen, accused California bankers of not making 
enough credit available for new enterprises and of refusing to purchase the 
bonds of new companies like electric street railroads. The committee 
blamed this conservative attitude for forcing promoters to turn to New 
York for funds.19 
Some of this criticism was probably valid. Businessmen, and not just 
fly-by-night speculators, incurred difficulties raising capital in California. 
The organizers of public utility and street car companies found themselves 
particularly hard-pressed. When expansions, reorganizations, and mergers 
took place in the early twentieth century, the promoters were almost 
invariably forced to travel to eastern money centers to float new stock and 
bond issues.20 This difficulty in raising money was, of course, one of the 
main reasons public utility officers desired state regulation of their compa­
nies, for they hoped inspection by the railroad commission would enhance 
the value of their stocks and bonds. Other industries also depended upon 
eastern capital for development. The lumber industry, in particular, relied 
upon eastern capital. Much of the development of California's lumber 
industry came from the influx of eastern capital and firms (like the 
Diamond Match Company) that moved into California in the 1890s and 
early twentieth century.21 
Although never completely successful in reconciling financial stability 
with financial expansion, California bankers proved more capable of 
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regularizing transactions among themselves. The growth of banking in 
new areas underlined the need for a statewide banking organization in 
California. The growth of small state commercial banks to finance the 
development of agriculture in the state's interior seemed, according to 
many Californians, to demand some sort of central regulation. Only such 
control could, they believed, rationalize relations between bankers in 
different regions and stabilize the banking industry throughout California. 
Bankers facing similar problems in other areas of the United States estab­
lished state or regional trade associations, and, by 1890, eleven state 
associations existed. Californians followed their lead with the formation of 
the California Bankers Association in 1891.22 
From its earliest days the California Bankers Association worked to 
improve relations between country and city bankers. In the early twentieth 
century it established a par checking system for the entire state. Califor­
nians were in the forefront of this nationwide movement; only New York 
bankers were more advanced. As California's economy became increas­
ingly complex, its residents needed to be able to cash checks wherever they 
were. Yet, most city bankers accepted drafts drawn on country banks only 
at a heavy discount. This practice particularly irked country bankers, 
because bankers in Los Angeles and San Francisco honored each other's 
checks at par. During the 1890s, country bankers tried to win acceptance 
for their notes at face value, or, failing in this matter, to secure approval for 
a uniform schedule of rates charged for cashing checks. In 1901, they 
succeeded. California Bankers Association members agreed to cash each 
other's checks at par, without any discounting or service charges. The 
organization also ironed out difficulties country bankers encountered as 
depositors in San Francisco institutions. Problems involved in these trans­
actions became frequent as country banks began placing parts of their 
reserves in San Francisco rather than New York banks. The association 
sought to fix standard interest rates offered correspondents and uniform 
daily balances required of them. The California Bankers Association 
brought together bankers from different regions in still other ways. In 
1902, it created a protective committee that circulated information about 
bank robberies, and ten years later it started purchasing office equipment 
for its members, usually receiving a 10 percent discount from the manufac­
turers.23 
The California Bankers Association also established a group banking 
system and tried to set up a network of clearing houses to stabilize banking 
conditions in California. With the differentiation of the state's economy, 
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the consideration of distinctly regional topics became increasingly urgent 
for California's bankers. To fill this need the California Bankers Associa­
tion formed a number of local associations. The first group of this system 
(which the bankers labeled "group banking") began holding meetings in 
1912, and within eight years six other groups existed. Besides discussing 
local problems, these bodies standardized bank forms and, in a few 
instances, established uniform interest rates paid depositors and charged 
borrowers. Some considered hiring inspectors to examine the financial 
soundness of their members.24 Still more significant were efforts to found a 
statewide clearing-house system. Following the panic of 1907, the mem­
bers of the California Bankers Association voted to set up ten regional 
clearing houses. Each would employ examiners to investigate the financial 
integrity of their members, and a central board elected by the state's 
bankers would lay down guidelines for the clearing houses to enforce. 
Hailed as a way to "prevent improper or unsafe conduct upon the part of 
any bank within the state," the plan won approval at the 1909 California 
Bankers Association convention. Yet, despite this auspicious beginning, 
the scheme never materialized, for bankers discovered that they could 
attain their goals more thoroughly and easily through legislation.25 
As their failure to set up a state clearing-house system indicated, bankers 
realized that only measures having the force of law could adequately solve 
their problems. Clearing houses and other organizations might help, but 
because membership in them was voluntary, they could not provide the 
complete answers. What they could not adequately achieve by private 
actions many bankers hoped to accomplish by legislation. 
Banking Legislation 
From its inception the California Bankers Association worked for the 
passage of banking legislation at Sacramento. Most historians dealing with 
American banking legislation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries have focused their attention on national developments. This 
emphasis is understandable, for federal legislation, the Aldrich-Vreeland 
Act and the Federal Reserve Act, did fundamentally alter banking in the 
United States. Yet, developments on the state level also proved important. 
In California bankers labored for bills to stabilize their state's banking 
system and protect their institutions from danger during financial panics, 
sometimes at the expense of extending credit and capital to farmers and 
businessmen. In addition, bankers pressed for measures regulating the 
expansion of multipurpose banking. 
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Bankers were not the only architects of California's banking laws. State 
officials, politicians, and various groups of businessmen influenced the 
legislation. Nor did bankers always agree upon the shape of legislation. 
Rifts often separated city from country bankers. They sometimes divided 
upon the issue of whether economic stability or rapid economic growth was 
more desirable, with city bankers usually taking the first and country 
bankers the latter point of view. Legislation also pitted bankers against 
each other on functional lines. Commercial and trust bankers, each of 
whom was trying to invade the other's domain, sought to use legislation 
defining multipurpose banking for their own ends. Yet, despite such splits, 
bankers played the predominant role in drafting California's bank laws. By 
hammering out their differences at the meetings of the California Bankers 
Association they often achieved near unanimity of purpose and as a result 
were able to establish the form of banking legislation in California. The 
California Banking Commission may have been, as the historian Gerald 
Nash has suggested, a ' 'good example of how a public agency was shaping 
enterpreneurial techniques of private business" in the early twentieth 
century, but it was the bankers who determined the scope and nature of the 
duties and powers of the commission.26 
Bank failures during the mid-1890s dramatized the need to modify 
banking legislation in California. California's three-man board of bank 
commissioners proved incapable of dealing with the depression. In­
adequate laws and lax regulation contributed to widespread bank failures in 
1893 and 1894, with only Kansas surpassing California in the number of 
closings. The failures of the Pacific Bank and its affiliate, the Home 
Savings Bank, attracted the most attention. Systematically looted by their 
officers, these institutions had passed examinations by the state bank 
commissioners in 1892.27 Bankers moved quickly to obtain legislation to 
prevent a recurrence of such events. At their convention in 1894 members 
of the California Bankers Association passed resolutions calling for mea­
sures to establish tighter state control over insolvent banks, set cash 
reserves for commercial banks, and fix capital requirements for savings 
banks. The state bank commissioners, who took part in the debates, wanted 
to go even further. In addition to the association's recommendations, they 
desired laws abolishing overdrafts and completely separating savings, 
commercial, and trust banking in California.28 
Meetings between a committee of the California Bankers Association 
and the bank commissioners smoothed out differences, and, in 1895, the 
commissioners sponsored bills in Sacramento on behalf of the bankers. As 
the president of the California Bankers Association explained in a letter to 
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the organization's members, public hostility to bankers made it unwise for 
bankers to demonstrate open support for the measures. Such efforts, he 
cautioned, might well hurt their cause. Bankers should instead, he urged, 
leave public backing of the proposals to the commissioners.29 This strategy 
succeeded, and the contours of the resulting legislation showed that the 
bankers rather than the commissioners had dominated the discussions on 
bank laws. Proposals setting capital requirements for savings banks, in­
creasing the authority of the bank commissioners over insolvent institu­
tions, and requiring savings banks to retain part of their profits as reserve 
funds won approval from the state legislature and became law. Nothing 
was said, however, about separating the different types of banking, the 
major concern of the bank commissioners.30 
The response of bankers to the legislation revealed divisions within their 
ranks. City bankers felt that additional laws would further strengthen and 
stabilize their state's banking structure, and at the 1895 convention of the 
California Bankers Association they persuaded country bankers to support 
a resolution condemning bank overdrafts. Los Angeles and San Francisco 
financiers, backed by the state bank commissioners, also urged that loans 
to an officer by his own institution be prohibited or limited to small 
amounts. Country bankers from Santa Rosa, Dixon, Fresno, and Stockton 
opposed this suggestion. Because small towns usually contained only a few 
banks, any statute of this type would, they argued, make it difficult for 
bankers to raise capital for business ventures in which they might be 
involved. Proposals against loans to bank officers might, they concluded, 
retard the economic development of their areas.31 
With the return of prosperity in the late 1890s the demand for new bank 
laws temporarily dissipated, but the issue of credit expansion reappeared, 
in a new form, in 1905. In that year the state legislature considered a bill 
that would have lowered the capital requirements for banks in small towns. 
Legislators from California's inland farm valleys and small towns favored 
the measure. They claimed that merchants and farmers in newly develop­
ing regions sometimes lacked adequate credit facilities and that this situa­
tion hindered their economic growth. Opponents of the bill argued that the 
proposal would lead to "banks springing up like mushrooms" and that it 
would "make our banking institutions weak and unstable." The measure 
passed the senate, but, because of the intervention of the California 
Bankers Association, it failed in the assembly. The association's large-city 
bankers worked against the bill, for they feared that undercapitalization 
might cause bank failures in times of financial stress. Some country 
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bankers approved of the measure; but others opposed it, for they had no 
desire to encourage the creation of competitors. Despite the defeat of this 
bill, the issues it raised were to recur in later legislative sessions.32 
Two years later the panic of 1907 transformed banking laws throughout 
the United States. Its impact on national legislation is well known. The 
crisis led to efforts to create a more elastic money supply and prevent bank 
failures. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 authorized national banks to 
form national currency associations in times of need. Banks belonging to 
such associations could issue new notes backed by commercial paper or 
selected types of bonds, thus increasing the available money supply and 
easing financial stringency. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act also set up the 
National Monetary Commission to recommend changes in the nation's 
monetary and banking laws, and this investigation ultimately resulted in 
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act five years later.33 While these 
developments were occurring, changes were also taking place on the state 
level. California led the way in new state-banking legislation. 
The failure of the California Safe Deposit and Trust Company supplied 
the catalyst for action in the Golden State. Founded in 1889, this institution 
was, according to one contemporary, "a hustler for deposit accounts." By 
offering higher interest rates than other San Francisco banks it boosted its 
deposits from $2,142,000 in 1903 to $9,303,532 just four years later. The 
bank's officers grossly mismanaged these funds, and, when the San Fran­
cisco Clearing House refused to bail them out, the institution folded. Its 
closing deprived 20,000 depositors of over $8,000,000 in savings.34 With 
this event, the president of the California Bankers Association correctly 
observed, "a stigma was cast on every bank in the state."35 
Bankers and politicians moved quickly to change banking practices in 
California. The state legislature set up a commission of six senators and 
assemblymen to examine banking in California and to report recom­
mendations for legislation at the 1909 session. At the same time the 
California Bankers Association appointed a committee to investigate re­
medial legislation.36 Meetings between the legislative commission and 
committees set up by the California Bankers Association eventually led to 
the enactment of the Bank Act of 1909, which remained the state's 
fundamental piece of banking legislation for some twenty years. 
The 1908 meeting of the California Bankers Association, which the 
legislative commission attended, laid the foundations for future legisla­
tion. Discussions at the convention revealed agreement among nearly all 
bankers on some subjects. With the mismanagement of the funds of the 
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California Safe Deposit and Trust Company fresh in their minds, all 
felt that banks should stop making loans to their officers (except directors) 
and the association passed a resolution asking for legislation on this matter. 
Most also believed that the reserve requirements of commercial banks 
should be raised, and they called for a law setting them at 15 percent of 
deposits. Legislation on these points, bankers argued, would help make 
their institutions safe from failure and thus restore public faith in bank­
ing.37 
Proposals for the separation of different types of banking aroused more 
controversy. Big-city bankers, including nearly all the financiers of San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento, favored strict segregation of the 
deposits and capital of commercial, savings, and trust banks. They pointed 
to temptations facing a commercial bank to use the deposits of a savings 
affiliate in its own business and concluded that only trouble could result 
from connections between essentially different institutions. Their argu­
ments made little impression upon country bankers. Country bankers 
conceded that separation might strengthen the structures of large-city 
banks. Yet, they feared that in smaller communities separation might 
retard economic progress. They claimed that where deposits were small 
segreg ation would make ' ' it impossible to have any bank there at all." As a 
San Jose banker noted, "large cities can specialize in all branches of 
business as provincial districts can not.'' Divisions opened on other lines as 
well. Trust bankers, who were then entering commercial banking, proved 
reluctant to back any measure that might limit their future actions. Com­
mercial bankers, who were trying to keep trust bankers out of commercial 
banking, were more amenable to separation. Because of these cleavages 
the association failed to reach agreement on this subject. A resolution 
calling for the severance of ties between commercial, trust, and savings 
banks split the convention and suffered defeat in a close vote.38 
Regardless of these divisions, bankers clearly felt that they should be the 
group to administer any new pieces of banking legislation, and at no time 
was this attitude more apparent than in the meeting's consideration of the 
future composition and duties of the state board of bank commissioners. 
Nearly all bankers wanted to replace the board of bank commissioners with 
a single superintendent of banks. By centralizing power in one man, 
bankers hoped to end the uncertainties stemming from the overlapping 
jurisdictions and actions of the commissioners. They probably also felt 
they could assure the selection of a superintendent sympathetic to their 
interests more easily than the appointment of an entire board. J. A. Graves, 
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a well-known Los Angeles financier, suggested that the governor choose 
the superintendent from a list of five names supplied by the California 
Bankers Association, and this proposal won instant approval at the conven­
tion. Some bankers urged, in addition, that the superintendent rely exclu­
sively upon clearing-house inspectors to examine the financial condition of 
California banks.39 
Few groups presented alternatives to the ideas of the bankers. Members 
of the legislative commission objected only to the method of selecting the 
superintendent of banks. Pointing out that the American Bankers Associa­
tion did not advise the president upon whom he should appoint as controller 
of the treasury, they felt it was improper for the bankers to suggest the man 
to regulate themselves.40 The Commonwealth Club of California dis­
cussed proposals for new legislation and reached some of the same conclu­
sions as the California Bankers Association. The club called for measures 
establishing a superintendent of banks and prohibiting loans by banks to 
their officers. Unlike the bankers, however, the Commonwealth Club also 
requested legislation dissolving all links between commercial, trust, and 
savings banks.41 
At the close of its 1908 meeting the California Bankers Association 
appointed a committee carefully chosen to represent the bankers of San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and the interior to work on legislation. Members 
of the commission appointed by the state legislature asked the bankers1 
committee to prepare a law suitable to themselves that would also provide 
absolute protection for depositors. At four meetings during the next few 
months the committee drew up an act embodying many of the resolutions 
passed at the 1908 bankers convention.42 The measure created the position 
of state superintendent of banks. Appointed by the governor (but not from a 
list supplied by the bankers), he would hold office for five years at an 
annual salary of $7,500. His main duty would be to examine the financial 
soundness of California's banks at periodic intervals. The proposal forbade 
banks to make loans to their own officers (except directors) and limited 
loans given any one person to a sum equaling one-tenth of the bank's 
capital. The bankers reached a compromise on the separation of different 
types of banks. When an investigation revealed that three-quarters of 
California's banks engaged in more than one sort of banking, they con­
cluded that to limit banks to one type of service would be "revolutionary, 
impractical, and contrary to business practice." Instead, they drafted a 
plan for what they called "departmental banking." Under this scheme an 
institution could take part in all forms of banking if it segregated the assets, 
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capital, and deposits of each. These requirements meant, for instance, that 
a bank could not use the deposits of its savings department for loans granted 
by its commercial department. Both commercial and savings banks were to 
possess a minimum capital of $25,000. If an institution engaged in both, 
each department was to maintain this amount. The capital requirement for 
trust companies was set at $100,000.43 
The commission of legislators altered this proposal little and offered it to 
the legislature in early 1909.44 With the strong backing of both the bankers 
committee and the legislative commission, the measure met scant opposi­
tion in Sacramento. Only one modification won approval. Legislators 
acceded to pressures from some country bankers and small-town busi­
nessmen to reduce the capital requirements for banks doing a savings and 
commercial business to $25,000, rather than that amount for each depart­
ment.45 The state legislature considered only one other bill dealing with 
banking, a measure that would have assessed all banks 1 percent of their 
average daily deposits to create a fund with which to pay off the depositors 
of any bank that failed. The bill was modeled upon an Oklahoma statute 
passed in 1907. By 1918, eight western, midwestern, and southern states 
possessed such laws.46 However, California bankers denounced the pro­
posal as "socialism, thinly disguised," and "simply an absurdity," and 
their opposition killed it in committee.47 
Bankers in California and the nation praised the Bank Act of 1909. The 
president of the California Bankers Association noted that "the committee 
[the bankers' legislative committee] did its work well" and was pleased 
that "the bill as drafted by them was practically the same as the one passed 
by the legislature."48 John Drum, the California Bankers Association's 
chief lobbyist, also characterized the measure as ably embodying the 
wishes of the bankers.49 Most financiers agreed with him and often 
reserved special commendation for the creation of the office of superinten­
dent of banks. The secretary of the American Bankers Association lauded 
Califomians for the passage of the act, and the legislatures of other states 
requested copies of it.50 
Governor James Gillette appointed Alden Anderson as superintendent of 
banks, a choice popular with California's bankers. A former assemblyman 
and lieutenant governor, Anderson possessed ample banking experience as 
president of the Capital Banking and Trust Company of Sacramento, 
vice-president of the London Paris National Bank in San Francisco, and 
director of the California National Bank of Sacramento. Upon taking 
office, Anderson outlined an approach to regulation designed to win 
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approval from the state s bankers. "I expect to advise with others," he 
declared, "whom I know to have been conservative, who have been honest 
and who have been successful in the banking affairs of the state." Ander­
son moved to enforce the Bank Act, but, as he phrased it, he allowed 
"change to be . evolutionary, in aid of which all possible assistance is 
being given." Financiers applauded the superintendent's "reasonable and 
judicious attitude," and praised him for appointing only men recom­
mended by bankers as bank examiners.51 
Although generally satisfied with the Bank Act of 1909, bankers, 
working in close cooperation with the superintendent, prepared several 
modifications for the 1911 legislative session. As they had done two years 
before, members of the California Bankers Association set up a committee 
to draft the bills. After meeting with Anderson, the committee drew up 
measures that the superintendent then introduced in the legislature. Passed 
with little debate, the bills altered the 1909 law in several ways. Most 
importantly, they set new capital requirements for both commercial and 
savings banks. The chronic conflict between city and country bankers was 
ended, at least temporarily, by fixing the requirements according to the 
population of the towns in which the banks were located: $25,000 for 
towns of under5,000; $50,000 for those of 5,000 to 25,000; $100,000 for 
cities of 25,000 to 100,000; $200,000 for centers of between 100,000 and 
200,000; and $300,000 for larger metropolises.52 
Anderson continued as superintendent until Governor Hiram Johnson 
replaced him in 1911. Johnson evicted him from office only after a lengthy 
legislative battle that resulted in making the tenure of the superintendent of 
banks dependent upon the pleasure of the governor. Governor Johnson 
dismissed Anderson for several reasons. Johnson condemned Anderson for 
failing to enforce the Bank Act, and there was substance to his criticism. 
Anderson had allowed some bankers to violate parts of the acts, particu­
larly those sections dealing with departmental banking, and he granted 
special favors to others. Political motives, however, also prompted 
Johnson's moves against the superintendent. As the choice of conservative 
Republicans for governor in 1910, Anderson had run against Johnson in the 
primaries, thus incurring his wrath, and Johnson was not the type of person 
to forgive past injuries.53 
W. R. Williams, the governor's new appointee, denounced Anderson's 
administration, but he maintained his predecessor's ties with bankers. In 
late 1911, the new superintendent charged that during Anderson's tenure 
"the whole system of state control has been permeated by discrimination, 
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inequality in administration of the law and the granting of special 
privileges." He reported that banks had loaned large sums to their officers 
and had violated the provisions for departmental banking with impunity.54 
Williams clamped down on these practices, but he continued to work with 
bankers on legislative matters. In his 1912 report he called for changes in 
the Bank Act, and in the same year the president of the California Bankers 
Association toured the state to find out what amendments bankers desired. 
As in the past, a committee of bankers and the superintendent drafted 
legislative proposals. Passed by the legislators without debate, the mea­
sures increased the powers and flexibility of the superintendent of banks in 
a number of ways.55 
The Bank Act of 1909, as amended in subsequent years, remained 
California's fundamental banking law until the 1930s. Together with the 
actions of bank organizations it brought a new measure of stability to the 
economic situation. Despite the continued founding of state banks, few 
failed in the decade after the law went into effect. Most weathered the 
shock of the outbreak of the First World War quite well.56 Although other 
factors, the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and the general increase in 
prosperity after 1907, contributed to the improvement, the Bank Act 
helped bring order to banking in California. The impact of the Bank Act on 
the provision of credit and capital for the state's farmers and businessmen is 
hard to judge. Certainly, California businessmen claimed that credit was 
scarce after 1909, and it appears that there was some truth to this com­
plaint. Yet, the act did not retard the founding of new banks in California. 
The number of state banks in California grew from 506 in 1908 to 843 in 
1933, and their capital increased from $483,000,000 in 1900 to 
$3,250,000,000 in 1930.57 Equally important, new banking methods 
made credit and capital more available to Californians from about 1910 on. 
Even before the First World War branch banking, pioneered by the Bank of 
Italy, began easing the credit situation, and in the 1920s this trend con­
tinued. Based in San Francisco, the Bank of Italy established branches 
throughout the state's interior farm valleys and then in Southern California. 
In doing so it combined the advantages of the stability of a strong city 
institution with those of country banks in touch with the needs of local 
farmers and merchants.58 
The Professionalization of Banking 
"Banking is a profession," declared the president of the California 
Bankers Association in 1905. "If theology is the science of religion, if 
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medicine is the science of the human body, if law is the science of justice," 
he continued, "then banking is the science of finance."59 Like other 
American businessmen, California bankers tried to win acceptance of 
themselves as professional men in the early twentieth century.60 In this 
way bankers hoped to foster better relations with the general public, and 
especially with the states businessmen, improve relations among them­
selves, and win support for their legislative programs in Sacramento. To 
achieve these ends bankers established new educational facilities, codes of 
business ethics, and social organizations. In their speeches and, though to 
lesser degrees, their actions, bankers demonstrated a growing awareness 
that they were an integral part of the larger society around them and that 
they owed certain obligations to their communities. 
As their business became more complex, bankers required an increas­
ingly sophisticated education. In the first decade of the twentieth century a 
number of American universities offered business courses, and both Stan­
ford University and the University of California took steps in this direction. 
Addressing the 1907 convention of the California Bankers Association, a 
Stanford professor of economics commented upon the fragmentation of 
American business. "Modern business has become so specialized," he 
observed, "that it represents a distinct profession or rather group of 
professions." Noting that universities presented courses in railroad trans­
portation, factory organization, accountancy, insurance, and foreign 
commerce, he urged that they also set up programs in banking.61 Despite 
the efforts of the universities, most of the education of bankers took place 
outside their doors. Yet, bankers recognized that learning on the job no 
longer sufficed, and, in late 1903, the American Institute of Banking, a 
national organization, opened a San Francisco chapter. Within a decade 
five other California cities possessed branches. By 1920, the Los Angeles 
group was the fifth largest in the nation, and only the New York chapter 
surpassed San Francisco's membership of l,800.62 Supported in part by 
the state's clearing houses, the California chapters offered both theoretical 
and practical instruction. In 1909, the San Francisco organization engaged 
a Stanford professor to lecture on corporations, money systems and mar­
kets, trust problems, and negotiable instruments. A decade later its pro­
gram had expanded to include political economy, international trade, 
public speaking, elementary banking, French, Spanish, business English, 
commercial law, foreign exchange, credits and accounting. Few other 
chapters had as wide a range of subjects, but most offered a fair variety of 
courses. All gave examinations and conferred certificates upon those who 
completed their programs.63 
114 The Politics of Business in California, 1890-1920 
As professionals, bankers tried to devise and uphold codes of business 
ethics. Although never totally successful in this endeavor, they made 
considerable progress. The clearing houses imposed stringent rules on all 
institutions using their facilities, and their membership included the most 
prominent commercial banks in California. The California Bankers Asso­
ciation, while possessing little formal control over its members, operated 
through legislation to upgrade the state's banking practices. 
Organizations established to further education and foster uniform codes 
of business conduct also brought about an increase in the group cohesive­
ness of bankers. Each convention of the California Bankers Association 
featured elaborate social functions for the delegates and their wives, and 
one of the reasons the association initiated group banking was so that 
"bankers of the various districts would become better acquainted with each 
other."64 The chapters of the American Institute of Banking provided 
many opportunities for closer social contact among bankers. They held 
dances, smokers, clam bakes, river excursions, picnics, and amateur 
plays. Their members competed against each other in adding-machine 
contests, track and field meets, debates, and baseball games. By 1916, the 
San Francisco chapter possessed committees on athletics, auditing, educa­
tion, entertainment, forum, library, public affairs, publicity, and thrift. As 
one San Franciscan noted, "many warm friendships have been made 
through the institute."65 
Bankers sought to gain consideration for themselves as experts capable 
of dealing with society's economic problems, and they realized that they 
could obtain such acceptance only if they played an active role in the 
development of their communities. As early as 1895, one financier de­
scribed bankers as ' 'public custodians'' and asked his fellows to recognize 
the existence of a mutuality of interest between bankers, depositors, and 
borrowers. In the twentieth century these ideas became more clearly 
defined. Jess Stoddard, a prominent Los Angeles banker, noted, in 1914, 
that banks were "more and more being regarded as quasi-public institu­
tions" and claimed that a bank "should recognize an implied obligation to 
use its loanable funds . . as will best protect and foster the industries that 
make for the general welfare." Bankers argued that they were more than 
"simply the representatives of stockholders" and contributed bank funds 
to local projects and charities. J. M. Elliot of Los Angeles requested that 
the stockholders of his bank set aside a sum that he could use for such 
purposes. James Lynch of San Francisco endorsed this plan, for he be­
lieved that a bank was "an entity, a person, an individual" that had "a duty 
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to the community." Country bankers adopted this attitude more slowly, 
but, by 1920, they had joined their city correspondents in financing and 
organizing boys clubs throughout California.66 
Bankers partially succeeded in securing approval for their status as 
professionals. Their acceptance as experts by the public helps explain why 
their legislative programs passed in Sacramento with almost no opposition. 
Even businessmen who suffered from bank closings and failures during the 
panic of 1907 looked to the bankers to prepare and administer new legisla­
tion. In 1908, a leading San Francisco businessman addressing the Com­
monwealth Club urged that bankers be allowed to choose the state superin­
tendent of banks. He noted that the state medical society recommended the 
state medical examiner and that the California Architects Association 
chose the state architect. "If doctors and architects can suggest," he 
queried, "why can not bankers also?" Another businessman added that the 
superintendent should rely upon clearing-house examiners to inspect the 
state's banks. Professional competence could be achieved only in this way. 
As he put it, "it seems to me the best regulators of banks are bankers . 
this is simply on the line of having the business overlooked by an expert, 
one who understands the business thoroughly." Not all businessmen, 
however, were satisfied with the actions of bankers. Some continued to 
complain, right up to the First World War, that bankers took little part in 
community affairs and that they failed to provide funds for community 
projects. Others objected to the paternalism implicit in the bankers' posi­
tion. Few Californians agreed, for instance, with the assertion of one 
financier that bankers should be ' ' the balance wheel'' that would ' 'prevent 
any [social or political] movement from going too far in one direction. "  6  7 
To solve the problems caused by economic changes in their state, 
California bankers formed cooperative associations, labored for the pass­
age of state legislation, and sought recognition as professionals. Though 
never totally able to reconcile their sometimes contradictory goals, bankers 
achieved a considerable degree of success in their endeavors. Clearing 
houses expedited transactions among their members and sought to protect 
them from the effects of financial panics. The California Bankers Associa­
tion improved relations among bankers and worked for banking legislation 
at the state capital. The Bank Act of 1909 and its later modifications were 
largely the creation of bankers. Finally, bankers won growing acceptance 
for themselves as professionals, skilled in their specialty and, like doctors, 
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lawyers, or clergymen, owing fairly definite obligations to the rest of 
society. 
The changing image Californians had of their state's bankers helps 
explain why bankers generally succeeded in getting their way in the state 
legislature. The senators and assemblymen were themselves mainly busi­
ness and professional men who were coming to view bankers as experts 
possessed of special knowledge in their fields of endeavor. In this situation 
the legislators were often willing to defer to the bankers as those who were 
best qualified to propose solutions for financial problems. Other factors 
were however, also important in the bankers' legislative victories. Most 
significantly, the bankers, when able to heal their splits, composed a highly 
organized interest group well able to make their wishes known in the state 
capital. The California Bankers Association maintained full-time lobby­
ists in Sacramento, and the organization's officers frequently traveled to 
the capital city to express the desires of the body. Yet, as in the case of the 
Public Utilities Act, the legislators viewed the Bank Act of 1909 as being in 
the public interest as well as in the best interest of the business group it most 
closely affected. Indeed, had not the measure promised protection for 
depositors, it would probably not have passed in Sacramento. As the 
various committees set up by the California Bankers Association and the 
commission established by the state legislature argued, the Bank Act 
would aid both bankers and depositors by stabilizing economic conditions 
in California. In the eyes of the bankers and legislators, at least, the public 
and private interests of their state could be neatly subsumed. 
7 
Investment Banking and the Blue-sky Law 
As in savings and commercial banking, California s economic expansion 
required changes in the state's investment banking. The need for credit and 
investment capital by California's booming businesses placed grave strains 
upon the Golden State s stockbrokers and investment bankers. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they found themselves faced with 
the dilemma of trying to provide financing for their state's rapid economic 
growth, while, at the same time, attempting to impose some sort of order 
upon California's highly fluid economic situation. Working through both 
private actions and state legislation, the brokers and bankers, often joined 
by other businessmen, sought to reconcile these divergent goals. 
Voluntary Supervision of Securities Sales 
Stockbrokers and investment bankers undertook the first efforts to 
supervise securities sales in California. Through their state's stock ex­
changes stockbrokers made some attempts to police the financial sound­
ness of corporations offering new issues for sale on their boards. Invest­
ment bankers formed local chapters of the Investment Bankers Association 
of America, which tried to drive shady investment companies out of 
business. When, however, it became apparent that their work alone would 
not end fraudulent securities transactions, most investment bankers and 
stockbrokers took a leading part in the drive for a tough blue-sky law. 
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Californians formed stock exchanges soon after the granting of state­
hood in order to facilitate capital transactions. Stockbrokers operated in 
San Francisco as early as the 1850s, but they worked in an informal 
manner, and prices were, as one pioneer dealer later remembered, "not all 
regular nor [sic] uniform."1 The discovery of immense silver deposits in 
Nevada*s Comstock Lode and the subsequent high volume of trading in 
mining issues led to the formation of the San Francisco Stock and Ex­
change Board in 1862. Thirteen years later the Pacific Stock Exchange 
opened its doors, and, in 1882, brokers founded the San Francisco Stock 
and Bond Exchange. Though the major function of these organizations was 
to mobilize capital for mining concerns, by the 1870s and 1880s, they were 
also listing the securities of insurance, gas, railroad, steamboat, water and 
telegraph companies.2 As in San Francisco, the first stock exchanges in 
Los Angeles owed their existence to mineral strikes, in this case the oil 
discoveries of the 1890s. In the early twentieth century the Los Angeles 
Stock Exchange absorbed other bodies to become the leading exchange in 
Southern California, and it was soon dealing in industrial, railroad, and 
public utility issues.3 
From their earliest days, most stock exchanges possessed the power to 
police new issues of securities. Before agreeing to list a firm's securities, 
exchange members could insist upon investigating the company *s financial 
soundness and future prospects. If anything were found amiss, the brokers 
could deny it a listing and, in this manner, exclude questionable issues 
from trading.4 The San Francisco Stock and Exchange Board originally 
required a majority vote of its members to place a security on the list called, 
and, in 1874, it set up a standing committee to examine all new applicants. 
In the 1880s, the exchange ordered mining companies to report all divi­
dends paid on capital stock, and late in the decade its members adopted a 
resolution empowering its president to employ an expert accountant to 
inspect the books of firms traded by the organization. The failure of a 
company to allow such an investigation could result in a suspension of its 
listing.5 The San Francisco Stock and Bond Exchange also maintained a 
committee to examine the affairs of corporations desiring listings, and, by 
1885, it was calling upon San Francisco's street railroads for monthly 
financial statements.6 Exchanges in Southern California followed the 
example of the San Francisco bodies. In 1916, the president of the Los 
Angeles Stock Exchange asserted that a listing should be a "moral guaran­
tee" of a stock's value and began tightening listing requirements. Within a 
few years the exchange had a committee that examined the affairs of 
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companies applying for listings and maintained a bureau of information to 
supply the public with reliable data about new security offerings.7 
The stock exchanges made, however, little use of their power to with­
hold listings in the nineteenth century. Like commercial bankers in the 
same period, they cared more about rapid economic growth than economic 
stability. Some brokers even abetted swindles. In fact, in its early years the 
San Francisco Stock and Exchange Board, composed of forty brokers, had 
an unsavory reputation, and the more conservative businessmen of the city 
labeled it "the forty thieves." One historian, using records now destroyed, 
noted that many of the issues listed by the exchange in 1876 either paid no 
dividends or were fraudulent and concluded that the examinations made by 
the exchange were "a sham."8 This could well have been the case, for the 
brokers made considerable sums by agreeing to list new firms on their 
exchanges. Listing fees ranged as high as $2,000, and the brokers, unwill­
ing to pass up such windfalls, probably made only perfunctory investiga­
tions into companies' assets and intentions.9 
Only in the early twentieth century did the exchanges begin denying 
questionable or unstable concerns access to their boards. The San Fran­
cisco Stock and Bond Exchange, for instance, refused to approve first 
mortgage bonds floated by one of the largest corporations in California, for 
in examining the deed of trust securing the bonds, the exchange's inves­
tigatory committee found that the issue was not a first, but a collateral, 
mortgage. Its only backing was the stock of other companies, which had 
already encumbered themselves with first, and in some cases, even second 
mortgages. Not until the firm's officers agreed to change the name of the 
bonds did the exchange allow trading in them.10 The same trend appeared 
in Southern California. By 1918, the president of the Los Angeles Stock 
Exchange could report that in the previous year his organization had 
rejected as many listing applications as it had accepted.11 
Investment bankers also tried to regulate the sale of securities in Califor­
nia. Like the exchange brokers, they realized that transactions in fraudulent 
or overly speculative stocks and bonds would injure their standing with the 
public and make future trading more difficult. Californians (eleven San 
Franciscans and three Los Angelenos) composed one of the largest state 
contingents at the formative convention of the Investment Bankers Associ­
ation of America in 1912.12 The organization worked to suppress irrespon­
sible dealers and to educate the public "so that they will know a sound 
security when they see it." Californians felt the need for control most 
urgently. Cyrus Pierce of N. W. Halsey's San Francisco office explained 
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the reason to the Sacramento chapter of the American Institute of Banking. 
The promoters of land development schemes, especially in Southern 
California, finding themselves unable to move their securities through 
reputable bond dealers, were, he complained, either forming new invest­
ment houses of their own or selling their stocks and bonds directly to the 
public. To halt such actions, which they viewed as undermining their 
businesses, nearly all the leading investment bankers in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco joined the association.13 
Stockbrokers and investment bankers soon found that their work by 
itself could not end fraudulent practices. As late as 1915, J. A. Graves, the 
vice-president of the Farmers and Merchants National Bank, found it 
necessary to urge members of the Wall Street Club of Los Angeles "to 
scrutinize with the greatest care every bond issue you attempt to sell" and 
to warn them that commissions received for any transaction would be "but 
a small compensation" for the loss of reputation suffered by dealing in 
shoddy securities.14 A year later the manager of the Los Angeles Stock 
Exchange estimated that three-quarters of the local business was still taking 
place outside the exchange, either on the curb or over the counter, and was, 
therefore, subject to no regulations.15 The same situation, though to a 
somewhat lesser degree, existed in San Francisco as well. Nor did mem­
bers of the Investment Bankers Association of America succeed in weeding 
out black sheep from their ranks. Shady practices continued despite their 
best efforts. 
The Movement for a Blue-sky Law 
Recognizing that their private efforts to police securities transactions 
were only partially successful, many stockbrokers and investment bankers 
worked for the passage of a blue-sky law providing for state regulation of 
their businesses. They were not, however, alone in their desires. Several 
different groups, for different and sometimes conflicting reasons, wanted 
the enactment of such a law. In fact, a wider variety of interest groups 
probably labored for the blue-sky law than for any other single piece of 
business legislation in California. 
The state mineralogist actually began the campaign for legislation to end 
phony stock sales in California. The oil and other mineral discoveries of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries required new capital invest­
ments to defray the expenses of development, and the state mineralogist 
feared that the failure of unsound enterprises would frighten off funds 
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needed by bona fide companies. Upon receiving complaints from investors 
in 1901, he investigated some of the schemes and discovered that many 
mining corporations "were making gross misrepresentations" of their 
finds. He also believed that "swindling operations" were scaring capital 
away from investment in legitimate concerns. To combat this trend he 
began legal prosecutions with the post office for mail fraud and within a 
year had obtained several convictions.16 These actions won the praise of 
the Mining and Engineering Review, one of the state's leading mining 
journals. At the end of 1903, its editor reported that the muddied waters of 
mining investments were clearing and that California would soon "be open 
for investors who wish to become interested."17 Progress by means of 
court cases, however, proved costly and time-consuming, and, in 1904, 
the state mineralogist called for the passage of laws "to deter these sharks 
[promoters of fraudulent mining companies] from further operations in this 
state."18 
The 1905 session of the state legislature approved a measure based upon 
the state mineralogist's recommendations. It forbade false advertising by 
mining companies and provided for a fine of up to $5,000 and a two-year 
term of imprisonment for those convicted of this crime.19 Within a year the 
state mineralogist asserted, somewhat prematurely, that ' ' the glittering and 
exaggerated statements which were so plentiful in the published adver­
tisements and prospectuses of some mining companies before the law went 
into effect are no longer seen."20 Many of the state's miners and oil 
producers favored this act and supported the regulatory efforts of the state 
mineralogist. In 1912, the California Miners Association passed a resolu­
tion requesting the legislature to appropriate more money for the state 
mining bureau to "examine any probable fake or 'wildcat' mining orga­
nizations affecting mining properties within the state."21 
When Hiram Johnson won election as governor, he added a new impetus 
to the movement for a blue-sky law. In his decision to press for legislation 
Johnson was influenced by events occurring beyond California's bound­
aries. By this time the movement for state blue-sky laws had become 
national in scope. States were moving from noncoercive to semicoercive 
and coercive means of executing securities regulations. No longer content 
to simply depend upon statutory requirements, legislatures empowered 
state officials to enforce their laws and in some cases set up new govern­
ment agencies to administer them. Kansas led the way with the passage of a 
stringent act in 1911. Johnson conferred with the governor of Kansas to 
discuss his state's experiences in securities regulation in 1912 and came 
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away from the meeting convinced that California needed a strong blue-sky 
law.22 
California's more conservative financiers and real estate men shared 
Governor Johnson's sentiments. As early as 1903, the president of the 
California Bankers Association urged his fellows to exercise restraining 
hands on new securities issues. He noted that although bankers could not 
prevent the flotation of inadequately secured stocks and bonds ' ' so long as 
the supply of paper keeps up and the presses are in good order," they could 
bring pressure to bear by refusing to loan money on them. In 1912, these 
ideas took a more definite form. In that year the secretary of the California 
Building and Loan League appeared before the annual convention of the 
California Bankers Association to ask for aid in pressing for legislation 
regulating the staters investment companies and securities sales. In re­
sponse to this request the convention of bankers passed a resolution 
condemning the ' ' allurements and misrepresentations of stock promoters'' 
and instructed the association's legislative committee to work with the 
Building and Loan League to secure the enactment of a blue-sky law like 
that in force in Kansas. Partners in some of California's leading investment 
houses, once convinced that it would "not hamper legitimate business," 
also came out for a blue-sky bill, for they hoped it would aid in securing 
capital for the expansion of California's railroads, electric power plants, 
and irrigation systems.23 
Progressive politicians favored the blue-sky proposal for different rea­
sons than most businessmen. Although not oblivious to the capital needs of 
theirstate, they stressed the benefits of ablue-sky law to the small investor. 
As one put it, the measure would protect the "man or woman, who by 
industry and economy gathers a little more than is required for immediate 
use and desires to invest i t ."2 4 Progressive newspapers and journals 
praised the bill in the same terms. The editor of the Sacramento Bee 
expected the blue-sky law to end "the monstrous evil of the sale of 
stocks and bonds of corporations without adequate assets to give security to 
investors."25 
With broad-based business and political support, Governor Johnson had 
Senator Lee Gates of Los Angeles and John Eshleman, the president of the 
California Railroad Commission, draw up a measure modeled on the 
Kansas blue-sky law. In drafting the legislation Gates and Eshleman took 
cognizance of the wishes of the businessmen it would affect. They took 
special care to confer with representatives of the Los Angeles Realty Board 
and the California State Realty Federation in preparing Johnson's bill.26 
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Yet, despite their efforts, some businessmen fought the proposed blue-
sky law. The California Association of Investment Corporations offered 
the most vehement resistance. The moving force behind this organization 
was the Los Angeles Investment Company, a speculative holding company 
with real estate, agricultural, and industrial ventures in Southern Califor­
nia. Charles Elder, the president of the Los Angeles Investment Company, 
also headed the California Association of Investment Corporations. The 
association maintained lobbyists in Sacramento to work for a weaker 
measure as substitute to Johnson's proposal. In addition, its officers sent 
out circulars to bankers, real estate promoters, and other businessmen 
denouncing the governor's bill for giving too much power to state offi­
cials.27 
Regardless of these actions, Governor Johnson's bill easily became law 
in 1913. It provided for a commissioner of corporations to examine each 
new issue of securities offered for sale in California. The commissioner 
could deny any company the right to float its stocks and bonds in the state; 
only those securities already coming under the jurisdiction of .other state 
agencies like the railroad commission were exempted from this provision. 
The law also gave the commissioner "general supervision and control" 
over investment houses and brokers. More specifically, he was to license 
all brokers who operated in California.28 In a closely related move the 
California Bankers Association, joined by some real estate corporations, 
won approval for an amendment to the Bank Act of 1909, which gave the 
banking superintendent the power to examine all bonds submitted by 
corporations for investment by state banks.29 
Businessmen throughout California applauded the passage of the blue-
sky law. By May, 1913, theCoast Banker, California's foremost financial 
periodical, could accurately report that the law was generally regarded in 
the financial world as "a very satisfactory measure."30 A Fresno busi­
nessman speaking before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco ex­
plained why many businessmen favored the new act. He noted that though 
the blue-sky law would eliminate corporations "formed for the sole pur­
pose of defrauding the public," it would further the development of 
legitimate enterprises. "The standing of a corporation that incorporates 
under the provisions of this act," he continued, "will be enhanced by the 
certificate of the commissioner of corporations." The investor, he be­
lieved, would be more willing to place his capital in such a company 
"knowing that some competent person, whose business it is, has investi­
gated its plan of business and manner of incorporation."31 
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Only the California Association of Investment Corporations openly 
opposed the measure. Shortly after its passage, the organization began a 
drive to invoke a public referendum against the "blue-sky law. Its officers 
charged that the law would allow the political party in office to build up a 
political machine by the use of patronage, and that the measure would 
discourage the entrance of new industries into the state. If the referendum 
defeated the blue-sky law, the association intended to present its alternate 
bill as an initiative proposition. The weapons of reform would be turned 
upon the reformers!32 The organization secured enough signatures on its 
petitions to hold the referendum. Then scandal blighted the efforts of those 
seeking repeal. In late 1913, the Los Angeles Investment Company failed 
and went into bankruptcy. The stock of the corporation plummetted from 
$4.50 to $0.40 per share, wiping out the savings of over 20,000 investors, 
most of whom were retired citizens living in Los Angeles. An investigation 
by a federal grand jury revealed that the firm's officers had systematically 
milked the company's funds for their own use. The board of directors and 
president of the corporation, Charles Elder, were indicted, tried, and 
sentenced to prison terms.33 A stockholders committee set up to recover as 
much of the company's assets as possible sent out circulars urging 
shareholders to "VOTE TO SUSTAIN THE BLUE-SKY LAW " The 
flysheets noted ruefully that "Elder made a bitter fight against the law" 
and claimed that his "operations would have been impossible had this law 
been in effect a few years ago."34 
With its opposition discredited, the blue-sky law won approval in the 
referendum election by a wide margin of votes, and, in 1917, the legisla­
ture extended its jurisdiction to the resale of stocks and bonds in Califor-
The Enforcement of the Blue-sky Law 
Once Californians upheld the blue-sky law at the polls, the commis­
sioner of corporations clamped down on questionable securities transac­
tions. He limited the amount paid sponsors for the sale of new flotations 
and severely restricted the issue of promotion stock without tangible 
support. When he permitted the sale of stocks backed by intangibles like 
inventions, the commissioner required that the certificates be placed in 
escrow until they began paying dividends. Between 1915 and 1920 he 
handled stocks with a par value of $326,956,000 in this manner. To 
prevent the undercapitalization of new companies the commissioner re­
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quired that a minimum amount of capital be actually paid up within a 
prescribed period of time. If the firms could not obtain adequate financing, 
the commissioner dissolved them and returned their funds to the investors. 
Fraudulent concerns—Sission's Diving Bell, Berry's Airship Company, 
firms purporting to manufacture wave motors and gold-making 
machines—were forbidden to raise funds in California. During the first 
four years of the blue-sky law's operation the commissioner of corpora­
tions denied 274 companies the privilege of selling securities in Cali­
fornia, and, in 1918, he reported with pride that corporate financing in 
his state had assumed a new "degree of sanity and stability."36 
The commissioner repeatedly stressed that his regulatory efforts would 
benefit California's legitimate businessmen and further the state's eco­
nomic growth. The deputy commissioner explained to members of the Los 
Angeles Chamber of Mines and Oil in early 1915 that the aim of the 
department of corporations was "to encourage legitimate industry which 
will upbuild the state and develop its resources, meanwhile driving the 
wildcatters and fraudulent speculators out of the field.'' The commissioner 
made the same point in his first biennial report to the state legislature. 
"Money saved from ultra-hazardous and impracticable ventures means," 
he asserted, "that more capital is available for enterprises which rea­
sonably promise returns." Besides exposing phony promoters, and thus 
making more capital available for genuine companies, the commissioner of 
corporation took other steps to help the state's entrepreneurs. As the 
commissioner pointed out, he assumed "the initiative to aid corporate 
business wherever possible, by suggesting legislation to meet changing 
conditions." In 1917, for instance, he secured passage for a law allowing 
the organization of California corporations with shares of stock of no par 
value. The staff of the state corporation department also offered to act as 
advisors to those just going into business or expanding their spheres of 
activities, and many businessmen conferred informally with them about 
their plans.37 
In late 1917, the corporation commissioner, speaking to the San Fran­
cisco Commercial Club, summarized his actions during the past two years 
and defined the purpose of the blue-sky law in a way that must have caused 
some progressives to wonder if it was the same measure they had fought 
for. The commissioner said nothing about the need to shield small investors 
from manipulations. Rather, he described the law simply as a way to 
further the development of legitimate business in California. He began by 
declaring that the "purpose of the department of corporation commissioner 
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is not to be repressive, but is one of putting scientific business methods into 
government.'' He noted that in applying the blue-sky law he had tried to be 
' ' as little onerous as possible'' and that permits for new securities flotations 
had been readily granted to firms whose management was "fair, reputable 
and competent." The commissioner concluded that the blue-sky law 
was " a business law for business people" and that it was designed simply 
to keep "crooked businessmen from getting into competition with 
decent business people."38 
The conduct of the commissioner won the approval of California's 
business leaders, especially members of the state's financial community. 
Bankers particularly liked the work of the commissioner and helped secure 
an extension of his powers in 1917. Some even suggested placing all of the 
state's land sales under his jurisdiction. In 1916, the president of the Los 
Angeles Stock Exchange lauded the blue-sky law and lamented only that a 
more stringent measure were not in force. Two years later the manager of 
the exchange called the attention of its members to "the ever increasing 
volume of business being transacted in high class investment securities 
through the Southwest'' and praised the efforts of the commissioner of 
corporations in "curbing the activities of ruthless promoters," which made 
this improvement possible. The California members of the Investment 
Bankers Association of America also looked with favor upon the efforts of 
the commissioner to eliminate unscrupulous securities dealers. In 1918, 
the commissioner of corporations could accurately state that the blue-sky 
law "has met with general commendation and hearty cooperation on the 
part of legitimate brokers and businessmen."39 
Government-business cooperation with regard to the blue-sky law 
reached a climax in 1919. When a stock promoter challenged the blue-sky 
law in the courts that year, managers of California's leading investment 
banking houses voluntarily subscribed " a substantial sum" for the em­
ployment of a special counsel to aid the state corporation department in 
defending the measure. For this assistance, which proved successful, the 
commissioner praised them as "progressive businessmen" who had 
helped in "the splendid work of the past six years in keeping out of this 
state the trashy funds originating in other states."40 
The campaign for the blue-sky law illustrated the diversity of support 
that a single business measure could engender. For stockbrokers and 
investment bankers its passage spelled the successful conclusion of long­
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standing efforts to upgrade and rationalize their businesses. Commercial 
and savings bankers, along with businessmen involved in a wide range of 
activities, viewed the measure as a way to mobilize capital for California's 
rapidly expanding industries. Like the public utility officers who supported 
the Public Utilities Act in 1912, they hoped state regulation of securities 
would speed the economic development of their state. Finally, progressive 
politicians worked for the blue-sky law for a still different reason. For them 
the protection of the small investor was the primary concern. 
Yet, while the campaign for the blue-sky law derived its backing from a 
wide range of sources, it also disclosed cleavages among California's 
businessmen. As in the case of banking legislation, capital requirements 
divided businessmen into opposing, if often ill-defined, groups. The more 
conservative businessmen, who, nonetheless, had an urgent need for new 
investment capital, favored the proposal because they felt it would help 
funnel additional funds to their companies. On the other hand, some 
businessmen saw state regulation of securities transactions as a threat to 
their existence and worked against the blue-sky law. In particular, officers 
of speculative, and sometimes fraudulent, real estate and land investment 
firms viewed the chaos resulting from changes in California's economy as 
an opportunity to be fully exploited for their private gain. They feared the 
restrictions a blue-sky law might place on their actions and fought the 
measure tooth-and-nail. 
8

The Insurance Industry 
From practically the earliest days of statehood California possessed an 
insurance industry composed of companies chartered in the state, branches 
of foreign firms, and companies incorporated in other states but doing 
business in California. Fires that swept through San Francisco in the early 
1850s convinced Californians of the need for protection, and, by 1857, 
four English and two eastern fire insurance enterprises had entered the 
state. The next decade saw a rush of eastern companies to California, and 
twelve local firms also began operations. Despite a high rate of turnover, 
local concerns continued to play an important role until rate wars in the 
1890s practically eliminated them.1 Life insurance companies also opened 
offices in California at an early date, and the struggle between the big 
three—the New York Life, the Equitable, and the Mutual Life of New 
York—added a fillip to the expansion of life insurance in the state. By 
1885, the three accounted for about half of the policies in force in Califor­
nia. Two decades later, however, their share of the market had dropped 
considerably. Other eastern firms filled the state's demand for life insur­
ance, for until after 1905 only one California company existed in Califor­
nia, and it failed to keep pace with the demand for insurance.2 
California's rapid urbanization, combined with the commercialization 
of agriculture and the growth of big business, brought changes to the 
insurance industry. Insurance men tried to blunt the impact of the new 
conditions through the formation of trade associations and state legislation. 
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Although they proved capable of solving many of their problems, the 
insurance men never succeeded in eliminating friction between themselves 
and other businessmen in California. The clash of interests became most 
pronounced in legislative struggles over measures designed to harness the 
funds of insurance companies for the economic development of California. 
As in the case of bankers, insurance men found themselves besieged by 
state officials and businessmen desirous of using their reserves and savings 
to build up California. 
The Problem of Competition 
Violent competition disrupted the nation's insurance industry in the late 
nineteenth century, and California became the storm center of the struggles 
on the Pacific Coast. Fire insurance men found themselves particularly 
hard hit and led a drive to dampen the rampant competition. However, they 
found themselves hampered in their efforts by the quest for what seemed to 
be two opposing goals: a high volume of business and economic stability. 
They wished to increase their companies' shares of the market and were 
willing to use almost any means at their disposal to achieve this aim. Yet, at 
the same time they longed for security and an end to the more virulent 
forms of competition. Rate wars in the 1880s and 1890s bit deeply into 
their profits, and neither agents nor managers wanted such conflicts to 
continue in the twentieth century. 
Fire insurance men first sought to control competition with the estab­
lishment of the Pacific Insurance Union in 1884. Within a year of its 
founding all the agencies in California had joined; and, by 1888, its 
jurisdiction extended over Montana, Idaho, Utah, Oregon, and 
Washington. The association tried to set uniform rates charged by the 
insurance companies. However, despite some initial success, the Pacific 
Insurance Union proved incapable of eliminating cutthroat competition. A 
rate war in Oakland led to a suspension of the Union's tariff and the 
rewriting of that city's risks at figures much lower than the former rates. 
Local contests also developed in other communities, and, as a result, the 
premiums received by companies for their business dropped precipi­
tously.3 The Pacific Insurance Union could not survive such competition. 
Many of the firms belonging to it either merged, went into bankruptcy, or 
withdrew from business in California. Between 1890 and 1895, the 
number of companies writing fire insurance in California fell by over 
one-half. Many of those firms remaining left the Pacific Insurance Union; 
in 1894 alone, twenty companies withdrew from its ranks. Last minute 
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efforts to save the organization by requiring monetary pledges from its 
members to prevent rebating and rate-cutting failed, and, in early 1895, the 
Pacific Insurance Union disbanded.4 
Unwilling to accept the loss of profits resulting from unrestrained 
competition, fire insurance men formed a new organization, the Board of 
Fire Underwriters of the Pacific. Like insurance trade associations in other 
regions, the board fixed uniform rates for companies belonging to it, 
outlawed rebates, set commissions for agents, and, through a noninter­
course clause, forbade reinsurance or other types of business with non­
board firms. These efforts to limit competition proved stillborn, for several 
of the most important companies refused to join the new compact. One 
company even brought suit against the board in the federal circuit court in 
San Francisco. Its attorneys accused the board of being " a gigantic combi­
nation organized for the purpose of controlling the fire insurance business 
of this coast," and demanded its dissolution. They struck particularly hard 
at the board's nonintercourse rule and charged that its members were trying 
to destroy the business of the independents. Lawyers for the board admitted 
that the association regulated rates to prevent "reckless" competition but 
denied accusations of conspiracy, coercion, and intimidation. The court 
decided in favor of the board, but it did prohibit fraudulent advertising 
designed to undermine the position of those firms remaining outside its 
ranks.5 
The board proved incapable of stifling rate-cutting and rebating, and, in 
late 1895, under the pressure of the independents, it suspended its tariff for 
California. A general rate war ensued, with the hottest contests taking 
place in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland. As the San Francisco 
manager of the Transatlantic Fire Insurance Company lamented, these 
years constituted "aperiod of demoralization—almost approaching a state 
of chaos." Fire insurance companies saw their profits dwindle as the 
premiums received for new business fell and losses on the rising number of 
poor risks they accepted rose.6 
Insurance men finally restored a semblance of order with the reorganiza­
tion of the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific in 1897. Now joined 
by nearly all the firms doing business in California, it regulated rates, 
policy forms, commissions for agents, agency appointments, and business 
with nonboard companies. The board forbade rebates, and its officers 
established an effective apparatus for the detection and punishment of 
violations.7 This time the association proved more successful in stabilizing 
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rates. New companies entered California, and both premiums and profits 
increased. In 1906, a general agent described the Pacific Coast as the "one 
green oasis in the desert of insurance waste in the United States.'' Yet, all 
was not well in the new Eden. Rate wars, though now localized, still 
occurred. In 1901, insurance men reported that competition in Santa Anna 
had "reached an unbearable extreme." In Los Angeles the contest begun 
in 1894 lasted for a full decade, and farther north in Visalia a rate war raged 
without interruption from 1910 to 1915.8 
If fire insurance men could not end what they considered excessive 
competition, life insurance men encountered even more trouble in this 
respect. The nationwide struggle among the big three insurance companies 
grew particularly fierce in the Far West. Then too, the method of rating 
required less cooperation among life than fire agents. Life insurance men 
relied upon standard actuarial tables and consequently had no need to lay 
down uniform rules governing the writing of risks. Nonetheless, life 
insurance men set up trade associations that, while never as strong as the 
Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific, established some guidelines for 
competition. 
In their headlong rush for business, life insurance men resorted to a wide 
range of "unfair" business practices. Company managers paid their local 
agents high commissions, parts of which the agents then used as rebates to 
acquire new customers. In the mid-1890s, the larger eastern companies 
signed an antirebating agreement to eliminate this expense, but, when the 
president of the Equitable withdrew his firm from the compact in 1899, it 
collapsed. Within a year refunds of 30 percent had become common on the 
Pacific Coast, and rebating continued well into the twentieth century. 
Fraudulent advertising also bothered those in life insurance. Agents sold 
assessment insurance on the pretense that it was straight life insurance and 
engaged in a multitude of other forms of misrepresentation. Such behavior 
frequently resulted in litigation that some insurance men condemned for 
"bringing odium upon the company contesting," and for letting "the 
bottom drop out of life insurance in that community for an indefinite 
period.'' Company officers viewed twisting (the enticement of policyhold­
ers from one company to another) as a still more serious vice. Since the 
combination of commissions paid to agents and office expenses often 
exceeded the premiums received on first-year policies, insurance compa­
nies usually made a profit only on return business. In the 1890s twisting 
threatened even these receipts. Agents, desiring the high commissions on 
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new business, lured policy holders from contending firms, and the lapsing 
of policies after thefirst year became a serious problem that cost companies 
several million dollars annually in California alone.9 
Like the fire insurance men, life insurance agents and managers estab­
lished trade associations to control competition. Northern California insur­
ance men formed the San Francisco Life Underwriters Association in the 
1890s to combat rebating, the payment of excessive commissions, and 
agent-stealing. Southern Californians made similar efforts with the estab­
lishment of the Los Angeles Life Underwriters Association in 1904. 
Finally, Sacramento agents set up an organization in 1910, which also 
joined the campaign to lessen competition. None of the efforts of these 
organizations proved very effective, however; and rebating, twisting, and 
agent-stealing continued almost unabated. As late as 1907, a leading 
insurance journal reported that the life insurance business in California was 
still in a "very disorganized condition."10 
During the first decade of the twentieth century insurance men came to 
recognize the limitations of their trade associations and sponsored legisla­
tion in Sacramento forbidding rebating and twisting. The state legislators 
also debated the merits of giving the state insurance commissioner the 
power to set uniform rates in California and discussed bills designed to 
permit the formation of new types of insurance companies. The many 
contests over insurance measures uncovered rifts as well as cohesion 
within the insurance community. Company managers and agents in the 
field could usually agree upon the need to end rebating and twisting, but 
they clashed on state rating proposals. As might be expected, insurance 
companies already established in California fought measures for the forma­
tion of new firms that would compete with their companies. 
After several preliminary skirmishes, insurance men mounted a major 
effort to push a bill forbidding rebating through the state legislature in 
1913. Drawn up by the California branch of the National Fire Insurance 
Agents Association, the measure also had the backing of the Los Angeles 
Fire Underwriters Association. To further restrict competition the Califor­
nia State Association of Local Fire Insurance Agents urged speedy passage 
for a bill limiting insurance companies to two local agents in cities of less 
than 100,000. The Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific, faced at the 
time with several local rate wars, backed both measures. With overwhelm­
ing support in insurance circles, the bills passed the assembly and senate, 
only to meet with a veto from Governor Hiram Johnson. He refused to 
approve bills that he felt would benefit insurance companies without 
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helping consumers. Unless the state were empowered to fix insurance 
rates, Johnson would countenance no measures limiting competition.11 
The same scenario was reenacted two years later. During the opening 
days of the 1915 legislative session members of the Los Angeles Life 
Underwriters Association met with the state insurance commissioner to 
draft a bill prohibiting rebating and twisting. After conferring with the Los 
Angeles body, the chairman of the Senate Insurance Committee intro­
duced this measure in the legislature. The bill passed both houses, and the 
life and fire associations of Los Angeles spearheaded a campaign to win 
Governor Johnson's approval.12 Yet, the governor again vetoed the pro­
posal. Johnson pointed out that unless state control of rates accompanied 
the abolition of rebates the measure might hurt policyholders by preventing 
agents from passing on part of their commissions to them. He concluded 
that the bill' 'does not give one penny of benefit to any man insuring in the 
State of California" and refused to sign legislation that he believed was so 
"wholly favorable to the companies and those engaged in the insurance 
business."13 
While the abortive drive for an antirebate law demonstrated a high 
degree of unity among insurance men, the struggle over state fire-rating 
measures revealed lines of cleavage. Company officials fought all attempts 
to transfer the power over rates and the evaluation of risks to the state. 
Lobbyists for the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific traveled to 
Sacramento on numerous occasions to argue against any proposals that 
would have eroded the power of their organization. Local agents, on the 
other hand, hurt by rate wars and frequent breakdowns of the board's 
discipline, supported state rate-fixing bills as a way to stabilize their end of 
the insurance business and, they, too, labored in Sacramento to win 
acceptance for their position. 
The results of San Francisco's earthquake and fire initiated efforts to 
secure state supervision of insurance rates. To recoup losses resulting from 
the disaster, the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific increased its 
tariff for San Francisco by one-quarter and began rerating all California 
risks. The attempts of some firms to escape paying their fire losses and the 
bankruptcy of others further hurt the standing of insurance companies in 
the eyes of the public. San Francisco Mayor James Rolph denounced the 
actions of insurance men, and a widely circulated report prepared by 
Matthew Sullivan for San Francisco's Mission Promotion Association, a 
local improvement body, condemned the Board as " a formidable trust 
which is responsible for the extortionate rates of insurance."14 
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Following several years of indecisive action, the drive for state control 
of insurance rates climaxed in 1913. Working together, Rolph and Sullivan 
drafted a bill outlawing all types of rate-fixing compacts. Strongly opposed 
by both insurance agents and underwriters, the measure failed to win 
legislative approval. Most of those favoring state regulation placed their 
hopes, instead, on a bill introduced as a progressive measure by Senator 
William Kehoe. Kehoe's proposition required fire insurance companies to 
use tables of hazards and classifications of risks prepared by the state 
insurance commissioner in drawing up their rating schedules. Unlike the 
Sullivan bill, Kehoe's measure recognized the need for uniform rates to 
prevent rate wars, but at the same time it gave thefinal power over rates to a 
public official rather than a private organization.15 
The struggle over Kehoe's measure exposed divisions between insur­
ance men. The Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific fought the bill 
with all the resources at its command. The head of its rating bureau, 
augmented by an army of lobbyists, labored diligently in Sacramento to 
defeat the bill. Local agents, however, initially favored Kehoe's measure 
as a way to decrease competition and raise their profits. The California 
State Association of Local Fire Insurance Agents maintained a committee 
in Sacramento to work for the measure and sent circulars to businessmen 
throughout the state pointing out that Kehoe's bill would prevent discrimi­
nation in rates.16 
The Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific won the contest. As the 
struggle over the proposal became heated, board members brought pres­
sure to bear upon their agents to change their views. Noah Adair who 
headed the association of local agents lost his agency. The actions of those 
belonging to the board secured the desired effect, and within a few weeks 
the association had reversed its position to oppose the Kehoe bill. In spite 
of the backing of California's leading progressive newspapers and Senator 
Kehoe's oft-repeated declaration that his measure would reduce insurance 
costs and thus save millions of dollars annually for the insured, the bill 
failed in a tied vote in the senate.17 Resurrected in 1915, Kehoe's measure 
suffered the same fate as two years before. The local agents of Southern 
California were, according to one insurance journal, "red-hot" for the 
state rating scheme. However, the Board of Fire Underwriters of the 
Pacific continued to fight it and managed, despite a favorable committee 
report, to kill it in the senate by the count of fourteen to twenty-four. After 
this defeat the measure was never revived.18 
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Legislation dealing with the formation of new types of insurance com­
panies in California uncovered still more divisions between insurance men. 
The well-established stock fire companies opposed measures to liberalize 
laws dealing with the founding of mutual fire insurance organizations. By 
the same token, the mutual life insurance companies tried to use state 
legislation to restrict the activities of their new competitors, assessment life 
firms. The mutual life and stock fire companies argued that the newer types 
of firm were financially unstable and apt to fail in times of crisis. The state 
insurance commissioner, disregarding conclusive proof to the contrary, 
aided the more established firms in these contests. 
Mutual life firms sought to combat the popularity of late nineteenth-
century assessment life schemes through state legislation. Throughout the 
1890s, they worked with the state insurance commissioner to extend state 
control over the assessment organizations and to slow their expansion in 
California. In 1891, the insurance commissioner obtained passage for 
measures laying the groundwork for state regulation of assessment compa­
nies. Three years later Commissioner M. R. Higgins, noting that the 
growth of assessment schemes had been tremendous, called for still 
tougher laws, and the 1895 legislature enacted the desired modifications. 
Probably because assessment companies declined in importance during the 
last years of the nineteenth century the commissioner made no further 
efforts to increase his power over them.19 
Stock fire insurance companies, also aided by the state insurance com­
missioner, sought to prevent the passage of legislation allowing the forma­
tion of mutual life insurance ventures. In 1895, the intervention of the 
Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific killed a measure permitting the 
establishment of mutual companies, but two years later a more limited 
proposition for the incorporation of mutuals in rural areas won approval. In 
1903, the mutuals sought permission to write risks in towns as well as 
country regions, but the combined opposition of the stock companies and 
the insurance commissioner blocked this move. The losses some 
policyholders suffered in the San Francisco earthquake and fire increased 
public insistence for the liberalization of mutual fire insurance laws, and, 
in 1907, the legislature broadened the types of risks mutuals could accept. 
The stock firms, however, quickly regained their poise and, with the 
assistance of the insurance commissioner, defeated additional steps in this 
direction two years later. Insurance Commissioner Myron Wolf even 
called for the repeal of the 1907 laws. Only in 1911 did measures further 
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enhancing the legal status of mutual firms win approval. Backed by 
Progressives as a way to check the rates of the stock companies, the bills 
passed the legislature and were signed into law by Governor Johnson.20 
As these legislative struggles demonstrated, a spirit of cordiality charac­
terized the relationship between the well-established mutual life and stock 
fire insurance firms and the state insurance commissioners. Few of the 
commissioners tried to increase their powers over these companies. In 
1888, Commissioner J. L. Wadsworth claimed that "the introduction of 
numerous bills" at each legislative session "tends to disturb well settled 
underwriting principles" and declared that "the present laws upon our 
statute book meet nearly, if not all, requirements of the business." Com­
missioner Wolf echoed these sentiments fifteen years later. "The laws of 
this state," he asserted, "are well settled, and the insurance people are 
honest, law-abiding people." Only Commissioner Andrew Clunie showed 
antagonism toward the insurance companies, and personal considerations 
probably motivated his actions. Appointed in 1897, he soon began harass­
ing the larger life companies, especially the big three. The attorney for the 
New York firms recommended the employment of a special counsel to 
settle the cases. When the companies chose Thomas Clunie, the commis­
sioner's brother, to represent them for a monthly fee of $250, Andrew 
Clunie s attacks lessened and then ceased.21 
Part of the explanation for this business-government coziness may be 
that the office of insurance commissioner became something of a step­
pingstone to a position as an insurance company executive. After M. R. 
Higgins retired as commissioner in 1896, he became second vice-president 
for the largest life insurance company chartered in California. When M. M. 
Rhorer stepped down as deputy insurance commissioner after twenty-five 
years of service, the San Francisco Life Underwriters Association held a 
testimonial dinner in his honor and presented him with a purse of $1,100. 
Many of San Francisco's foremost bankers and insurance men endorsed 
Myron Wolf's application for the position of commissioner in 1902, and, 
upon his resignation from office eight years later, Wolf accepted the 
vice-presidency of an insurance company in San Francisco. J. E. Phelps, 
who took over as commissioner in 1914, had been a local agent in Los 
Angeles and vice-president of the California State Association of Local 
Fire Insurance Agents. As one insurance journalist noted with approval, he 
was not an iconoclast and would do nothing to upset existing conditions. In 
all, three of California's five insurance commissioners between 1890 and 
1915 either had been or would become insurance men.22 
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The Rationalization of the Insurance Business 
Even as they wrestled with the problem of competition, California 
insurance men encountered difficulties resulting from the growing com­
plexity of their state's economy. Urbanization and industrialization, and 
the new life styles these processes engendered, forced insurance men to 
rationalize their businesses. Fire insurance men sought to devise scientific 
methods of rating risks and worked together to hammer out reinsurance and 
loss-adjustment agreements. Both fire and life insurance men labored to 
standardize insurance policies. 
Devising accurate methods to rate fire risks was a chronic problem in 
California, for economic and social conditions were in such a state of flux 
that insurance men could not build up a body of statistics to use in 
formulating probabilities. Urbanization and the consequent increase in 
conflagrative hazards, the adoption of new building materials and 
methods, and the introduction of electric and oil-burning engines in indus­
try thwarted rate-makers who tried to depend upon past experience. In 
1902, William Saxton, the dean of special fire insurance agents in Califor­
nia, summed up the changes insurance men had to deal with. The old-
timer, he observed, "floated from rough board, shake roof, cloth and 
paper, tallow candles to rustic shingle roof." By way of contrast, he noted 
that the modern agent had to deal with "the skyscraper, acetylene gas, 
and electricity."23 
Insurance trade associations set up rating bureaus to cope with these 
problems by fixing standard or uniform charges. These bodies first set rates 
on what they called the "tariff" basis. This method considered only three 
variables in arriving at charges: the class of construction of a building, the 
occupation carried on inside it, and how close the building was to other 
structures (exposure charge). In 1869, the San Francisco Board of Fire 
Underwriters specified four classes of exposures and about 200 occupa­
tions, and local agents possessed considerable leeway in setting rates. 
Eighteen years later the Pacific Insurance Union recognized five exposure 
charges and nearly 400 occupations, and detailed rules limited the freedom 
of local agents. By 1912, the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific 
listed 550 different uses for buildings and had promulgated twenty-five 
general rules for agents to follow in setting rates.24 Even this increasing 
refinement in setting rates fell short of the needs of many insurance men. 
On the one hand, some agents complained that they could not understand 
the twists and turns in the labyrinth of rate-making. On the other hand, 
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many felt the rates, which normally covered entire states or even larger 
areas, needed further modifications to take local conditions into considera­
tion.25 
A new method of setting rates, which insurance men labeled 
"schedule" rating, won acceptance in the late nineteenth and early twen­
tieth centuries and provided a partial solution to the troubles encountered in 
tariff rating. While retaining the same variables as the tariff system, 
schedule charges also took into account the general fire danger prevailing 
in the spots to which they were applied. Schedule rating did not, however, 
increase the authority of local agents, for surveyors from the Board of Fire 
Underwriters of the Pacific continued to make their rounds checking rates. 
By 1909, the Board employed eight electrical engineers, seven engineers 
to supervise sprinkler systems, thirty daily report examiners, and thirty 
rating supervisors. Although insurance men never eliminated all in­
equalities, rate-making became an increasingly systematic science in 
which guess work had little place.26 
Insurance men also standardized the adjustment of fire losses. Since 
policyholders usually insured their property with more than one firm, the 
companies had to devise ways to apportion losses among themselves. This 
situation often resulted in acrimony. Insurance men found it hard to 
determine the amount each firm owed, and the expenses of adjustment 
were large, sometimes as high as 5 percent of the actual damages suffered. 
Then too, on some occasions one company, desiring to appear generous to 
the insured, forced hasty and unnecessarily costly settlements upon the 
others. Continued complaints led the Fire Underwriters Association of the 
Pacific, an organization of special agents and adjusters, to set up a commit­
tee to study the problem. The committee's report of 1879 urged that 
companies act in harmony and not seek competitive advantages by lax 
settlements. However, only with the adoption of what became known as 
the "Kinne Rule" six years later did adjusters finally reach agreement. 
This formula provided guidelines for the apportionment of losses and 
established standards for the division of adjusting expenses. With few 
modifications it remained in effect well into the twentieth century.27 
Because few fire insurance companies wanted to be held liable for all of 
a large loss, they reinsured parts of their policies with other firms. Like fire 
adjusting, reinsurance raised a number of ticklish questions. Efforts to 
draft a standard reinsurance contract failed in the 1890s, but insurance men 
achieved some success in the next decade. In 1901, the Board of Fire 
Underwriters of the Pacific and the Fire Underwriters Association of the 
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Pacific created a joint committee to draft a uniform contract. This commit­
tee presented its findings two years later. Although the contract embodying 
the committee's suggestions never won total acceptance, it did help 
rationalize this branch of the insurance business.28 
Campaigns for the adoption of standard life- and fire-insurance policies 
provided the most dramatic manifestations of the drives for efficiency and 
rationality. New York state's investigation into life insurance in 1905 and 
the San Francisco disaster a year later aroused public interest in the matter. 
Policyholders came to view standard policies as a way to protect them­
selves from insurance companies trying to avoid paying their losses. 
Insurance men also favored standard policies, for they saw in standardiza­
tion a way to rationalize their businesses. Yet, few insurance men wanted 
to go as far in this direction as most policyholders, and the resulting 
conflicts between the desires of the insured and the insurance companies 
set the stage for a series of lively legislative contests. 
By the early twentieth century life insurance policies had become quite 
confusing, and efforts to standardize them led to legislative battles in 
Sacramento. Persons seeking life coverage could choose from a myriad of 
policy types: industrial, level premium, semitontine, and all shades in 
between. To attract new business California companies even offered com­
binations of life, health, and accident insurance. The Armstrong Investi­
gation into life insurance in New York revealed that many policyholders 
failed to understand complicated clauses of their policies, and after the 
investigation a conference of governors, attorneys general, and state insur­
ance commissioners met in Chicago to prepare a model standard-policy 
law. In 1907, California's insurance commissioner sponsored this measure 
in Sacramento. However, officers of insurance companies chartered in 
California successfully blocked its passage. They feared that the bill would 
outlaw the new types of policies they were pioneering and that it would thus 
deprive them of their most potent weapon against the competition of the 
larger eastern firms. The legislators heeded their arguments and, believing 
they were protecting a home industry, defeated the bill.29 
Fire insurance policies matched the confusion of the life policies, and 
early attempts to standardize them failed. In the 1870s and 1880s, fire 
policies were unwieldy affairs that contained lengthy and sometimes con­
tradictory printed and handwritten clauses. Some firms adopted the stan­
dard New York form in the 1890s, but many discrepancies remained. In 
1899, the California legislature considered bills that would have made the 
New York policy obligatory for all companies operating in California. 
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When, however, the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific advised the 
solons that similar proposals in other states had been declared unconstitu­
tional, they dropped the measures.30 
The San Francisco earthquake and fire focused public attention on 
standard policies and laid bare the conflicting interests of the insured and 
the insurance companies. When some firms tried to escape paying fire 
losses on technicalities in their policies, San Francisco merchants or­
ganized a policyholders league to press the claims of its members and to 
work for standard-policy legislation. In 1907, the league presented a 
standard-policy measure for consideration in Sacramento. Though claim­
ing that they favored "any legislation calculated to render insurance 
contracts more uniform and easier of comprehension," members of the 
Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific opposed the bill. They argued 
that the proposal needed further work to iron out rough spots and threatened 
to withdraw their companies from California should the act become law. 
Despite this threat, the legislature passed the bill. The insurance men then 
brought pressure to bear on Governor James Gillette, and the governor, 
who claimed that he disliked several riders attached to the measure, vetoed 
the bill.31 
Continued pressure from both San Francisco businessmen and the insur­
ance companies kept the issue of standard policies alive. In December, 
1907, Governor Gillette set up a special commission to investigate the 
problem. Composed of the insurance commissioner, representatives of San 
Francisco's merchant bodies, and William Dutton who headed both the 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and the Fire Underwriters Associa­
tion of the Pacific, the commission prepared a compromise measure 
acceptable to both the insurance men and the merchants. In 1909, the 
commission secured its introduction into the state legislature. After amend­
ing the bill, against the wishes of the insurance men, to provide for indirect 
as well as direct fire losses, the legislators gave it their approval, and the 
measure soon became law.32 
Insurance Companies and Economic Development 
Contests over state regulation of insurance company funds exacerbated 
the other conflicts between insurance men and California businessmen. By 
the late nineteenth century, insurance companies possessed large amounts 
of capital that could be invested to stimulate a region's economic growth. 
California businessmen and legislators hoped to prevent insurance compa­
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nies from extracting more from their state in premiums than they returned 
to it in the payment of losses and investments. To achieve this end 
California legislators passed laws specifying the types of investments firms 
incorporated in California could make and even considered regulating 
those of eastern and foreign companies. The solons also enacted measures 
establishing deposit requirements for firms operating in California. 
Long-standing complaints that eastern companies operating in Califor­
nia were draining the state of capital led to efforts to supervise their 
investments for the benefit of home industry. In 1894, the New York Life 
bid on a $500,000 state bond issue because of criticisms that it had no 
investments in California. In the same period the Prudential entered the 
state's loan business, and the Mutual placed a large deposit with the Bank 
of California. By 1897, Insurance Commissioner Clunie could report that 
California was losing little insurance money to eastern centers. Many 
businessmen, however, reached different conclusions and thought that the 
insurance companies should do more to aid their industrial and commercial 
ventures. In 1907, the Texas legislators approved a measure requiring 
insurance firms to invest three-quarters of the reserves generated by Texas 
business in Lone Star securities. Two years later Californians drew up a 
similar bill; but they never introduced it in the legislature, perhaps out of 
fear that, as had happened in Texas, the large eastern insurance companies 
would leave the state. In 1915, a nearly identical proposal died in commit­
tee.33 
Despite the lack of legislation on this matter, the investments of eastern 
companies in California rose sharply in the early twentieth century. In the 
years after the Armstrong Investigation the firms were particularly vulner­
able to public criticism and found that they could improve their public 
images by investing in the same areas in which they sold policies. Then, 
too, investment opportunities in California widened as the state's economy 
developed, and insurance executives probably recognized that they could 
earn more on capital in the Far West than in most other regions. By 1911, 
the Pacific Coast led all but two other sections of the country, the South­
west and the Northern Plains, in the percentage of insurance reserves 
derived from the area's premiums being reinvested in the region. Califor­
nia money was staying at home, and Californians were drawing upon 
capital accumulated elsewhere, most notably in New England, for the 
development of their state.34 
Legislators also tried to tap the savings of insurance companies incorpo­
rated within California. The requests of California insurance men for a 
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wider range of investment opportunities and the desire of local busi­
nessmen to channel insurance funds into their state's industries trans­
formed the laws governing the investments of California insurance compa­
nies. Before 1905, insurancefirms could place their funds in federal bonds, 
the note issues of all states, the municipal and county bonds of California 
and Oregon, certain types of real estate loans, and (with the exception of 
life companies) the bonds of corporations chartered both inside and outside 
California. Legislation passed in 1905 liberalized the types of investments 
allowed. Insurance companies could now purchase the securities of coun­
ties and cities anywhere in the nation, and the new laws relaxed restrictions 
on property loans and legalized loans made on policies. Life insurance 
firms could, for the first time, acquire corporate securities, and stocks as 
well as bonds won approval for purchase. This last provision, however, 
had a catch. Because they wanted to use insurance funds to further the 
economic development of their state, the legislators stipulated that the 
insurance companies could buy only the securities of corporations char­
tered in California. The same trends continued in later years. By 1913, the 
legislature had added the bonds of school and irrigation districts to the list 
of investment possibilities, timely provisions for a state with a swelling 
population and an agricultural system dependent on irrigation.35 
Finally, legislators sought to encourage California's growth by setting 
deposit requirements for insurance companies. In 1895, the solons consid­
ered a proposal requiring all insurance companies doing business in 
California to place $200,000 of securities with the state treasurer. The 
securities could consist of the bonds of the national or any state govern­
ments and the notes of California municipal or county governments. 
Proponents of the bill, who included California insurance men already 
under the jurisdiction of a similar measure, argued that the bill would 
protect policyholders from losses and help stem the capital drain to the 
East. Out-of-state life and marine firms, however, won exemption from the 
proposition, and, as passed by the legislature, the bill applied only to fire 
companies. Disliking the exclusion of life and marine companies, the 
governor vetoed the bill and called for the enactment of a more stringent 
law. Nothing came of such pleas until the 1906 disaster revived public 
interest in deposit legislation. Several foreign firms, unwilling to pay the 
losses they incurred, withdrew from California leaving their debts unset­
tled. To discourage such actions in the future the 1907 legislature passed a 
measure requiring a $200,000 deposit from all foreign companies. The 
firms could place this sum with any state treasurer, not just California's, 
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and the range of permissible securities was wide. This act dissatisfied many 
Californians. Insurance Commissioner Wolf believed, for instance, that at 
least part of the deposit should be in the hands of California officials and 
that some of the securities should consist of California issues. Nonetheless, 
the measure won the governor's approval and became the law regulating 
the deposits of foreign companies for over a decade.36 
The Professionalization of Insurance Men 
Like bankers, insurance men looked upon themselves as professionals 
and hoped that the professionalization of their business would dampen 
competition, help speed their efforts at rationalization, and improve their 
image with California businessmen. As early as 1879, one of the state's 
leading fire insurance men urged his fellows to end "charlatanry, backbit­
ing and all manner of envy" for the sake of "our profession," and, by 
1910, the president of the Fire Underwriters Association of the Pacific was 
describing his calling as " a combination of business and a profession." To 
gain public acceptance as professionals, insurance men tried to work out 
codes of business ethics, set up schools to provide professional education, 
and increase their social contacts with one another.37 
The insurance trade associations sought to establish standards of "fair" 
business practices, for many insurance men wanted to control the abuses of 
competition they viewed as unseemly for professionals. At the height of 
the rate wars of the 1890s, the secretary of the Fireman's Fund condemned 
"the tendency of the day in changing our profession from a science to a 
mere barter and trade proposition" and called for a return to higher 
standards. The organizations of insurance men labored to end rate wars, 
rebating, fraudulent advertising, and the stealing of agents and, though 
never totally successful, made some progress in these areas.38 
Reflecting the growing complexity of California's economy, the insur­
ance business grew increasingly specialized, and insurance men came to 
require a broader, professional education. At the opening of the twentieth 
century, six universities in the United States offered insurance courses. 
The University of California was among the leaders in this field. By 1904, 
it presented classes on the actuarial problems and mathematics encountered 
in insurance work, and in later years its program expanded in detail and 
scope. Insurance men relied, however, primarily upon their own organiza­
tions for education. The Fire Underwriters Association of the Pacific and 
the life insurance organizations provided forums at which insurance men 
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could present papers and debate current business topics, and such discus­
sions played an important role in the development of uniform reinsurance 
and fire-adjustment agreements. Most ambitious were efforts to create an 
institute for the education of fire insurance men in San Francisco. In 1905, 
the Fire Underwriters Association of the Pacific set up a school modeled 
upon insurance institutes in England. The first of its kind in the United 
States, the school gave a ten-week series of lectures covering many facets 
of fire insurance. The 1906 disaster halted plans for expansion, but at­
tempts to revive the courses proved partially successful when the Insurance 
Institute of America established a Pacific Coast branch in San Francisco 
five years later. The Fire Underwriters Association of the Pacific also 
entered the field again in 1914 with bimonthly lectures on reinsurance, the 
California standard policy, schedule-rating, and other insurance topics.39 
Organizations that brought insurance men together for educational pur­
poses promoted social intercourse among them as well. Insurance men 
founded the Fire Underwriters Association of the Pacific to "promote 
harmony" between managers and special agents, and, by 1881, the or­
ganization's president could speak of its members as forming "one large 
insurance family." The rate wars of the mid-1890s partially dispelled this 
feeling of fellowship; but, by 1897, several agents could again ascribe the 
establishment of "enduring personal friendships" to the association, and 
some predicted these social contacts would help check competition in the 
future. During the opening years of the twentieth century, Los Angeles and 
San Francisco fire insurance men organized "ponds" of the Ancient and 
Honorable Order of the Blue Goose, a national social organization. In 
1910, San Franciscans also set up a local club for agents and adjusters "to 
wear away the rough edges of distrust," and Los Angelenos followed this 
example several years later. Life insurance men exhibited less social 
cohesion, but their trade associations provided a source of some social 
contacts. At their annual banquets in Los Angeles and San Francisco the 
revelers told stories, shared experiences, and sang popular songs of the 
day.40 
Despite their various efforts, insurance men failed to win professional 
acceptance they sought. As legislative contests over such matters as policy 
standardization demonstrated, the interests of insurance men and other 
businessmen often clashed. The inability of insurance men to harmonize 
their goals with the needs of California businessmen helps explain their 
rejection as professionals. In this context it is worth noting that bankers, 
who more fully reconciled their aims with those of California businessmen, 
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were more successful in winning wider recognition for themselves as 
professionals. 
Like so many other California businessmen, the insurance men sought, 
through the campaigns to dampen competition, their drives to rationalize 
business methods, and their efforts to win acceptance as professionals, to 
stabilize an industry caught in the web of economic change. California 
insurance men worked through their trade associations and state legislation 
to cope with alterations in their business environment, but they never 
completely succeeded. The insurance community included too many clash­
ing interests to achieve harmony of purpose. Insurance agents fought 
insurance underwriters, mutual life battled assessment life companies, 
stock fire opposed mutual fire firms, and companies chartered in California 
contended with those incorporated elsewhere. The insurance business 
probably contained as many diverse, and often conflicting, elements as any 
other industry in California. Pressure from other business groups and 
bodies of policy holders also contributed to the instability of California's 
insurance industry. Like bankers, insurance men were at times troubled by 
other businessmen and state officials seeking to harness insurance funds for 
California's economic development, and, again as in the case of bankers, 
the goals of financial stability and economic growth sometimes conflicted. 
For these various reasons, the insurance business long remained one of the 
most difficult industries to regulate in California. 
Big Business and Tax Reform 
Like the campaign for railroad regulation, California's tax reform move­
ment involved nearly all of the state's businessmen. Beginning in the 
1890s, reformers sought to adjust California's system of taxation to 
changes in their state s economic structure. Their plan, which finally won 
approval in 1910, separated the sources of revenue for the state and local 
governments. Under this scheme the state government derived its funds 
almost entirely from taxes levied by a central state board of equalization 
upon the gross earnings of the state's public service corporations. Counties 
and cities relied upon an ad valorem tax on all forms of property other than 
that of the public service corporations. This system replaced an arrange­
ment in operation since 1879 by which all the revenues gathered in 
California came from a general property tax collected by county boards of 
assessment under the supervision of the state board of equalization. It was 
expected that the new plan would both rationalize California's system of 
tax collection and, by levying state taxes on public service corporations, 
provide new funds to meet the growing expenses of the state government.* 
Early Efforts at Tax Reform 
In the 1890s, the California state government found itself chronically 
short of money, and the growing gap between revenues and expenditures 
turned the attention of Californians to tax reform. Government officials 
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often exhausted the state's general fund long before the next year's taxes 
were due. When this situation arose in 1897, Governor James Budd used 
the threat of his veto power to insure that all appropriations bills passed by 
the legislature included provisos that the funds allotted could not be spent 
until after taxes had been gathered ten months later. To avoid this condition 
in the future the governor called for a revamping of the state's tax system. 
In his messages to the legislature in 1897 and 1899 he declared that the 
burden fell too heavily on landed property and asked for the enactment of a 
corporate income tax.2 Carl Plehn, a professor of economics and tax expert 
at the University of California, backed the governor's request for tax 
reform. In addresses before the California Bankers Association, the Con­
vention of County Assessors, and the American Economics Association, 
Plehn claimed that the state's general property tax had grown obsolete, 
because it failed to reach forms of corporate property that had come into 
existence in the past twenty years. Too much of the tax weight fell on 
landed property, he thought, and thus on the state's farmers. Nor was even 
the tax on land equitable. Assessments and rates, Plehn amply demon­
strated, varied widely from county to county, and the state board of 
equalization had failed in its attempts to make them uniform.3 
The state legislature responded to these cries for reform during its 1899 
session. Assemblyman A. Caminetti introduced a bill exempting all real 
estate from taxation for state purposes. The state should instead, Caminetti 
argued, receive its funds from a levy on railroad, express, telephone, and 
telegraph companies. Passed by the assembly, this measure died in the 
senate. Some senators disliked provisions in the bill exempting church and 
school property from taxation, and others feared that too strict a tax on 
public service corporations might retard California's economic develop­
ment. Moreover, most advocates of tax reform, even many of those voting 
for Caminetti's proposal, felt that more time had to be given to a study of 
the problem. Accordingly, Senator F. S. Stratton secured passage for a 
measure, prepared by Carl Plehn, that set up a committee to investigate 
California's tax system.4 After examining its operation in California and 
other states, the committee condemned the general property tax as "in­
equitable, unfair and positively unjust." Its report urged the legislature to 
make "a radical change" and concluded that "a large part of the burden 
should be shifted to business."5 
California's new governor, Henry Gage, ignored the committee's rec­
ommendations. As a conservative Republican, he hoped to balance the 
budget by reducing state expenses rather than by altering the method of 
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taxation. Upon taking office in 1901, Gage claimed that Californians had 
elected him to end ' ' waste in the expenditure of state funds" and vowed to 
cut spending to the bone. The state legislature, probably believing that 
Gage's rhetoric would become reality, approved an unusually small tax 
levy for the next biennium. This action created a financial crisis, for not 
even Governor Gage could keep expenses down. Despite some efforts to 
reduce spending (Gage refused to pay the state bounty on coyote scalps, for 
instance), state expenditures rose 18 percent between 1901 and 1903.6 
When George Pardee took over as governor in 1903, he found the state's 
general fund practically empty and immediately began looking for ways to 
increase the state's revenue. He revived the report of the senate committee 
and in his inaugural address spoke favorably of the efforts that New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and New York were making to divide the 
sources of state and county revenues. He emphasized, however, the need to 
proceed slowly and carefully "so as to give the least shock to established 
industries and to vested interests." A successful jail break from the state 
prison at Folsom in July, 1903, upset his plans for gradual change. The 
escape heightened public awareness of the tax issue, for in widely pub­
licized statements the prison's warden complained that the outbreak had 
been possible only because he lacked funds to buy cement to repair the 
institution's crumbling walls. He blamed the legislature's stinginess for the 
break and called for hikes in the tax rate.7 
After this incident the tax problem never disappeared from sight. State 
expenditures continued to rise, 32 percent between 1903 and 1905 and 
another 14 percent in the next two years.8 These increases pressed against 
state revenues and left the government strapped for funds. Economic 
rivalry between Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Francisco added more fuel 
to the fire, for the residents of each metropolis believed that they paid too 
large a share of the state's taxes and felt that the inhabitants of other cities 
gained at their expense. After the state board of equalization raised assess­
ments in San Francisco in 1903, one of the city's largest newspapers 
condemned the board as " a pirate ship" and called for changes in the tax 
laws of the state.9 When Oaklanders faced a similar prospect two years 
later, they accused San Franciscans of being "tax shirkers" and insinuated 
that they had bribed the board of equalization.10 The continuing work of 
Carl Plehn also retained public interest in the matter. In 1902, he defended 
the separation of tax revenues at a meeting of university professors in 
Boston.11 A year later he presented his ideas to the Commonwealth Club of 
California, and, in the spring of 1904, this group passed resolutions asking 
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the legislature to abandon the attempt "to support both the state and local 
governments from taxes laid in the same sources of revenue'' and instead to 
devise "a single and uniform system" of taxation.12 
This agitation prodded Governor Pardee to accelerate the pace of re­
form. During his visit to the world exposition in St. Louis in the summer of 
1904, Pardee surveyed the tax systems of eastern states, and he sent his 
secretary on a follow-up tour that fall to gather additional data. In his 
address opening the 1905 legislature the governor again acknowledged the 
necessity of increasing state revenues and called upon Californians to 
follow other states in revising their tax system. He specifically pointed to 
the efforts being made in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio 
to separate state and local revenues. Pardee reiterated the need for tax 
separation in California as a way to tap corporate income for state purposes 
and requested that the state legislature draft constitutional amendments 
embodying his desires.13 
The legislature responded with a hodgepodge of legislation rather than 
the measures Pardee had hoped for. The issue of tax reform through the 
separation of revenues was still new in the United States and California. 
Consequently, many solons wanted further study of the matter before 
proceeding further. The opposition of some businessmen may also have 
influenced the decision to go slow. Although the Commonwealth Club 
backed Pardee's plan and lobbied for it in Sacramento, other business 
groups were dissatisfied with it. The San Francisco Merchants Exchange 
feared that any actions to change the state's tax system might "frighten 
capital away to other fields." Both the Los Angeles and San Francisco 
bank clearing houses, while accepting the principle of separation as a way 
to rationalize California's system of taxation, opposed specific bills de­
signed to implement the governor's plan. Despite the appearance of Carl 
Plehn in the capital to argue for the governor's scheme and frequent 
conferences between Pardee and the senate and assembly committees on 
revenue and taxation, it soon became clear that the solons would not agree 
on any single program. Governor Pardee had to accept piecemeal changes: 
a state licensing fee for corporations, an inheritance tax, and an increase in 
the taxes levied on insurance companies.14 
More importantly, the governor secured passage for a measure setting up 
a five-man commission to examine all aspects of the state's tax problems. 
As yet Californians actually knew little about how the separation of tax 
revenues would affect their state. The senate committee's report of 1901 
was superficial, and the investigations of Carl Plehn and Governor Pardee, 
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though adding to the store of knowledge, had been far from exhaustive. 
The legislature empowered the commission (composed of four senators 
and assemblymen under the chairmanship of Carl Plehn) to gather informa­
tion and draft specific proposals for a new tax system in California. 
Tax Reform Legislation 
From the outset of their work members of the commission sought to 
design a comprehensive system of taxation rather than simply a set of 
unrelated laws and emphasized that tax reform would benefit busi­
nessmen.15 For the first nine months of its existence the commissioners 
studied the tax plans of other states and collected data about California. By 
the end of this period they agreed that any future plan should separate the 
sources of county and state revenues and that the gross revenues of public 
service corporations should be taxed solely for state purposes. The com­
missioners stressed that taxation by the state government rather than by 
scattered county officials would aid those companies affected by their 
propositions. At the beginning of the commission's work Carl Plehn made 
a point of asserting that "this movement contains nothing that is hostile to 
or dangerous to capital or to the corporations."16 He felt that his relations 
with company officials would be "entirely of an amiable nature" and 
doubted that he would have to use the powers given him by the legislature 
to command their cooperation. Senator Martin Ward, another member of 
the commission, claimed that although the public service corporations 
would have to render higher taxes than before, they would gain in other 
respects. "They will pay at the same rate on all their property," he noted, 
' ' and not at one rate in one county and at another in another.'' Furthermore, 
he continued, "they will pay all at one time, and not at a half a dozen or 
more different times, and at as many different places." Carl Plehn, 
speaking to the County Assessors Convention, also declared that 
"uniformity is the desire" most sought by the commission.17 
Carl Plehn's predictions about the attitudes of businessmen proved 
correct, for most readily cooperated with the commission. In a series of 
hearings beginning in March, 1906, businessmen made it clear that they 
were willing to accept increased taxes in return for greater stability and 
predictability in their relations with government. Public service corpora­
tion spokesmen welcomed a way to escape perennial haggling with county 
officials, and some favored the plan as a means to escape the necessity of 
bribing local tax assessors. Most wanted a highly centralized method of 
 151 Big Business and Tax Reform
taxation run along efficient, rational lines. At the end of the commission's 
studies Plehn reported that in only one instance had corporate officials 
attacked the principle or plan of taxation devised by the commission.18 
Bankers were the first businessmen to appear before the commission. In 
laying the groundwork for this meeting the tax commission sent out 
questionnaires to all of the state's bankers asking for detailed information 
on their real estate holdings, solvent credits, holdings of stocks and bonds, 
and taxes paid in the past year.19 The preparations of the bankers were 
equally elaborate. The executive council of the California Bankers Associ­
ation circularized the organization's members for their ideas on taxation 
and set up a committee to study and compile the results.20 The conference 
that followed revealed a high degree of harmony between business and 
government officials. The bankers readily endorsed the principle of tax 
separation as a move in the direction of uniformity and efficiency. Only a 
few points of friction arose. Whereas bankers wanted the taxes levied on 
the book value of a bank's capital stock, the commissioners hoped to see 
them based on the stock's market value. The commissioners were, how­
ever, simply using this issue as a bargaining counter and soon gave way on 
it. More importantly, the bankers complained that the proposed rate of 
taxation, 1 percent of a bank's capital and surplus, was too high. They 
found the commissioners "impossible to move" on this subject and finally 
agreed that the charge would be "partially offset by the advantages which 
would come from absolute uniformity and certainty in the taxation of all 
banks."21 
Insurance men testified next and, like the bankers, praised the centraliz­
ing tendencies of the commission's plan. However, they too believed the 
commissioners desired too great a rate of taxation. They also feared that, if 
California imposed a state tax on companies incorporated in other states, 
these states would retaliate by taxing California firms. The discussion that 
followed uncovered a partial solution to these impasses. The insurance 
men explained that, if local licensing fees were abolished, they would be 
able to pay more to the state. The commissioners agreed, and their final 
report recommended ending all county and municipal charges.22 
Railroad executives also came out in favor of tax reform. Some railroad 
men, most notably Southern Pacific officials, had initially opposed tax 
reform, because they feared that any alterations might increase their taxes. 
Meetings with the tax commission revealed that the railroad men had 
changed their attitudes by 1906. As early as November, 1905, officers of 
the Southern Pacific assured the commissioners that they were for tax 
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reform, and in hearings on the matter a year and a half later representatives 
of other lines added their assent. As Carl Plehn described these sessions, 
the railroad men were reluctant to pay more taxes but did agree that the new 
system would be more equitable. Company officials particularly empha­
sized that they favored state taxation of their property as a way to eliminate 
the need to work with the many county officials.23 
By their actions railroad officials had already shown that they desired 
state taxation of their companies. Unlike other public service corporations, 
railroads, under the terms of the state constitution of 1879, were taxed by 
both state and county governments. The state board of equalization taxed 
the operating property of all railroads providing service in more than one 
country, and the county assessors taxed the nonoperative property of the 
lines. (The division between operative and nonoperative property was 
fuzzy. In general, a railroad's roadbed, rails, and cars made up its operative 
property. Nonoperative property included land right-of-ways, buildings, 
and yards.) Despite the fact that the state board of equalization nearly 
doubled its assessments of railroad property between 1898 and 1906, 
railroad officers tried to place as much as possible of their roads' properties 
under state supervision. They hoped in this manner to decrease their total 
expenses by abolishing bribes to county officials, lowering bookkeeping 
costs, and ending other charges resulting from irregular practices concern­
ing the taxation of nonoperative properties. In a ruling handed down in 
April, 1906, the Supreme Court of California thwarted these efforts of 
railroad men to secure greater uniformity in tax gathering. In a case pitting 
the city of Stockton against the San Francisco and San Joaquin Railroad, 
the court decided that the real property of the railroad—its real estate, 
terminal depots, passenger and freight sheds—could not be defined as 
operative property and, therefore, had to be taxed by the assessors of the 
various counties through which the line passed. This decision went against 
the wishes of the railroad's officials who argued that their line should be 
assessed as an entirety by the state board of equalization. Not surprisingly, 
railroad executives embraced the tax commission1 s plan for the separation 
of state and local tax revenues as a way to circumvent the court's ruling.24 
Public utility officials also sought greater predictability in their tax 
arrangements. After attending the 1906 conference on the Pacific Coast 
Gas Association, John Britton, then manager of the Pacific Gas and Elec­
tric Company, wrote the commission, as Carl Plehn reported to Governor 
Pardee, that the light, heat, and power companies were overwhelmingly in 
favor of the commission's scheme.25 
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After a final meeting with representatives of the state's leading railroads 
and public utilities in October, 1906, the commission released its findings 
and recommendations. Its three-hundred-page report labeled the general 
property tax as hopelessly out of date. "The state has outgrown the simple 
conditions of economic life," it observed, "to which alone the system was 
adapted." With the expansion of industry and commerce new types of 
wealth had developed, but they remained virtually untouched by taxation. 
Corporate income, in particular, the commissioners thought, was taxed too 
lightly. The report demonstrated that, while farmers paid the equivalent of 
a 10 percent income tax, manufacturers paid only 2 percent. Personal 
property, money, and credits, the document revealed, "escape taxation 
almost entirely.'' The commissioners concluded by noting that the general 
property tax led to widespread tax evasion and condemned California's tax 
system as a " school for perjury" that' 'puts a penalty on honesty and pays 
high premiums for dishonesty." The solution, according to the commis­
sion, lay in the complete separation in the sources of revenue for the state 
and the counties. The state would still draw funds from a poll tax, the 
inheritance tax, a tax on insurance premiums modified to remove in­
equities, earnings from the sale of state lands, and a few other minor items. 
The state would now also receive revenue from gross-earnings taxes on 
railroads, street railroads, light, heat and power corporations, express 
firms, telephone and telegraph companies. Banks would pay 1 percent of 
the book value of their stock, and all corporations would yield 1 percent of 
the assessed valuations of their franchises. Counties and municipalities 
would continue to derive their income from the general property tax, but 
now the properties of public service corporations (except for those classed 
as nonoperative) would be exempted from city or county charges.26 
The tax commission's report attracted immediate attention throughout 
the state and nation. Small-town newspapers and farm organizations found 
particular praise for the new tax scheme. The Watsonville Register lauded 
the commission's efforts as an "endeavor to bring order out of chaos and to 
devise a system in harmony with the scientific principles of taxation."27 
Papers in farming areas praised the proposed tax scheme for shifting the 
burden of taxation from agriculturalists to big businessmen. One journal, 
for instance, pictured Governor Pardee as following Robert LaFollette's 
footsteps in taxing corporate income in Wisconsin and predicted that any 
attempt "to make the corporations pay their just dues into the state treasury 
would assuredly be appreciated by the general public. "  2  8 Not surprisingly, 
farm groups came out in favor of the tax commission's plan as a means to 
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reduce taxes on fanners and fruit growers.29 Reformers in other states 
hoped the California experiment would succeed and redound to their 
benefit. Speaking before the Commonwealth Club, E. R. A. Seligman, a 
professor at Columbia University and a tax reformer of national reknown, 
hailed the commission's report as the "clearest most logical, and best 
propounded document on taxation which has emanated from any of our 
states." Representatives of the Civic Federation of Chicago, appearing 
before the same body, added that the report "is regarded as one of the 
ablest of such documents."30 
Senator J. B. Curtin, who had been a member of the tax commission, 
presented a measure to the 1907 session of the state legislature that 
incorporated the commission's recommendations. With some alterations 
his proposition passed the senate by the overwhelming vote of thirty-six to 
one, and the assembly quickly endorsed this action. As a constitutional 
amendment, Curtin's measure now had to win approval in a public ref­
erendum to be held in November, 1908.31 
In the intervening months many public service corporation officials 
rallied to the support of the tax proposal. George Peltier in his presidential 
address to the California Bankers Association in 1908 extolled the measure 
because "it stands for an honest assessment return" and because under its 
terms "all public utilities, corporations, and quasi-public corporations are 
taxed alike in their respective classes. "  3  2 Grayson Dutton of the Fireman's 
Fund Insurance Company also waxed enthusiastic. Speaking before the 
Commonwealth Club, he asserted that the "reason that we are willing to 
have this tax is that we are now beset by all kinds of difficulties in the way 
of payments." He pointed out that his firm paid so many different city and 
county license fees that "it makes a bookkeeper pretty nearly crazy" and 
concluded that "one flat rate'' would be "a great relief.'' Dutton was even 
willing to risk the retaliation of other states, and thus a higher tax burden, in 
return for greater rationality in the payment of taxes.33 
Farmers and agriculturalists also backed tax reform, though for a differ­
ent reason. They hoped changes in California's tax system would shift 
some of the tax burden from themselves to big business. In late 1907, the 
California State Grange endorsed Curtin's proposal and urged passage for 
the measure in the upcoming election. Country newspapers also sup­
ported tax reform as aiding farmers. The Rural Free Press spoke for many 
similar journals when it defined the tax issue as one of " rural benefits'' and 
observed that agriculturalists were "righteously inflamed by it."34 
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Yet, many Californians who had been ardent proponents of the separa­
tion of state and county taxation since the inception of the movement 
withheld their backing from the proposal, for they objected to changes 
made in the tax commission s original plans by the senate and assembly. 
They complained that in fixing the percentages to be charged against 
corporate earnings the legislature had in each case chosen the minimum 
levy suggested by the commission. They doubted that the revenues would 
be sufficient to run the state government and pointed out that, since the tax 
rates were to be embodied in a constitutional amendment, it would be 
difficult to raise them in the future. Some feared, in addition, that, because 
the proposal provided for the election of the board of equalization by 
district instead of at-large as the tax commission had recommended, the 
corporations might gain control of the agency set up to tax them. As one 
merchant complained, the new tax scheme, far from raising corporate 
taxes, would create in the public service corporations " a privileged class 
of tax payers."35 
Yet another source of opposition came from city officials reluctant to 
relinquish their power to tax public service corporations. San Franciscans 
were especially stubborn in this respect. Following the 1906 earthquake 
and fire, they faced the massive task of rebuilding their city and proved 
loathe to yield any taxing authority to the state. Mayor James Phelan 
explained these issues at a meeting of the Commonwealth Club. Phelan 
claimed that under the proposed plan "we will lose valuable property on 
which the city might levy for municipal purposes'' and feared that this 
situation would mean that the tax burden on "real estate, improvements, 
and the stocks of our merchants'' would have to be raised, thus placing San 
Francisco at a competitive disadvantage in attracting business from other 
areas. Phelan concluded that the tax plan was "an ambush that has been 
prepared for an unsuspecting community." San Francisco businessmen 
(other than public service corporation executives) backed their mayor's 
stand. Like Phelan, they pointed to the need for additional corporate taxes 
in light of the "large bonded indebtedness" their city would have to incur 
in order to rebuild. The Commonwealth Club, after hearing such testi­
mony, reversed its stance of a few years before. In 1905, the club's mem­
bers had endorsed the separation of taxes as a way to rationalize Califor­
nia's system of taxation, but, in 1908, they withdrew their backing from 
the scheme because they were afraid that it might deprive San Francisco of 
badly needed tax revenues.36 
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Doubts and confusion about tax reform killed the constitutional amend­
ment. Not even the frequent appearances of Carl Plehn in different areas of 
California could allay the fears of many. Nor were the issues clear. Despite 
the fact that the tax reform movement was now a decade old in California, 
many voters still failed to understand what tax reform was all about. 
Others, like the San Franciscans, voted against the proposal because they 
feared it might erode the tax bases of their local communities. As a result, 
the constitutional amendment lost at the polls by the margin of SI,977 to 
114,104. 
Faced with an 18 percent jump in state spending between 1907 and 1909 
without a comparable boost in state revenues, the legislators tackled the tax 
problem anew in their regular 1909 session and in a special session a year 
later. Following Carl Plehn's advice, they remedied the objections that had 
helped defeat the constitutional amendment in 1908. To quiet fears that the 
state, by relying so heavily on public service corporations for its revenues, 
might be left without adequate funds the solons made it easier to raise the 
rates of taxation as the situation required. The legislature also returned to 
the tax commission's original plan of electing members of the state board 
of equalization at-large, and this move reassured those who were afraid that 
the public service corporations might capture control of the board. Passed 
by lopsided votes in the senate and assembly, the measure won Governor 
James Gillette's backing as "a movement in taxation along modern, 
progressive lines" and was again sent to the public for approval.37 
As they had two years before, many corporate executives lifted their 
cudgels on behalf of the measure. The president of the Los Angeles Gas 
and Electric Company came out for the plan, because he felt it would 
"accomplish much in the way of a more equitable assessment of public 
service corporations'' and because it would allow them "to avoid continual 
wrangling with equalization boards and expensive law suits.'' Members of 
the California State Realty Federation worked for the proposal for similar 
reasons. They hoped its passage would "insure a steady, adequate and 
non-political taxation of public service corporations and banks." San 
Francisco businessmen, with their city now almost completely rebuilt, 
were less anxious about tax revenues than in 1908, and the San Francisco 
Chamber of Commerce, the San Francisco Merchants Exchange, and the 
San Francisco Merchants Association all passed resolutions favoring the 
38 measure.
Politicians, joined by the state grange and numerous business groups, 
carried on an extensive campaign to educate the voters about the merits of 
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tax reform. Their arguments, combined with a growing public awareness 
of the tax problem, proved persuasive. In late 1910, the constitutional 
amendment separating the sources of state and local tax revenues won 
ratification by the vote of 141,312 to 96,493. 
With the passage of this constitutional amendment California joined 
many other states that had already accepted similar types of tax reform. By 
1908, nine states—New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Ohio, New 
Jersey, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Missouri—had incor­
porated the principle of the separation of tax revenues into their fiscal 
systems. In many respects the movement for tax reform in California was 
like tax reform campaigns elsewhere. As the historian Clifton Yearly has 
shown, many other states were looking for new funds to meet the growing 
costs of government at the turn of the century. State officials, often backed 
by tax experts, farmers, and small businessmen, denounced the general 
property tax as antiquated and inadequate to supply their needs. Yet, 
however much the California experience resembled those of other states, it 
differed from them in one crucial regard. Whereas in many states big 
businessmen, fearing higher taxes on their companies, fought tax reform, 
in California they generally welcomed it and worked for it. California's 
nineteenth-century system of taxation was probably even more chaotic 
than the systems of other states. City and county officials competed with 
each other and state officials in their search for tax revenue. Public service 
corporation executives disliked the costly delays, uncertainties, and mis­
cellaneous expenses (like bribes) involved in dealing with this swarm of tax 
collectors. They desired, instead, the establishment of a single state agency 
to levy taxes in a more efficient manner. In short, public service corpora­
tion officials backed tax reform because it promised to rationalize one of 
their major business expenses.39 
Tax Reform in Practice 
Public service corporation officials quickly demonstrated their approval 
of California's new tax system. Representatives of the Southern Pacific 
Railroad, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and the Pacific Telegraph 
and Telephone Company worked to obtain a broad definition of operative 
property in order to place as much as possible of their firms' properties 
under the taxing authority of the state rather than the many counties in 
which they did business. The Southern Pacific sought, for instance, to have 
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all of its wharves, warehouses, fences, signal systems, ferryboats, steam­
boats, machine shops, tools, and rights-of-ways designated as operative 
property. When the line received only partial acceptance of its desires, its 
officers claimed that local governmental officials were discriminating 
against their company.40 Other public service corporations went to court to 
press their claims. When the city of San Francisco tried to tax the Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company, the company brought suit against the city and 
received a favorable verdict that put nearly all of its property under state 
jurisdiction. In a similar case the Pacific Electric Railroad, an interurban 
line in Southern California, successfully sued the city of Los Angeles to 
allow state rather than municipal officials to tax its lines.41 
Bankers, though they believed the tax rate on their institutions should be 
lowered, also endorsed the new tax system. In his 1911 presidential 
address before the California Bankers Association, William High, a San 
Francisco financier, praised the plan for making taxation simpler and more 
equitable. A short time later J. F. Sartori, a prominent Los Angeles banker, 
lauded the new system, because it "brought about uniformity of taxation" 
for corporations and banks. The editors of California's leading financial 
journal, the Coast Banker, summed up the thoughts of many, when they 
noted with approval that the new tax law set a rate of taxation that was 
"absolutely uniform on all banks." As a result, the journal concluded, 
bankers could now so closely estimate the amount owed the state "that a 
sum may be set aside monthly from the profits to care for it."42 
Despite the success of the tax reformers, the tax question remained a 
central concern for Californians. Progressives, led by Hiram Johnson, won 
control of the statehouse and governorship in 1910, and under their rule the 
social and economic roles of the state government were significantly 
broadened. For instance, the number of pupils in state normal schools rose 
30 percent between 1911 and 1913, and the number of insane in state 
hospitals increased by 15 percent in the same period. In addition, the 
Progressives set up new regulatory commissions and expanded the func­
tions of old ones. This growth in state activity required more money, and, 
as a result, the Progressives, like their predecessors, found themselves 
strapped for funds. A special report issued by the state board of equaliza­
tion in 1912 provided additional arguments for further tax reform. It 
showed that, although the public service corporations were paying more 
taxes than before, most still paid at a lower rate than the general public. For 
every one hundred dollars of taxable property, railroads paid an average 
of $0.91 in taxes, gas and electric corporations $0.75, telephone and tele­
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graph companies $0.91, and express firms $1.54. The general public paid 
county and city levies amounting to $1.14 per hundred dollars worth of 
property. The findings also illustrated that some of the smaller companies 
were taxed more heavily than the larger ones.43 
The state legislature tackled the tax problem again in 1913. Governor 
Johnson called for an immediate increase in the tax rates of public service 
corporations and an end to inequities between large and small concerns. 
The public service corporations quickly mobilized their forces to resist any 
such hikes. The California Bankers Association compiled statistics that 
purported to show that the tax rate on banks had increased 66 percent in the 
past three years, and insurance company and public utility officials also 
argued against proposed raises. J. H. Scott of the Southern Pacific Railroad 
offered the most spirited opposition. Presenting figures on his own, he 
challenged the accuracy of estimates of property valuation used by the state 
board of equalization. In a dramatic confrontation in the senate chambers 
Senator A. H. Breed of Alameda discredited Scott's testimony. He proved 
that Scott had falsified many of his calculations and revealed that in 
preparing his case Scott had employed, at the Southern Pacific's expense, 
county assessors to collect his data. When resistance collapsed following 
these disclosures, the legislators boosted taxes on all types of public service 
corporations except banks and express companies. They failed, however, 
to deal effectively with the more difficult problem of discrimination be­
tween large and small firms.44 
The issues raised in 1913 recurred two years later. In his address opening 
the legislative session Governor Johnson again decried the existence of a 
deficit and accused the corporations of not paying their fair share of 
California s taxes. Most Progressives agreed with him, and the senate and 
assembly set up a joint committee to consider whether the tax rates should 
be raised. As they had in 1913, company executives fought the proposed 
increases. Warren Olney appeared before the committee on behalf of the 
Southern Pacific, Santa Fe, Western Pacific, and Northwestern Pacific 
railroads. He argued that time was too short during a single legislative 
session to arrive at any meaningful conclusions and urged the solons to 
leave the rates unchanged. Burke Corbett of the Pullman Company added 
that his firm already yielded enough revenue to the state. Disregarding 
these protests, the legislature boosted charges on express firms and rail­
roads. Representatives of the state's major power companies also argued 
against increases, but the legislators ignored their pleas and raised their 
taxes. Nor did executives of the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Com­
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pany and the Home Telephone Company succeed in keeping their rates the 
same. Not even bankers could forestall a rate hike. John Drum, a lobbyist 
for the California Bankers Association, later explained to his organiza­
tion's members that matters had already been discussed in Sacramento and 
that his presentations had no effect on the legislators.45 
Despite the chronic complaints of Progressives that the public service 
corporations were evading their fair share of California's tax assessments, 
the new tax system did increase the tax burdens of the corporations. In 
1910, tax experts estimated that, had the new system been in effect the 
previous year, corporate tax payments would have been $746,110 higher 
than they actually were. Once in effect, the revised tax system did boost 
corporate tax payments. During the first four years of its operation corpo­
rate levies rose from $ 10,454,215 to $ 13,609,663. The greatest percentage 
increases came from railroads, gas and electric companies, and insurance 
firms. Insurance companies, which had been paying about $110,000 
annually to California before the new system went into effect, found 
themselves paying over seven times as much by 1914.46 
The conflicts over taxation that enlivened politics during the Progressive 
Era continued into the 1920s. As the functions of the state government 
expanded (despite some temporary cutbacks), the legislature continued to 
raise the charges on public service corporations, and, as before, those 
corporations affected continued to protest that their tax rates were too high. 
In addition to seeking redress by having the legislature lower their tax rates, 
corporate executives sought to decrease their charges by pressing for a 
reduction in state spending and by having county and city governments 
assume some of the expenses of the state government. Yet, the public 
service corporation officers made no efforts to change the structure of 
California's tax system. They had become too devoted to the concepts of 
predictability and uniformity to tamper with the established arrangements. 
When a major overhaul of the state's financial system threatened to 
decentralize assessments and collections in 1929, many public service 
corporation executives joined those opposing revision.47 
10

The Politics of Business 
"Organization wins all the earth's victories," noted one of California's 
most prominent fruit growers in 1910, "whether of war or peace, of art, 
commerce, or religion." Organization, he continued, was "the wedding of 
strength to strength, of efficiency to efficiency, the abandonment of weak­
ness, the enthronement of power."1 These words well summed up the 
thoughts of most California businessmen, for they reacted to the disrup­
tions in their economic environment by establishing a high degree of 
organization in their business world. Vertically and horizontally integrated 
firms replaced the single-level company, and trade associations, marketing 
bodies, and other organizations linked together single firms within most 
industries. In the legislative arena, as well, businessmen increasingly 
operated as self-conscious interest groups to obtain their goals. 
The California experience suggests that on the local as well as on the 
national level it may be most valuable to understand the ways Americans 
lived and thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
terms of what historians are calling the "organizational synthesis." That 
is, Americans, and especially businessmen, responded to the dislocations 
resulting from the modernization of their economy by trying to reorder 
their lives in ways that stressed the need for stability, efficiency, and 
professional expertise.2 This was certainly the case in California. In both 
their private, nonlegislative actions and their public political activity 
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California businessmen labored to dampen competition, rationalize their 
business practices, and increase the efficiency of their operations. Finally, 
as they surmounted one crisis after another, they sought a professional 
identity for themselves and tried to gain acceptance as professional men 
from the general public. 
Private Actions 
Many California businessmen agreed with the assertion of one of their 
state1 s leading bankers that whatever could b e ' ' done by legislative activity 
can be more perfectly accomplished by association."3 As the various 
sectors of their state's and nation's economy became increasingly complex 
and interdependent, Golden State businessmen hastened to reorganize the 
companies and industries along new lines. When the problems they faced 
became regional and national rather than simply local in scope, busi­
nessmen sought ways out of their difficulties by reshaping the nature of 
their individual firms and by banding together to undertake joint collective 
action. 
The growing links between different regions within California and the 
connections between the state and the rest of the nation heightened compe­
tition among California businessmen and accentuated their vulnerability to 
market fluctuations. Those producing goods for statewide and national 
markets found it difficult to coordinate their actions and most urgently felt 
the need to.limit competition. Faced with repeated gluts in their eastern 
markets, fruit growers formed cooperative marketing associations to re­
duce competition and raise prices. Lumbermen and oil men had to deal 
with the same problems, and both tried to insulate themselves from market 
dislocations by restructuring their firms along the lines of vertical integra­
tion. State and regional trade associations also aided them in cutting back 
production, fixing prices, and opening new markets. Competition and 
insecurity plagued the state's service industries as well. The intense rate 
wars that disrupted the insurance business in the 1890s led insurance men 
to set up organizations designed to combat rate-cutting, rebating on 
policies, and fraudulent advertising. Bankers faced a somewhat different 
problem. The rapid expansion of California's banking system, combined 
with its tightening connections with eastern financial centers, made bank­
ers more susceptible to regional and national economic fluctuations. 
Bankers formed clearing houses and trade associations to aid them in 
reducing the chance of bank failures while at the same time providing credit 
and capital for California's growing industries. 
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Though helpful, none of these private efforts to lessen competition 
proved wholly successful; for at the same time that they wanted to stabilize 
their economic situation, businessmen were tempted to exploit the chaotic 
conditions to secure advantages over their competitors. Some fruit grow­
ers, desiring short-term rather than long-run profits, always remained 
outside of the ranks of the cooperative marketing and agricultural standar­
dization bodies and, thus, limited the effectiveness of the organizations. 
Nor did the organizations of oil men and lumbermen operate smoothly. 
Because some companies refused to join, the bodies never achieved com­
plete market control and most collapsed within a few years of their 
founding. In banking, investment banking, and insurance similar problems 
prevailed. Lacking the force of law, the trade associations that tried to 
organize these businesses could not compel adherence to their rules or 
guidelines; and, since some firms sought quick, speculative profits, none 
succeeded in eliminating instability or what they considered "unfair" 
competition. 
Californians were better able to rationalize their business practices to 
meet the needs of the state's changing economy. Fruit growers and lum­
bermen standardized and specialized their production methods. For bank­
ers, insurance men, and the like the movement took the form of a 
campaign for uniform business methods. All shared a growing concern for 
efficiency. Yet, as contests for the conservation of oil and timber demon­
strated, businessmen adopted improved techniques only when these tech­
niques promised to increase profits, and most businessmen were interested 
only in short-term gains. 
Agriculturalists carried specialization farthest among California busi­
nessmen, but the tendency manifested itself in all lines of work. Production 
for national markets led fruit growers to specialize their output by region, 
function, and market. The state horticultural commissioner repeatedly 
urged each section of California to "select its especially adapted fruit and 
follow that up as far as possible," and the growers heeded his advice.4 
Different areas concentrated upon the crops they could raise most profit­
ably: oranges in Southern California, grapes around Fresno, prunes in the 
Santa Clara Valley, and peaches, apricots, and cherries in various parts of 
the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys. Fruit growers further specialized 
their operations by raising separate varieties of the same fruit to be sold 
fresh, dried or canned. Grapes destined for sale as raisins differed from 
those prepared for table use, and fresh peaches were unlike those grown for 
canning. Fruit and vegetable growers even adjusted the yearly cycles of 
their crops to coincide with market demands. Orange growers, in coopera­
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tion with state officials, developed two species, the Valencia and the 
Washington Navel, which matured at different seasons, to assure the 
nation^ markets of a constant supply of the golden fruit. Lumbermen also 
felt the impact of market demands, and companies that had once produced 
only rough lumber expanded their offerings to include a wide variety of 
finished goods for different uses. In the financial world departmental 
banking became increasingly common, as bankers specialized their opera­
tions. Similarly, in the insurance and securities businesses the differences 
between the various types of agents and companies grew more pro­
nounced. 
The desire for predictability also led businessmen to regularize their 
business practices. Farmers and lumbermen, working through their trade 
associations, sought to establish standard grades for all products shipped 
out of state. City bankers set up clearing houses to speed transactions 
among themselves, and both city and country bankers tried to standardize 
their relations by setting up the California Bankers Association. Insurance 
men prepared uniform coinsurance and reinsurance clauses and, though 
never totally successful, attempted to work out standard rate risks for both 
the fire and life businesses. 
As part of their program to rationalize their operations, businessmen 
placed a high value upon efficiency, a concern tempered, however, by their 
desire for short-term profits. In one line of work after another more 
advanced methods of production and providing services replaced the less 
efficient. Yet, unless the improvements promised to boost short-run prof­
its, businessmen usually rejected them. New processes might be 
technologically more efficient than older ones, but, unless they were 
efficient in the economic sense as well, businessmen refused to institute 
them. The clash between economic and technologic efficiency was most 
apparent in the struggles over the conservation of petroleum and timber. In 
both cases businessmen wasted large quantities of California's natural 
resources by employing technologically inefficient methods of production. 
Yet, they made no improvements until convinced that innovations would 
pay handsome dividends. Only when water intrusion into their wells 
threatened their immediate profits did oil men form cooperative associa­
tions to shut it off; and timbermen supported scientific forestry only when 
increased prices during the First World War made it economically feasible 
to do so. 
As the pace of change accelerated in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, businessmen sought to define themselves as profes­
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sional men. Bankers and insurance men carried this movement farthest, but 
it extended to those in almost every type of activity. By 1910, even fruit 
growers were calling themselves professionals. Businessmen likened 
themselves to clergymen and doctors and, through trade associations and 
professional organizations, tried to establish codes of ethics and "fair" 
business practices. In addition, they set up their own schools or helped start 
courses at the University of California and Stanford University to provide 
the growing body of knowledge needed for professional educations. Fi­
nally, businessmen tried to alter their relationships with the rest of society. 
They stressed their integration with the larger community around them and 
increased their involvement in public affairs. Although their rhetoric often 
exceeded reality, especially in the sphere of community relations, busi­
nessmen did win partial acceptance as experts capable of solving society's 
problems within their fields of specialization. 
Business Legislation 
Addressing the Commonwealth Club in late 1905, William Sproule, a 
high-ranking Southern Pacific officer, asserted that "the less political 
administration becomes fastened upon business the better." What was 
needed, he believed, was "more business administration in our political 
life, not more politics in our business. "  5 Businessmen throughout Califor­
nia frequently expressed such sentiments. They particularly condemned 
what they viewed as the inefficiency of politics as a way to solve their 
difficulties and often tried to avoid politics, because they believed that 
politicians, lacking training in business specialties, could not properly 
understand the legitimate needs of businessmen. Some also feared that 
political contests would stimulate class hatred and accentuate divisions 
between clashing interest groups. Thus, Seth Mann, the San Franciscan 
who had been prominent in the drive for railroad regulation, decried the 
constant demand for new legislation and called instead for the return of 
public sentiment "such as existed in Old New England communities" so 
that "the laws will take care of themselves and you will have common 
honesty in truth."6 
Historians and social scientists have recently been reexamining corpo­
rate political involvement in modern American history. Much of their work 
has centered upon the question of whether American politics have been 
elitist or pluralistic in nature and, especially, the extent to which busi­
nessmen have controlled politics for their own ends.7 Historians, in par­
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ticular, have been reevaluating the roles businessmen played in politics 
during the Progressive Era. Their studies in this field have focused upon 
how businessmen sought to use politics in dealing with the manifold 
problems resulting from the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the 
nation.8 Although few of the findings are in complete agreement, many 
suggest that businessmen worked through politics to restrict competition 
and stabilize the general business environments. 
In California, despite avowed reservations, businessmen were among 
the leading participants in the legislative process. Most of them quickly 
discovered that they could only partially control the forces of economic 
change through individual efforts or the work of trade associations and 
were soon traveling to Sacramento, as they sought political solutions for 
business problems. Though often influential in state politics, businessmen 
rarely, however, obtained all their desires. In California, at least, politics 
were pluralistic, and most pieces of business legislation were compromises 
resulting from the complex interplay of different interest groups. State 
officials, organized bodies of consumers, and conflicting groups of busi­
nessmen usually shared power in the legislative contests, and the degree of 
success that businessmen attained depended on more than their own ef­
forts. Businessmen proved most effective when they were able to appeal 
beyond narrow group interests for the support of a broader public, some­
times through the use of symbolic issues. 
Quite often businessmen resorted to legislation designed to limit compe­
tition when their trade associations had proven incapable of doing so. Oil 
men, for instance, sought measures limiting the output of crude only when 
their own attempts to set production quotas had failed; and insurance men 
pressed for legislation prohibiting rebating, twisting, and the stealing of 
agents only after the rate war of the 1890s demonstrated the inability of 
their trade associations to dampen competition. In like fashion, bankers 
and investment bankers sought state aid in stabilizing their industries, 
when their business organizations proved only partially successful. The 
rationalization of their industries was also of vital concern for busi­
nessmen, and in this realm, too, they turned to Sacramento for assistance. 
Fruit growers required legislation to give the agricultural standardization 
movement teeth, and the scientific forestry campaign that became, in its 
later stages at least, a drive to rationalize the lumber industry depended 
heavily upon state legislation. The attempts of businessmen to rationalize 
their businesses with state aid reached a climax in the tax-reform move­
ment, in which public service corporation executives proved willing to 
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trade an increase in their taxes for greater uniformity and regularity in the 
collection of them. 
At times businessmen proved quite effective in politics. They were 
particularly successful when they could focus their attention upon specific 
issues directly affecting single industries or businesses. Upon occasion 
business groups were the only organized bodies on the scene, and, in the 
absence of opposition, legislators accepted businessmen's recom­
mendations on business subjects. When businessmen could convince legis­
lators that as professional men they were best capable of dealing with topics 
within their spheres of expertise, they could sometimes obtain their goals 
unimpeded by other groups. Thus, bankers drafted the Bank Act of 1909, 
and insurance men played major roles in drafting much of the legislation 
for state regulation of their industry. 
Businessmen also often achieved success when able to enlist backing 
from beyond the business world; indeed, the support of groups outside the 
business community often proved essential for the passage of business 
legislation in Sacramento. Although many public service corporation 
executives favored tax reform as a way to rationalize their businesses, it is 
unlikely that the tax reform measures would have won approval without the 
backing of state officials seeking additional tax revenue and the support of 
fanners trying to shift California's tax load onto big business. The blue-sky 
law was passed not simply because investment bankers and stock brokers 
were hoping to stabilize their businesses, but also because progressive 
politicians wanted to protect small investors from fraud. The support of 
state officials, who were anxious to build up their bureaucratic empires, 
was frequently of special importance. The state forester and the larger 
lumber companies worked hand-in-hand to strengthen California's scien­
tific forestry laws after 1915, and the labors of state mining officials were 
of great help to oil men trying to stem the flow of water in their oil fields. 
By the same token, Harris Weinstock, the state market director, greatly 
aided agriculturalists in their legislative contests in Sacramento. 
Although definitely influential in the legislative arena, businessmen 
often faced opposition to their measures and usually had to accept compro­
mises. Groups outside of the business world could seriously hinder or alter 
the political plans of businessmen. One of the characteristics of politics in 
California between 1890 and 1920 was the entrance of organized bodies of 
consumers into the legislative process. As was happening in Wisconsin and 
other parts of the nation in the same time period, consumers were forming 
their own groups to lobby in the state capital.9 The conflict between con­
168 The Politics of Business in California, 1890-1920 
sumer and business organizations was most apparent in the struggles sur­
rounding the roles and power of the state market director. In these contests 
the businessmen-farmers emerged triumphant over the consumer bodies, 
but the opposition of the consumer groups prevented the agriculturalists 
from winning legislative sanction for all of their goals in Sacramento. 
Similar fights centered upon other pieces of business legislation. The 
pressure of organized groups of policyholders led to the passage of stan­
dard insurance policy legislation against the wishes of most insurance men, 
and consumers played significant roles in some of the oil and forestry 
legislation as well. 
Divisions within business ranks still further eroded the power of busi­
nessmen to shape the course and nature of legislation. The goals of 
California's many business interests often collided, and the resulting 
conflicts could sometimes be resolved only by legislative action. There 
was no single, monolithic business community in California; rather, 
California possessed a wide variety of different, and often warring, busi­
ness groups. 
Business conflict took place between different industries. A major 
source of dissension was the struggle between those businessmen who 
wanted to stabilize the economic situation in California and those for whom 
rapid economic growth, even at the expense of stability, was the major 
goal. The tension between economic stability and economic expansion was 
most apparent in the debates on banking legislation, but it was evident in 
the consideration of other business measures as well. Contests over the 
blue-sky law, bills regulating the investments of insurance companies, and 
the tax-reform proposals revealed differing opinions among California 
businessmen on this subject. Many other issues also found businessmen 
from different industries on opposite sides of the fence in Sacramento. For 
a long time agriculturalists and lumbermen fought each other on timber 
conservation measures, and railroad officials opposed the efforts of other 
business interests to increase the power of the state government over their 
industry, at least until 1911. 
Splits within industries also made business cooperation on legislative 
matters difficult. Cleavages opened on many lines, and only when busi­
nessmen healed these divisions were they effective in the state capital. 
Because of the different demands of their businesses the redwood and pine 
lumbermen found it hard to work in harmony on fire protection and 
reforestation measures. Not until the First World War united them did the 
lumbermen present a common front in Sacramento. Oil producers and 
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refiners faced different problems and could only rarely agree upon legisla­
tion affecting their industry. Partly because of this situation, some of the 
initiative on oil-conservation and pipeline-control measures slipped from 
their hands into the hands of state officials. City and country bankers often 
clashed on key issues, and, as a result, banking legislation was usually 
some sort of compromise measure that failed to fully satisfy either group. 
Divisions were still more numerous within the insurance industry, with 
many different interests battling each other in the legislative arena. 
Business participation in politics extended beyond the legislative bat­
tles, for businessmen tried to influence the policies of the state regulatory 
commissions set up to supervise their activities. Governor Hiram Johnson 
explained to another leading Progressive, Meyer Lissner, that it was "the 
desire of every business in the State to have state regulation for their 
profit."10 As Johnson's statement suggests, businessmen in California 
would have liked to turn state regulation of their enterprises to their 
advantage. 
Yet, in only a few cases did businessmen capture control of the commis­
sions set up to supervise their activities, at least during the Progressive Era. 
Mutual life and stock fire insurance companies appear to have established 
hegemony over the state insurance commission and to have worked with 
the insurance commissioners to thwart the ambitions of their rivals. Many 
insurance commissioners, in turn, seem to have used their official position 
as a steppingstone for later employment with the insurance companies. 
Though not to the same extent, investment bankers exercised considerable 
power over the corporation commissioner who administered the blue-sky 
law, and bankers worked closely with the state superintendent of banks. 
Conflicts between the regulatory commissions and the businesses they 
supervised were, however, at least as numerous. The state forester, for 
instance, frequently found himself at odds with California s lumbermen 
particularly before the First World War. Moreover, the divisions between 
industries apparent in the struggles over legislation often reappeared in the 
form of contention before the commissions. The same interest groups that 
had fought over the establishment of a new railroad commission in 1911 
continued to battle each other in later hearings before the commission, and 
these struggles helped insure that no single business interest would gain 
hegemony over the commission. 
Nor should instances of cooperation between businessmen and regula­
tory agencies be accepted by themselves as proof that businessmen had 
taken over the commissions for their own ends. State officials could work 
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with businessmen without betraying their public trust, for the goals of 
businessmen and the consuming public were not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. When the state superintendent of banks moved to end bank 
failures, he was both helping bankers stabilize their industry and protecting 
depositors from a loss of their savings. The efforts of the railroad commis­
sion to reduce competition between public service corporations was de­
signed to aid both the utilities and the consuming public. As the railroad 
commissioners pointed out, rate wars often actually hurt the consumer, for 
at their conclusion the victorious company, now alone in the field, often 
boosted rates above previous levels. 
State legislation was, then, an important means by which businessmen 
tried to resolve their difficulties, and the course of events in California 
indicates that there was a basic continuity in the approach of businessmen 
to public politics between the mid-1880s and the mid-1920s. As economic 
change continued throughout this period, so did the political responses of 
businessmen to it. In particular, the Progressive Era as a distinct epoch 
spanning the years between 1910 (when Hiram Johnson won election as 
governor) and 1915 or 1917 held little meaning for Californians, at least 
with regard to business legislation. 
Most of the campaigns for business legislation were of long standing, 
and many of the most important measures won approval either before or 
after the progressive years in the Golden State. California's fundamental 
bank law, for example, was enacted in 1909, well before Progressives won 
control of the statehouse, and the most significant scientific forestry 
proposals became law only after the First World War, when progressivism 
was rapidly fading as a potent political force. Nor did the Progressive Era 
mark a sharp break or turning point in the types of business legislation 
considered or approved. Banking and insurance acts, passed before this 
time, were further extended and modified during it. Even the campaigns 
for railroad regulation and the blue-sky law, which were tagged as pro­
gressive reforms by Governor Johnson, were less creatures of the state's 
progressive movement than culminations of lengthy drives by interested 
business groups. 
By the same token, few of the contests surrounding business legislation 
were fought out along strict party lines. Divisions usually opened on other 
lines instead. The campaign for the creation of a state market director was 
of utmost importance for both fruit growers and consumers but never 
became a bone of contention between the different political parties. Rather, 
battles on this subject exposed geographic divisions, with politicians from 
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farm areas supporting the desires of agriculturalists and those from urban 
regions the requests of consumer bodies. Similarly, urban-rural distinc­
tions proved more significant than party divisions on issues connected with 
state regulation of banking and forest resources. Only infrequently, as in 
the case of railroad regulation, did a piece of business legislation receive 
the progressive label; more often business measures were considered with 
little debate as to whether they were "progressive" or "reactionary" or 
whether they were inspired by Republicans or Democrats. 
The California experience demonstrates that, like their counterparts 
throughout the nation, Golden State businessmen reacted to alterations in 
their business environment with a broad spectrum of private and public 
actions. By restructuring their individual firms, organizing their industries 
through trade associations, and entering the legislative arena, businessmen 
tried to control the modernization of their state's economy. They per­
ceived, if usually only imperfectly, that the growing complexity of their 
economic situation required changes in their business methods. Yet, how­
ever much they sought to order events, California businessmen achieved 
only partial success. They failed to grasp the full meaning of the changes 
occurring around them and so were never totally effective in dealing with 
them. Then, too, divisions within business ranks and the frequent interces­
sion of nonbusiness groups further limited the mastery businessmen 
sought. The result, in most cases, was compromise, for only rarely did 
California businessmen realize all their desires. 
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TABLE 1 
CALIFORNIA OIL PRODUCTION BY FIELD, 1900-1914 
(Thousands of barrels) 
Field 1900 
Ventura Co. and Newhall . . 443 476 652 968 
Los Angeles and Salt Lake . 1,722 2,226 3,729 2,504 
Coalinga 547 8,882 18,646 15,925 
Whittier Fullerton 254 2,118 6,281 14,130 
McKittrick 80 1,373 5,471 3,820 
Kern River 826 15,253 14,776 7,030 
Sunset 12 419 9,218 12,546 
Midway . .  . 18 11,174 37,479 
Santa Maria . .  . 3,402 7,607 4,303 
Total* 4,319 34,298 77,697 103,623 
SOURCE: F T C , Pacific Coast Petroleum, 1:227-29. 
'Minor fields not specified in this table are included in this total. 
TABLE 2 
PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND STOCKS OF OIL IN CALIFORNIA, 1910-1920 
(Thousands of barrels) 
Price 18°B. Price 24°B. Production Consumption oil at wella oil at well" 
1910 77,697 66,543 $0.50 $0.65 
1911 83,744 72,933 0.30 0.45 
1912 90,074 86,075 0.30 0.48 
1913 97,867 95,658 0.30 0.55 
1914 103,623 92,967 0.39 0.55 
1915 89,566 90,946 0.38 0.40 
1916 91,822 104,933 0.48 0.55 
1917 97,267 108,853 0.73 0.80 
1918 101,637 102,045 0.98 1.05 
1919 101,221 102,784 1.23 1.30 
1920 105,721 113,961 1.27 1.55 
SOURCE: F. T. C  , Pacific Coast Petroleum, 1:68; 2:32. 
aEnd of first quarter of the year. 
TABLE 3 
COST OF PRODUCTION AND PRICE PER BARREL OF OIL PRODUCED, 1914-1918 
COST OF PRODI CTION PRICE PER BARREt 
YEAR Over 
1.000,000 
250,000­
1,000.000 
50,000­
250,000 
Under 
50,000 Under 18°B. 24°B. 
1914 $0.25 $0.29 $0.49 $0.72 $0.39 $0.48 
1915 .28 .27 .43 .98 .36 .41 
1916 30 33 53 .96 .60 .67 
1917 .34 .38 .62 1.09 .87 .94 
1918 .38 .47 .69 1.19 1.15 1.22 
SOURCE: F. T. C  . Pacific Coast Petrole urn. 1:134. 
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TABLE 4 
CALIFORNIA LUMBER PRODUCTION AND PRICES 
REDWOOD WHITE PINEC SUGAR PINE TOTAL 
YEAR CALIFORNIA 
Production" Price" Production" Price" Production" Price" PRODUCTION 
1899 . . 360,167 $10.12 285,306 $10.87 52,108 n.a. 737,035 
1904 . . 519,267 12.83 388,623 12.75 n.a. n.a. 1,077,499 
1905 
1906 . . 
411,689 
659,678 
n.a. 
16.64 
363,932
347,249 
n.a. 
13.90 
120,002
130,231 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,061,608
1,348,599 
1907 .  . 569,450 17.70 405,610 18.30 108,747 n.a. 1,345,943 
1908 
1909 . . 
404,802 
521,630 
15.66 
14.80 
318,406 
364,748 
16.17 
18.51 
92,500
88,822 
n.a. 
n.a. 
996,115
1,143,507 
1910 . . 543,493 15.52 399,067 15.04 101,561 n.a. 1,254,826 
1911 . . 489,768 13.99 390,173 14.40 115,470 n.a. 1,207,561 
1912 . . 496,796 14.13 365,169 13.85 128,376 n.a. 1,203,059 
1913 . . 510,271 n.a. 317,053 n.a. 147,023 n.a. 1,183,380 
1914. . 
1915 . . 
1916 . . 
535,199 
418,824 
490,828 
n.a. 
13.54 
13.93 
409,953 
389,991d 
494,973d 
n.a. 
14.89 
15.40 
132,368 
114,494" 
165,461" 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,303,183 
1,119,458" 
1,413,541" 
1917 . . 487,458 21.00 478,565" 22.50 127,951" n.a. 1,417,068" 
1918 . . 443,231 24.30 357,351" 21.28 108,423" n.a. 1,277,084" 
1919 . . 410,442 30.04 444,150 30.38 129,155 n.a. 1,259,363 
1920 476,003 46.90 509,471" 37.50 141,134" n.a. 1,482,102" 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, American Forests and Forest Products, Statistical Bulletin 21 (Washington, 1921), pp. 
130-31,221-22,260-61. 
"Thousands of board feet. 
bPer thousand board feet at the mill. 
cAlso called ponderosa or western yellow pine. 
includes Nevada. 
TABLE 5 
CALIFORNIA BANKS 
Y e a  r *<** 
Savings 
State 
Commercial National 
1890 37 126 35 27 
1894 60 166 35 17 
1900 53 178 37 19 
1906 122 302 108 33 
SOURCE: C.B.C , Annual Report, 1890-1906. 
TABLE 6 
CALIFORNIA BANK ASSETS 
Year San Francisco Savings 
Other 
Savings 
San Francisco 
Commercial 
Other 
Commercial 
1895 $113,657,468 $31,333,260 $74,256,132 $56,258,492 
1900 . . . 130,829,016 43,043,483 75,121,516 71,371,256 
1905 . . . 171,010,363 95,197,846 124,864,921 113,870,387 
SOURCE: C.B.C, Annual Report, 1890-1906. 
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TABLE 7

FIRE INSURANCE—CALIFORNIA BUSINESS

Year and Companies Number Premiums Amount Written 
1885: 
California .  . 10 $1,355,798 $ 86,398,727 
Out of state 59 1,773,404 98,475,104 
Foreign . . .  . 38 2,056,569 123,647,668 
1890: 
California .  . 11 1,480,763 86,206,605 
Out of state 74 2,259,521 128,538,528 
Foreign . . .  . 37 2,563,038 153,866,232 
1895: 
California . . 2 397,479 31,514,873 
Out of state 37 1,740,504 135,405,607 
Foreign . . .  . 33 2,566,600 191,818,679 
1900: 
California . . 2 435,024 27,013,192 
Out of state 58 2,397,897 155,967,277 
Foreign . . .  . 37 2,962,585 206,197,099 
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California . . 3 945,197 46,570,746 
Out of state 72 5,524,046 368,425,355 
Foreign . . .  . 31 3,884,564 260,691,211 
1910: 
California .  . 3 895,685 49,668,856 
Out of state 86 9,892,221 970,984,948 
Foreign . . .  . 23 5,112,617 314,574,194 
SOURCE: C.I.C., Report. 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910.

TABLE 8

LIFE INSURANCE—CALIFORNIA BUSINESS

Year and Companies Number Premiums Amount Written 
1885: 
California . . 1 $ 224,469 $ 5,238,446 
All other . . . 19 1,365,874 41,484,162 
1895: 
California . . 1 337,646 7,528,737 
All other . .  . 22 21,456,586 106,222,353 
1904: 
California . . 
All other .. . 
1 
33 
689,453 
9,549,725 
15,775,912 
258,928,374 
1910: 
California .. 7 2,036,450 51,952,904 
All other . .  . 36 12,749,970 353,547,336 
SOURCE. C.I.C., Report, 1885, 1895. 1910; Coast Review 67 (March, 1905):l 19. 
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I Continued from front flap) 
the national level, it is of enormous value 
and compelling interest to gain some better 
understanding of the ways in which Americans 
lived and thought in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in light of what 
historians are now calling "organizational syn­
thesis' — the term that designates the phenom­
enon that identifies the responses of California 
businessmen in particular, and Americans in 
general, to the radical dislocations that resulted 
from modernization of the economy and to 
the forces that were permanently transforming 
both the structure and the quality of life 
within and throughout the nation and state. 
Mansel G. Blackford is an assistant professor 
of history at the Ohio State University. 
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